Allowed

Veer Singh & Anr. v. State & Anr.

Delhi HC17 Apr 2017W.P.(CRL)/237/2017

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The single-judge court allowed a writ petition seeking quashing of an FIR under Sections 498A and 406 IPC. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court quashed the proceedings due to a comprehensive settlement between the matrimonial parties, observing that continuation would serve no useful purpose.

What did the court decide?

FIR No.672/2015 and all emanating proceedings were set aside; the writ petition was allowed.

Veer Singh & Anr. Vs State & Anr. — Matrimonial and Divorce | Delhi HC (2017)

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$~12

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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- W.P.(CRL) 237/2017

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VEER SINGH & ANR ..... Petitioners Through: Mr. Jatin Kumar, Adv. along with the petitioners in person versus STATE & ANR ..... Respondents Through: Mr. R.S. Kundu, ASC with Mr. Rakesh Kumar for the State Mr. Subhash Chander, Adv. for R-2 SI Vineeta Prasad, P.S. Subhash Place

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CORAM:

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR O R D E R % 17.04.2017

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The petitioners, who are nine in number, have sought quashing of the FIR bearing No.672/2015 dated 11.08.2015 (P.S. Subhash Place) instituted for offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC on the strength of a settlement having been arrived at between the parties.

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Petitioner No.1 is the husband of respondent No.2 whereas petitioner nos.2 to 9 are related to petitioner no.1.

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Petitioner no.1 was married to respondent no.2 on 03.05.2014 in accordance with Hindu religious rites but the marriage could not subsist and the husband and wife started living separately. This marital discord led to filing of several cases in different forums. Since the protracted litigation which necessarily would have followed such fall out between the husband and the wife, the parties decided and sat across the table to settle their

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disputes. The settlement, curiously named as “divorce deed” was brought about, wherein the petitioners were required to pay Rs.2 lacs on the date of signing of the settlement and filing of the First Motion under Section 13(B) (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act whereas Rs.50,000/- had to be paid on withdrawal of domestic violence complaints pending before the concerned court. An amount of Rs.50,000/- was required to be paid at the time of withdrawal of the maintenance case lodged by respondent no.2.

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Rs.5 lac was required to be deposited during the recording of settlement in the second motion before the Family Court and the balance amount of Rs.1 lac had to be deposited at the time of quashing of the FIR No.672/2015 (P.S. Subhash Place).

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Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in total, an amount of Rs.11 lac had to be given to respondent no.2 under the settlement, keeping in mind the future career and life of respondent no.2.

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Learned counsel appearing for the parties jointly stated that Rs.8 lac has already been paid by the petitioners. Out of the aforesaid Rs.8 lac, Rs.3 lac have been paid at different stages, as delineated in the settlement agreement and an amount of Rs.5 lac, which had to be given at the stage of second motion, has been deposited with the Registrar General, under the orders of this court and which amount has been invested in an FDR, initially for a period of one year. The petitioners, today are ready with a draft of Rs.3 lac for giving it to respondent no.2.

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Considering that all the disputes have been settled between the parties and that the petitioners and the respondent state that they shall remain bound by the settlement, this court deems it appropriate to terminate and discontinue any further proceedings pursuant to FIR bearing No.672/2015

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(P.S. Subhash Place) as no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the investigation of the FIR.

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In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the Supreme Court has held that cases which are not compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. could also be quashed, when continuation of any criminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility and where justice demands that the dispute between the parties should be put to an end and peace is restored. But ending of such criminal proceedings could only be ordered for securing the ends of justice.

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The Supreme Court has further observed in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another (Supra):

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“58............................ No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all

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disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.” [ Refer to B.S. Joshi, (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma, (2008) 16 SCC 1 .]

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In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466 . The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

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29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

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29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (iii) ends of justice, or

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(iv) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

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While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

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29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

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29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

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29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

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29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the

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nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the

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appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

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In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58 , wherein the Supreme Court in respect of the matrimonial disputes has specifically held as follows:-

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“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

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16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. They institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that

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the proceedings ought to be quashed….”

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The petitioners and respondent no.2 are present along with their counsel. Respondent no.2 has no objection to the quashing of the FIR pursuant to the agreement entered into between the parties. The draft of Rs.3 lacs bearing No.412572 has been handed over to respondent no.2 in the presence of her counsel in court. It is made clear that on the date of second motion, respondent no.2 shall cooperate and get her statement recorded for divorce by mutual consent. The Registrar General of this court, on respondent no.2 approaching him within a period of two weeks from today would have the FDR of Rs.5 lac withdrawn and have the money re-issued in the name of respondent no.2, including the interest which has accrued on such amount.

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For the reasons afore-recorded, the FIR No.672/2015 (P.S. Subhash Place) and all the emanating proceedings therefrom are set aside.

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The writ petition is allowed.

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ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J

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APRIL 17, 2017 ns

Veer Singh & Anr. v. State & Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Veer Singh & Anr. v. State & Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

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