occurred during a routine sortie. The learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submits that therefore, even otherwise the petitioners were entitled to the insurance cover as is applicable to other pilots flying elsewhere in the country for the respondent no. 1. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent no.1 reiterates that the second insurance policy taken by the respondent no.1 from the respondent no.3 was not in the form of an „additional‟ coverage but only because the original policy/the first policy taken by the respondent no.1 would not have covered the pilots who were deployed in Anti-Naxal Operations of the BSF and in a high-risk Naxal-Infested Areas. He submits that such additional coverage was obtained by the respondent no.1 only in the year 2012, however, such policy cannot have a retrospective effect. He further submits that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as no representation of any additional coverage was ever extended by the respondent no.1 to the petitioners or to their husbands. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation & Anr., (1993) 3 SCC 499, he submits that a pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation and create a right.
