would be acting within his right in doing so. Conditions of service, for this purpose, would include promotion and seniority. An employee cannot claim a vested right or static applicability of the conditions of service which were in existence when he had joined the service. The power to amend or change the conditions of service is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the amendment or change cannot offend Articles 14 and 16 and the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or be arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise objectionable on account of being contrary to any applicable statute. In the present case, the respondents have not questioned the amendment of the bye-laws or contended that the same are arbitrary or invalid. The impugned judgment also does not record any finding to this effect. The contention of the respondents, which has been accepted by the impugned judgment, is that the appellant No.2 Council could not have changed the rules or conditions of service to the perceived detriment of the respondents after they had joined and were appointed in the service of the appellant No.2 Council. This precept which is a foundation of the impugned judgment is unacceptable and contrary to law. The new bye-laws have to be assessed and analysed on merits, and not on the basis of the old rule position. 14. We now turn to the first issue. An amendment to the service conditions normally operates prospectively, unless it is made retrospective by express provision or necessary intendment. Retrospectivity is not to be inferred by way of surmises and conjectures. Retrospective amendment taking away the benefits already acquired under the old service conditions can be challenged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as being arbitrary and unconstitutional. Lastly, an employee cannot claim a vested right to promotion. He has a right to be considered for promotion. When a chance of promotion is affected, it does not mean denial of consideration,
