Before the Tribunal, the respondent contended, in her Statement of Claim, that she had been working on the post of typist, in the office of the petitioner, w.e.f. 23rd January, 1984. She contended that her absence from duty, from 10th October, 1989 to 4th November, 1989, was attributable to her illness, regarding which she sent medical certificates, from time to time, to the petitioner. The respondent submitted that she had been engaged, by the petitioner, as a Class III employee, and that, throughout her tenure with the petitioner, she was made to work as a typist. She also drew attention, in her Statement of Claim, to the fact that, in each year from 1984 to 1989, she had completed more than 240 days of work. Per contra , the petitioner, in its written statement filed before the Tribunal, submitted that the respondent had never been appointed as a typist, and that there was, in fact, no vacant post of typist in its establishment . It was emphasised that the respondent was only a casual worker, and that, therefore, there was no question of granting any leave to her. Casual workers, it was submitted, were paid according to the days during which they had worked, but the respondent had become a habitual absentee, leaving the petitioner no option but to terminate her services. A preliminary objection, to the effect that the petitioner was not an “industry”, within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the ID Act”) was also advanced, by the petitioner, before the Tribunal; however, the said objection was rejected, by the Tribunal
