became due and payable, was not accepted by the Court for the reason that it cannot be said to be just, fair or equitable because in a case where the rate of exchange has gone against the plaintiff, the defendant escapes by paying a lesser sum than what he was bound to and thus is the gainer by his default while in the converse case where the rate of exchange has gone against the defendant, the defendant would be subject to a much greater burden than what he should bear. The Court felt that the same criticism would apply to the second of the dates, namely, the date of the commencement of the action or suit because suits are not often disposed of for an unconscionably long time and if we take into account the time that would be spent in appeals, further appeals, and revision and review applications which may be filed, the longevity of the litigation is doubled, if not tripled, so that none can with any certainty predict even a probable date for its termination. As regards the third date, namely, the date of the decree, the Court observed that a decree crystallizes the amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff and it is the decree which entitles the judgment-creditor to recover the judgment debt through the processes of law. Dealing with the objection that the date of the decree of the trial court is not final decree for there may be appeals or other proceedings against it in superior courts and by the time the matter is finally determined, the rate of exchange prevailing on that date may be nowhere near that which prevailed at the date of the decree of the trial court, it was observed that this difficulty is easily overcome by selecting the date when the action is finally disposed of, in the sense that the decree becomes final and binding between the parties after all remedies against it are exhausted. As regards the fourth date, i.e., the date when the court orders execution to issue, it was felt that execution of a decree is not a simple matter because it involves execution of
