Mohammad Hakeem Rayeen Vs the State of Chhattisgarh

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Ms. Shital Soni, Advocate. For State/Respondent No.1 : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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08-07-2026

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The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following relief(s):-

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“10.1 Issue a WRIT in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate WRIT, Order or Direction, commanding the Respondent State authorities to conduct a fair, impartial and independent inquiry into the unaddressed Written-Representations submitted

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by the Petitioner before the SHO to PS Pendra on 08.04.2026 and the Superintendent of Police on 13.04.2026.

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10.2 DIRECT the Respondent Authorities not to take any coercive steps till completion of investigation or up to filing of Final-Report cum Charge-Sheet as the present Petitioner is ready to co-operate the investigation. An Application for Grant of InterimRelief/Stay is filed herewith, separately.

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10.3 Pass any such other or further Order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”

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That, facts as mentioned in the petition in brief are that, the petitioner is a next-door neighbor to the family of the victim. On 08.04.2026, the petitioner submitted a detailed written-representation before the SHO to P.S. Pendra, followed by an identical writtenrepresentation before the Superintendent of Police, Gaurela-PendraMarwahi C.G. on 13.04.2026. Despite these representations being duly submitted in the month of April-2026, no response was given to the same. On 12.04.2026 a written-complaint was submitted by the minor victim at P.S. Pendra and based on this complaint, the FIR No. 112/2026 has been registered against the petitioner for the alleged commission of offences under Sections 74, 79, and 296 of the BNS read with Section 12 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’). In the said FIR, it has been alleged that incident transpired 05-Days prior, on 07.04.2026, between 19:30 hours and 20:00 hours. It has been alleged in the complaint made by

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the complainant/victim that while she was taking a walk in front of her residence, the petitioner approached her on a motorcycle. There is further allegation in the FIR that the petitioner caught hold of her hand, touched her inappropriately to outrage her modesty and attempted to coerce her to accompany him on the motorcycle by offering her a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. The complainant also alleged that upon going into her house and informing her parents, the petitioner engaged in verbal abuse against the family before fleeing from the spot when neighbors gathered. It is contended by the petitioner that the victim had previously leveled an identical, highly serious complaint against the petitioner, the said prior complaint was subsequently withdrawn by herself, who formally conceded that the allegations were entirely false, baseless and had been leveled purely at the behest and manipulation of her parents. It is contention of the petitioner that the present FIR is a cyclical continuation of that malicious design. It has been further stated in the petition that apprehending an immediate threat to his personal liberty, the petitioner previously moved an application for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS. However, vide order dated 15.06.2026 passed in MCRCA No. 646 of 2026, this Court has rejected his anticipatory bail application wherein the minor victim raised objection through virtual mode. It has been further stated in the petition that after the rejection of his anticipatory bail application on 15.06.2026, the petitioner is facing an imminent, real and irreversible threat of arbitrary arrest and harassment by the police authorities and left with no other efficacious remedy to safeguard his fundamental rights guaranteed

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under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, hence, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition (Criminal).

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned criminal proceedings are blatant abuse of the process of law, initiated with an oblique motive to harass, humiliate and extort the petitioner. The earlier complaint of similar nature was subsequently withdrawn by the victim herself, wherein she conceded that those allegations were completely false, baseless and leveled solely at the behest of her parents. The present FIR is nothing but a cyclical replication of the same malicious design. The present FIR has been lodged with a delay of five days as the alleged incident is stated to be occurred on 07.04.2026 whereas, the written complaint was made on 12.04.2026. The delay explained in the FIR as ‘after family consultation’ is completely boilerplate, unsatisfactory and highly suspicious. Such delay strongly points towards deliberate afterthought, tutoring and fabrication of colourable narrative to falsely implicate the petitioner who happens to be next-door neighbour. The incident is said to be happened in the public area, but no independent witness has come forward to corroborate the core accusation of physical assault or outraging of modesty. The version of the prosecution is highly improbable that a person would openly attempt to force the victim to accompany him on motorcycle in broad daylight in bustling locality, offer a specific money of Rs.5,000/- and immediately invite public exposure. The mechanical invocation of Section 12 of POCSO Act and Section 74 of BNS, has been done as a tool to leverage to ensure the absolute denial of

