designedly refers only to large-size billboards falling in Category-I, and not to all types of advertising devices falling under the said category. When the policy itself does not impose any such condition on the exhibition of buildings wraps, it is unfathomable how even such a condition could have been a factor considered by the Respondent while granting permission to the Petitioners to display a building wrap on the Commercial Property, or consequently a ground for cancelling such permission. In the light of the aforesaid specific clause of the policy, I am unable to persuade myself to accept Mr. Peechara’s contention that the permission letter dated 21.05.2015 was granted to the Petitioners on the basis of their representation dated 20.03.2015, wherein they stated their intention to use the proceeds from the advertisement to further the charitable activities of their institution “Hindi Gyan Vigyan Kendra”. 37. At this stage, it may also be important to note that no objection to the Petitioners’ social and charitable activities (or rather absence thereof) was taken by the Respondents in the First and Second Show Cause Notices, which itself appears to be attributable to the lack of any such precondition in the policy for the grant of permission to exhibit a wall wrap. It is only in the final show cause notice that the aforesaid ground was taken for the first time, a perusal of which Notice reveals that the condition had been imposed vide some recent speaking orders passed by the Respondent in relation to the case of 'Greenline', and had no basis in the statutory policy. There appears to be no reason to conclude that, as per DOAP 2008, the Petitioners were legally obligated to carry out
