‘AICTE’) is mandatory. He has referred to various provisions of the AICTE Act, 1987 and has relied on the principles laid down in the case of Hindustan Aviation Academy (supra) . While taking this court through the mandate of the JCC, learned counsel submits that the JCC cannot stretch its scope beyond what is envisaged in the MoC itself. He has extensively read over the scope of JCC under MoC to indicate that the JCC was envisaged to assist and provide the suggestion/mechanism to complete the course of 2010-2011 students. He, therefore, submits that when there were repeated requests by the petitioners to confer the degree and to issue a consolidated marksheet, the IGNOU constituted a committee to examine the veracity of the aforesaid complaint. 25. He, therefore, submits that a detailed inquiry was conducted by the committee which notes that the first intake of the students under the MoC was from July/August, 2010. He, therefore, justifies the impugned decision by stating that the JCC acted beyond the mandate conferred by MoC dated 08.06.2010 and the subsequent MoU dated 14.10.2011. He, therefore, submits that if certain steps such as deposition of fees, issuance of registration certificate etc., are taken by the petitioners and IGNOU, the same would not confer any right in the teeth of statutory provisions of the Act. According to him, since the migration of 2009 batch is not envisaged under the MoU, there is no question of JCC allowing the petitioners to deposit or transfer the fees or for the IGNOU authorities to issue the registration certificate etc. 26. Learned counsel has submitted that the petitioners themselves understood the factual position in the right perspective and therefore, in terms of the letter dated 25.05.2011, it was stated that the
