South East Coalfield Limited Vs Smt Sukhmanti

Appellate Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act, Deputy Chief And Deputy Chief Commissioner (Central), D- 6, Sector-1, Adarsh Society, Avanti Vihar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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3. The Controlling Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act, 1972 And The Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Torwa Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner : Mr. Vivek Verma, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Gary Mukhopadhayay, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board

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21.04.2026

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1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):-

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“10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner.

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10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 28.07.2023.

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10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to remand back to the appellate authority to decide on merit.

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10.4 Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.”

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Facts in brief are that husband of respondent No. 1, namely, Shobhanath was

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working under the petitioner. His services were terminated by the company vide order dated 22.03.2009. The workman died on 27.11.2020 and till that date the amount of gratuity was not paid by the petitioner herein, therefore, an application was moved by the respondent No. 1, who is wife of the workman before the Controlling Authority under Rule 10(i) of Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1972. The petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity, and thereafter, the Controlling Authority passed an order on 17.11.2022 and directed the petitioner herein to make payment of amount of gratuity to the tune of Rs. 1,57,898/- with interest at the rate of 10%. The difference amount Rs. 38,441/- was also assessed by the Controlling Authority. The petitioner herein paid amount of gratuity to respondent No. 1 on 03.08.2020. Thereafter, the petitioner herein preferred an appeal before the appellate authority according to the provisions of Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972, on 14.03.2023 but difference amount Rs. 38,441/- and interest component were not deposited within prescribed period of limitation i.e. 120 days. The appellate authority vide order dated 28.07.2023 dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner, against said order this petition has been preferred.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that amount of gratuity assessed by the Controlling Authority was paid to the respondent No. 1 on 03.08.2020. He would contend that the difference amount and interest component were not deposited with the Controlling Authority prior to filing of appeal according to the provisions of Section 7(7) of Act of 1972 and said

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fact is foundation of dismissal of appeal preferred by the petitioner. He would contend that the appellate authority granted time to the petitioner to deposit the said part, and subsequently, it was deposited on 26.07.2023 through a bank draft. He would contend that as the order passed by the Controlling Authority was complied with, the appellate Authority committed error of law while dismissing the appeal.

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On the other hand, Mr. Gary Mukhopadhayay, Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 would submit that the petitioner failed to deposit entire amount of gratuity assessed by the Controlling Authority before or at the time of filing appeal, therefore, the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein was rightly dismissed. He would contend that according to the provisions of Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972, the petitioner was required to deposit entire amount of gratuity assessed by the Controlling Authority including difference amount and interest part before expiry of period of limitation, whereas, in the present case, difference of gratuity assessed by the Controlling Authority and interest part were deposited by the petitioner after expiry of said period. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of State of Chhattisgarh vs. Chowaram and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 3842.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record.

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6. Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 reads as under :-

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“7(7) Any person aggrieved by an order under subsection (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in

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this behalf:

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Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days.

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[Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.] [ Inserted by Act 25 of 1984, Section 4 (w.e.f. 1.7.1984).]

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Bare reading of the above-quoted provision would make it clear that after

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receipt of order passed by the Controlling Authority, appeal is to be preferred within sixty days from said date. It is further provided that the said period of sixty days may be extended to further period of sixty days, if sufficient cause is shown. In the present case, the petitioner herein received copy of order passed by the Controlling Authority on 25.11.2022, whereas appeal was preferred before the appellate authority on 14.03.2023. The period of 120 days expired on 25.03.2023. The difference part of gratuity amount and interest component were deposited by the petitioner with the Controlling Authority on 26.07.2023, thus, the provisions contained in Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 were not complied with.

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8. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of Chowaram (supra) while dealing with provisions of Section 7(7) of Act of 1972 in para 6 and 7 held as under :-

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“6. The learned Division Bench, in Kirtan Ram

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Thakur (supra), observed in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 as follows:

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“(7) The opening portion of Section 7(7) of the PG Act clearly lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of authority passed under Section 7(4) may prefer appeal to the appropriate Government or authority. The Limitation prescribed for filing such appeal is sixty days starting from the date of receipt of order from which the appeal is preferred. Proviso to this Section lays down that the appellate authority, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, may extend the period for a further period of sixty days.

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(8) It is thus clear that the limitation for filing an appeal is sixty days and the limitation starts to run from the date of receipt of the order of the appropriate authority. If the appeal is not filed within sixty days, then appellant shall have to satisfy the Appellate Authority that there was sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal. However, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down in the proviso to Section 7(7) of the PG Act that the appellate authority cannot extend the period beyond another sixty days, which means the outer limitation is 60 + 60 = 120 days. If the appeal is filed on 121st days, then the appellate authority cannot condone the delay.

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(9) We must remember that the appeal is creation of statute. Law makers lay down the period of limitation. In case there was no outer limitation provided in the proviso, we could have taken recourse to the Limitation Act and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applicable. However, in the PG Act, which is a special piece of legislation, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down that delay can be condoned only up to sixty days and no further delay can be condoned, therefore, the Appellate Authority is powerless to condone the delay when the delay is

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beyond sixty days.”

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7. The learned Single Judge followed the decision in Kirtan Ram Thakur (supra), which is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and as such, there is no merit in the appeal.”

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