Smt. Priyanka Gaikwad Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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CGHC010265462026 2026:CGHC:30171

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPS No. 5387 of 2026

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Smt. Priyanka Gaikwad S/o Shri Vijay Gaikwad, Aged About 39 Years Post - Assistant Grade- I I (A. G. -I I), Resident of Piyush Colony, Amlidih, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioner

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versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Public Food Distribution and Consumer Protection, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Director, Department of Pubic Food Distribution and Consumer Protection, Block - 2, 3rd Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, New Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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3 - Joint Director, Department of Pubic Food Distribution and Consumer Protection, Block - 2, 3rd Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, New Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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4 - Commissioner, Department of Pubic Food Distribution and Consumer Protection, Block - 2, 3rd Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, New Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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5 - Alok Kumar Ogre, S/o Parmeshwar Ogre, Aged About 40 Years Resident of Village Nayakbandha, Post- Abhanpur, Tahsil - Abhanpur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH ASHUTOSH MISHRA MISHRA Date: 2026.07.16 17:40:20 +0530

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6 - Purushotam Kumar Dewan, S/o Prem Singh Diwan, Aged About 38 Years Resident Of C/o Gend Singh Dewan, Shriram Chowk, Near Satbahaniya Tempel, Tikrapara, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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7 - Santandev Jogi, S/o Sukhchand Jogi, Aged About 37 Years Resident of Village - Diggi, Post- Sikari Kesli, Tahsil - Simga District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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8 - Nilesh Kumar Yadav, S/o Bisahu Ram Yadav, Aged About 41 Years Resident Of Village And Post - Bavankera, Tehsil And District - Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

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9 - Madhukar Agarkar, S/o Baburav Agarkar, Aged About 36 Years Resident of Quarter No. H - 7, Thakur Pyarelal Pandit And Rural Development Instution - Nimora, Post - Mana Basti, Tahsil -Abhanpur, District -Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 10 - Vikash Kumar Patkar, S/o Tukaram Patkar, Aged About 41 Years Resident of Village And Post - Borsi, Tahsil - Rajim, District - Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondents

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For Petitioner	:	Mr. Ravi Bhagat, Advocate
For State/Respondent	:	Ms. Poorva Tiwari, PL

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(Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru)

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Order on Board

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16/07/2026

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The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner questioning the legality and validity of the orders dated 05.02.2015 and 29.07.2016 whereby the respondents extended the petitioner’s probation period beyond the prescribed period of two years.

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(a) The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Grade-III pursuant to a regular process of direct recruitment against a sanctioned vacant post vide order dated 20.12.2011 and joined service on 27.12.2011. Under the terms of appointment, she was required to undergo a probation period of two years, which was extendable by a specific order. Upon completion of the initial probation period, the

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respondent authorities, in a meeting held on 05.01.2015, decided to extend the petitioner's probation for one year, and accordingly an order dated 05.02.2015 was issued. The petitioner questioned the said action by submitting a representation dated 29.02.2016. Thereafter, the respondent authorities again extended the petitioner's probation for a further period of one year vide order dated 29.07.2016, against which the petitioner submitted another representation dated 01.08.2016. Since no action was taken on the said representations, reminders dated 23.09.2017 and 05.12.2017 were also submitted. Subsequently, the respondents issued an order dated 27.12.2017 bringing the petitioner's probation period to an end. As no regular sanctioned post was available on that date, the order recorded that regularization would be granted as and when a regular post became available.

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(b) The grievance raised in the present writ petition is that the extension of probation vide orders dated 05.02.2015 and 29.07.2016 was arbitrary and illegal and, on account of delayed confirmation and regularization, the petitioner suffered loss of seniority, promotional prospects and other consequential service benefits. Accordingly, the petitioner has sought quashment of the aforesaid orders and consequential service benefits.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed through a regular process of recruitment against a sanctioned post and successfully completed the prescribed probation period with satisfactory service. He would next submit that there was neither any adverse entry nor any disciplinary proceeding nor any material

