194. The answers to these, in the opinion of this Court, are that the definition ipso facto does not spell out whether certain kinds of income can be excluded. However, the reference to specific provisions enabling or mandating collection of certain rates, tariffs or costs would have to be examined. Generically, going by statutory models in enactments (under which corporations boards or trust or authority by whatsoever name, are set up), the mere fact that these bodies have to charge amounts towards supplying goods or articles, or rendering services i.e. for fees for providing typical essential services like providing water, distribution of foodgrains, distribution of medicines, maintenance of roads, parks, etc. ought not to be characterised as ― commercial receipts ‖. The rationale for such exclusion would be that if such rates, fees, tariffs, etc. determined by statutes and collected for essential services, are included in the overall income as receipts as part of trade, commerce or business, the quantitative limit of 20% imposed by the second proviso to Section 2(15) would be attracted thereby negating the essential general public utility object and thus driving up the costs to be borne by the ultimate user or consumer which is the general public. By way of illustration, if a corporation supplies essential foodgrains at cost, or a marginal markup, another supplies essential medicines, and a third, water, the characterisation of these, as activities in the nature of business, would be self-defeating, because the overall receipts in some given cases may exceed the quantitative limit resulting in taxation and the consequent higher consideration charged from the user or consumer.
