Lastly, it is submitted that a prima facie reading of the averments made in the FIR would itself show that the ingredients of Section 75 JJ Act are not met against the present petitioner. It is contended that to fall within the ambit of Section of the 75 JJ Act, the child must have been subjected to assault, abuse, or exposure by an individual who had actual charge and control over the child. However, the petitioner, being the owner of the maid agency business, merely facilitated the process of her getting employed after duly verifying her age from age-proof documents provided by her. Moreover, there are no specific allegations in the FIR qua the petitioner, nor any evidence on record to suggest any physical harm or abuse inflicted upon the victim, causing her any mental or physical suffering. Accordingly, relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal reported as 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , it is submitted that the present case is fit for quashing of the FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom.