was aware that Respondent No.2 was a married man. Even assuming that the petitioner believed the promises and assurances of Respondent No.2, if any such promises were ever made, there is no evidence that Respondent No.2 had no intention of keeping the promise that he made almost a decade back. As observed in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2019 SCC 4010 , to vitiate the consent of a woman, it is necessary that the promise to marry was false and given in bad faith with no intention of following through. The Court underscored the difference between breach of promise to marry and non-fulfillment of a false promise that was given with the understanding that it will be broken. Further, the subject FIR was quashed by the Hon’ble Apex Court after observing that the failure of the appellant therein to fulfill a promise in the year 2016 that he had made in the year 2008 could not be construed to mean that the promise itself was false. 32. As discussed above, the learned Trial Court has evidently applied its judicial mind and considered the totality of the facts before discharging Respondent No.2 of the alleged offences in light of the absence of grave suspicion against Respondent No.2. 33. Considering the aforementioned facts, no ground is made out to warrant any interference in the impugned order. 34. The present petition, along with the pending applications, are dismissed in the aforesaid terms.