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indicating unsatisfactory performance warranting extension of probation. He would next submit that despite completion of the prescribed probation period in the year 2013, the respondents arbitrarily extended the probation by orders dated 05.02.2015 and 29.07.2016 without assigning any reasons or recording any objective satisfaction regarding the petitioner's performance. He would next submit that similarly situated employees were confirmed immediately after completion of probation whereas the petitioner alone was subjected to repeated extensions, thereby violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that the respondents themselves ultimately ended the probation period by order dated 27.12.2017, regularized the petitioner on 05.01.2018, granted annual increment and thereafter promoted her as Assistant Grade-II, which clearly establishes that the petitioner had satisfactorily completed probation and that the earlier extensions were wholly arbitrary. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned orders be quashed and the petitioner be granted all consequential service benefits.

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Per contra , learned State counsel submits that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches. It is contended that the first order extending the petitioner's probation was passed on 05.02.2015, whereas the present writ petition has been instituted only after an unexplained lapse of about eleven years, by which time the petitioner had already been regularized, granted annual increments and promoted in service. She would further submit that the petitioner accepted the subsequent orders of regularization, increment and

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promotion without any protest and continued in service for several years. The challenge to the extension of probation has thus become highly belated and stale. She would further submit that no satisfactory explanation has been furnished for the extraordinary delay in invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. She would lastly submit that the petitioner has approached this Court after an inordinate and unexplained lapse of time, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone, irrespective of the merits of the challenge.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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The principal challenge in the present writ petition is against the orders dated 05.02.2015 and 29.07.2016, whereby the petitioner's probation period was extended. The record further reveals that the petitioner's probation was brought to an end on 27.12.2017, she was regularized on 05.01.2018, granted annual increment on 31.01.2018 and was also promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-II in the year 2018. The writ petition, however, has been instituted only after an inordinate lapse of time. The first order extending the petitioner's probation was passed in the year 2015, whereas the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court after about eleven years. Even reckoning from the subsequent order dated 29.07.2016 or from the order of regularization dated 05.01.2018, the challenge suffers from gross and unexplained delay.

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This Court has no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that the

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petition suffers from inordinate delay and as such is hit by delay and latches. No justifiable and plausible explanation has been given by the petitioner to explain the delay in approaching the Court for redressal of his grievance. 11 years is a pertty long time for a person aggrieved to approach the Writ Court for invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as also this Court in ‘n’ number of cases that against an impugned order, if a person wishes to approach the Court invoking writ jurisdiction, he should approach the Court within a reasonable period. The reasonable period cannot be stretch to the extent of more than a decade.

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So far as the delay and laches are concerned, the law in this regard is by now well settled by a series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The question of delay and laches came to be considered recently by the Supreme Court in case of State of Uttaranchal and Another v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others¹ in which the court has declined to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction in case the petitioner invokes jurisdiction of court with inordinate delay, and held as under :

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"In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam[8], this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: -

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...filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of

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1 2013 (12) SCC 179

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that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.”

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Likewise, in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. and

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another v. Jabar Singh and others² , it was observed as under:

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“43 . The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches.”

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Further, in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v . Pan Singh and

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others³ , the Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to interference in cases where the petitioner approached the Court with

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unexplained delay, held as under :

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“16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan .)”

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In the case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu⁴ , it has been held as under :-

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“It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed

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2(2007) 2 SCC 112

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3 ( 2007) 9 SCC 278

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4(1975) 1 SCC 152

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in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.”

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In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India⁵ , it was held as under:

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“8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed.”

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In the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage

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Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu⁶ , the Supreme Court has clearly held that the delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation, and expressed their opinion as under-

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“8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed.”

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5 (1992) 3 SCC 136

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6 2014 (4) SCC 108

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In view of the aforementioned authoritative decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court does not find any good ground for entertaining the present writ petition and the same thus is dismissed at

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the motion stage itself on the ground of delay and laches.

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SD/- ( Bibhu Datta Guru ) JUDGE

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ashu

Smt. Priyanka Gaikwad v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Smt. Priyanka Gaikwad v. State of Chhattisgarh

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