Chaitram Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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CGHC010002722019

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2026:CGHC:28102

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPL No. 8 of 2019

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1 - Bodhram Rathore S/o Shri Maheshram Rathor Aged About 51 Years Carpenter R/o Village - Seoni, Thana - Champa, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water Resources, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Executive Engineer Hadeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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WPL No. 10 of 2019

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1 - Chaitram Sahu S/o Shri Vedram Sahu Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Mudpar, Thana- Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner

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Versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water Resources, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Executive Engineer Hadeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir, District Janjgir- Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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WPL No. 3 of 2020

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1 - Phulesh Ram Kashyap S/o Chhotu Ram Kashyap Aged About 48 Years R/o Village - Mudpar, Post - Khisora, Tahsil Pamgarh, District - Janjgir - Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

--- Petitioner

Versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water Resources, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Executive Engineer, Hasdeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir, District - Janjgir - Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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WPL No. 11 of 2019

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1 - Bhagwat Rathore S/o Shri Kanhai Rathore Aged About 51 Years R/o Village Seoni, Thana Champa, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner

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Versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water Resources, Mantralaya, Mahanandi Bhawan, Atal Nagar District Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Executive Engineer Hasdeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents

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For respective Petitioners : Mr. KPS Gandhi, Advocate and Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate For State : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Dy. A.G.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board

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08.07.2026

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Heard.

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In these batch of writ petitions filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners/workmen have challenged the award passed by the learned Labour Court, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), in Case No. 14/I.D. Act/Reference/2013, Case No. 16/I.D. Act/Reference/2013, Case No. 34/I.D. Act/Reference/2013 and Case No. 39/I.D. Act/Reference/2012, dated 14.09.2018, respectively, whereby the statement of claim filed by the petitioners have been dismissed.

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The facts, in brief, according to the statement of claim, are that the petitioners were engaged by the respondent department between 1980 to 1984; their services were discontinued by the department. Thereafter, they moved an application before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) and in turn, appropriate Government referred the matter to the concerned Labour Court for adjudication as to whether the termination of services of the petitioners is valid and proper. In the first round of litigation, the learned Labour Court answered the question in favour of the workmen and held that they were entitled to reinstatement without back wages. Those awards were challenged by filing writ petitions, bearing WPL No. 150/2014, WPL No. 153 of 2014, WPL No. 155 of 2014 and WPL No. 253 of 2014, preferred by the employer/State Government. Above-referred writ petitions were allowed, and cases were remitted back to the concerned Labour Court to consider the cases afresh by recording specific findings with regard to (i) continuous work for a period of 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination, and (ii) the principle of ‘last come, first go’.

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The petitioners herein, in their statement of claim, pleaded that they had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their services, and that the said decision of termination of services of the respondent/employer was contrary to the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’).”

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The Learned Labour Court recorded a specific finding that the

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workmen failed to establish the fact that they had worked for 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their service, and that they also failed to prove that the employees appointed after the petitioners/workmen were working with the department. Therefore, it is held that the principle of ‘last come, first go’ has not been proved by leading cogent evidence. Learned Labour Court dismissed the statement of claim filed by the petitioners.

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Learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners/workmen would argue that the petitioners adduced sufficient evidence to establish the fact that they had worked for 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their services. It is also contended that the Learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the said piece of evidence. They would further contend that the workmen who were engaged in the department after the engagement of the petitioners are still working, whereas, the services of the petitioners were terminated, and thus the department failed to comply with the provisions of Section 25G of the Act of 1947. It is also argued that petitioners moved applications before the learned Labour Court seeking a direction to the respondent/employer to provide material documents regarding engagement of the petitioners but no order was passed on those applications. They would submit that as the applications were moved by the petitioners, this Court may draw an adverse inference against the employer. Mr. Gandhi, Advocate, has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Division

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Bench in Writ Appeal No.278 of 2021, parties being Smt. Kunti Bai Kashyap and the State of Chhattisgarh and others, decided on 01.02.2023 , wherein it is held that where a daily-wage employee fails to produce evidence to show that he continuously worked for five years under the employer, such employee would be entitled to monetary compensation. They would pray that a direction may be issued to the respondent employer to make payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement of services, as most of the petitioners have already attained the age of superannuation.

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On the other hand, Mr. Pandey, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State would oppose the submissions. He would submit that the petitioners could not lead clinching evidence to establish the fact that they worked for 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their services. It is further argued that sufficient documents were not produced before the Court below in this regard. Mr. Pandey would submit that the employer examined the Sub-Divisional Officer of the department, who categorically stated that the petitioners/workmen did not work for the period pleaded in the statement of claim. This witness further stated that the workmen never worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year with the department and that their engagement was casual in nature. With regard to compensation, Mr. Pandey would argue that the petitioners/workmen have to establish the fact that they worked for 240 days in a calendar year and they are entitled to reinstatement; and in such a situation, a

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direction with regard to payment of monetary compensation can be considered. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 697.

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I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and perused the records.

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Perusal of the statements of claim filed by the petitioners show that the petitioners/workmen specifically pleaded that they worked for 240 days in a calendar year under the respondent department.

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10.Perusal of the record would show that the petitioners could not adduce documentary evidence to establish this fact. The oral evidence adduced by the petitioners/workmen would not suffice, and therefore the learned Labour Court recorded a specific finding that the petitioners failed to prove the fact of their engagement for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their services.

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11.It is a well-settled principle of law that the burden of proof lies on the workman so as to entitle him to the benefits of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Rafi (supra) held that where a workman fails to discharge the initial burden, an award of the Labour Court holding the termination of services as illegal on the ground of non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 and directing his reinstatement would be erroneous. Relevant paragraphs 6 to 10

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are reproduced herein below :

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“6. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2004 (8) SCC 161), the position was again reiterated in paragraph 6 as follows:

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"6.It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC 25). No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240 days as claimed."

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7.In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195), it was held that the burden was on the workman to show that he was working for more than 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment. In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in paragraph 11 as follows:

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"11.The above burden having not been discharged and the Labour Court having held so, in our opinion, the Industrial Court and the High Court erred in basing an order of reinstatement solely on an adverse inference drawn erroneously. At this stage it may be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas JT 2004 (7) SC 248 wherein this Court disagreed with the High Court's view of drawing an adverse inference in regard to the non-production of certain relevant documents. This is what this Court had to say in that regard:

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"15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always

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optional and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production, other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional nonproduction may be found to be justifiable on some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the evidence adduced by the respondent."

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In Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S. Mani and Ors. (2005(5) SCC 100) a three-Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. Tribunal's view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous. In Batala Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran Singh (2005 (8) Supreme 481) it was held as follows:

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"13.So far as the question of onus regarding working for more than 240 days is concerned, as observed by this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani the onus is on the workman."

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The position was examined in detail in Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dehyabhai Amarsingh (2005 (7) Supreme 307) and the view expressed in Range Forest Officer, Siri Niwas, M.P. Electricity Board cases (supra) was reiterated.

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In R.M. Yellatti v. The Asst. Executive Engineer (JT 2005 (9) SC 340) , the decisions referred to above were noted and it was held as follows:

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"17. Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the

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workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case."

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10 .The above position was again re-iterated in O NGC Ltd. and Anr. v. Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik (2006 (1) SCC 337) and Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam and Anr. v. Sham Lal (2006 AIR SCW 3574). ”

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After going through the pleadings made by the petitioners in the statement of claim, the evidence adduced by them and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Rafi (supra) , in my opinion, the learned Labour Court rightly held that the petitioners/workmen failed to establish the fact that they worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their services.

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13.With regard to the application of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947, it is necessary on the part of the workmen to plead and prove that the employees were workmen, who belong to a particular category of workmen in that establishment. In the absence of any agreement, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman

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who was the last person to be employed in that category.

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14.In the present case, the workmen failed to plead and prove the fact that the workmen who were employed after the petitioners are still working with the establishment. In absence of such evidence, in opinion of this Court, provisions of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947 would not attract and the learned Labour Court rightly denied relief under said provision.

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15.One more submission was made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that an adverse inference should be drawn against the establishment/employer because documents were not provided before the learned Labour Court despite applications having been filed.

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It is a well-settled principle of law that the workmen must establish the primary foundation of their case, and if the establishment or employer thereafter fails to rebut that foundation and further fails to produce necessary documents, an adverse inference may be drawn against the establishment or employer.

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17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of State of Uttarakhand and Others v. Sureshwati, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 108 , held that the burden to prove that the workman had worked for 240 days lies on the workman himself. The question whether an adverse inference could be drawn against the employer, in case he did not produce the best evidence available with it, arises thereafter. If some of the documents have not been produced by the establishment, an adverse inference could not be drawn.

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Relevant para 26 is reproduced herein below :

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“26. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhavnagar Municipal Corpn. v. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha, 2014(16) SCC 130 held that :

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“7. It is fairly well-settled that for an order of termination of the services of a workman to be held illegal on account of nonpayment of retrenchment compensation, it is essential for the workman to establish that he was in continuous service of the employer within the meaning of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For the respondent to succeed in that attempt he was required to show that he was in service for 240 days in terms of Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii). The burden to prove that he was in actual and continuous service of the employer for the said period lay squarely on the workman. The decisions of this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani,(2002) 3 SCC 25, Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, 2004(8) 195,, M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram, (2004) 8 SCC 246. Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan,(2004) 8 SCC00000000000 161, Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai, 2005(8) SCC 450 and R.M. Yellatti v. Executive Engineer, 2006(1) SCC 106 unequivocally recognise the principle that the burden to prove that the workman had worked for 240 days is entirely upon him. So also the question whether an adverse inference could be drawn against the employer in case he did not produce the best evidence available with it, has been the subject-matter of pronouncements of this Court in Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas and M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram [M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram, , reiterated in RBI v. S. Mani18. This Court has held that only because some documents have not been produced by the management, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against it.”

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With regard to the monetary compensation claimed by the petitioners herein, as they failed to prove the fact that they had worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their services, and further failed to establish that the employees engaged after the appointment of the petitioners are still working with the establishment, no such relief can be granted.

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In the matter of Smt. Kunti Bai Kashyap (supra) , she was offered engagement as a daily-wage earner on a compassionate basis and had worked for 6½ years.

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Accordingly, the Hon’ble Division Bench in that matter granted monetary compensation. However, the facts of the present case are entirely different. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in the form of monetary compensation. Accordingly, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed.

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Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge

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Rekha

Chaitram Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Chaitram Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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