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personal liberty, despite the underlying absurdity of the claims. It has been further argued that even if the entire contents of the FIR is taken at face value, it fails to satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence alleged. Therefore, the respondent/State authorities may be directed to conduct a fair, impartial and independent inquiry into the representations dated 08.04.2026 and 13.04.2026 submitted by the petitioner before them and also direct them not to take any coercive steps till completion of investigation or filing of final report/charge sheet as the petitioner is ready to cooperate in the investigation.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are wholly misconceived and are liable to be rejected. The impugned FIR, on its plain reading, discloses the commission of cognizable offences warranting investigation. The allegations regarding mala fide intention, abuse of process, previous withdrawal of an earlier complaint, delay in lodging the FIR, absence of independent witnesses, and the alleged improbability of the prosecution story are all disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated at this preliminary stage. The withdrawal of an earlier complaint does not, by itself, render the present FIR false or non-maintainable, nor does a delay of five days, sufficiently explained in the complaint as being on account of family consultation, justify quashing the proceedings. In cases involving allegations of offences against a woman or a child, such delay is not uncommon and its effect, if any, is a matter of appreciation of evidence during trial. Likewise, the contention that the provisions of Section 12 of the POCSO Act and

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Section 74 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (in short ‘BNS’) have been mechanically invoked cannot be examined in proceedings seeking interference with an ongoing investigation, as the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences requiring a fair and complete investigation. It is further submitted that the petitioner seeks an impermissible appreciation of disputed facts at a stage when the investigation is still in progress. The representations dated 08.04.2026 and 13.04.2026, along with the petitioner's defence, shall be duly considered by the Investigating Officer during the course of a fair and impartial investigation, but cannot justify interference with the statutory process or grant of blanket protection against coercive action. As the FIR prima facie discloses cognizable offences and no exceptional ground for exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court is made out, the present petition deserves to be dismissed and the investigation permitted to proceed in accordance with law.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the petition and documents annexed thereto. 6 . In the matter of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra , reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 23 held as under :-

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“23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in

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what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

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i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

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ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

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iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

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iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

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v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

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vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

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vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

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viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

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ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

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x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;”

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7. In the matter of State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani

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and others, (2017) 2 SCC 779, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraphs No.23 and 24 that:-

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“ 23. We have referred to the authority in Hema Mishra [Hema Mishra v. State of U.P. [(2014) 4 SCC 453 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 363] as that specifically deals with the case that came from the State of Uttar Pradesh where Section 438 CrPC has been deleted. It has concurred with the view expressed in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh [Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. [(2009) 4 SCC 437 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 330]. The said decision, needless to say, has to be read in the context of the State of Uttar Pradesh. We do not intend to elaborate the said principle as that is not necessary in this case. What needs to be stated here is that the States where Section 438 CrPC has not been deleted and kept on the statute book, the High Court should be well advised that while entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC, it exercises judicial restraint. We may hasten to clarify that the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the investigation and may pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law, but it is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable to pass an order of the present nature while declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is not appropriate to stay the investigation. This kind of order is really inappropriate and unseemly. It has no sanction in law. The courts should oust and obstruct unscrupulous litigants from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court on the drop of a hat to file an application for quashing of launching an FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an interim order. It is the obligation of the Court to keep such unprincipled and unethical litigants at bay.

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24. It has come to the notice of the Court that in certain cases, the High Courts, while dismissing the application under Section 482 CrPC, are passing orders that if the petitioner-accused surrenders before the trial Magistrate, he shall be admitted to bail on such terms and conditions as deemed fit and appropriate to be imposed by the Magistrate concerned. Sometimes it is noticed that in a case where sessions trial is warranted, directions are issued that on surrendering before the trial Judge concerned, the accused shall be enlarged on bail. Such directions would not commend acceptance in light of the ratio in Rashmi Rekha Thatoi [Rashmi Rekha Thatoi v. State of Orissa, (2012) 5 SCC 690 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 721], Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465 : AIR 1980 SC 1632], etc., for they neither come within the sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution of India nor Section 482 CrPC nor Section 438 CrPC. This Court in Ranjit Singh [Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 16 SCC 797 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 405] had observed that the sagacious saying "a stitch in time saves nine" may be an apposite reminder and this Court also painfully so stated.”

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In view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra) and having considered the rival submissions and the material available on record, and the facts that the FIR discloses allegations constituting cognizable offences warranting a thorough investigation, the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the alleged falsity of an earlier complaint, delay in lodging the FIR, absence of independent witnesses, improbability of the prosecution version, and false implication are all disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the stage of investigation, further that the petitioner's representations dated 08.04.2026 and 13.04.2026, along with all other relevant materials are matters to be duly considered by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation, the anticipatory

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bail application preferred by the petitioner has already been rejected by this Court after considering the nature of the allegations and the material available on record, the petitioner cannot seek substantially the same protection against coercive action by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure (supra) has categorically held that where an FIR prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the High Court should refrain from interfering with the investigation except in the rarest of rare cases. The Court cannot, at this stage, embark upon an inquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations or appreciate the petitioner's defence. As no exceptional circumstance has been made out warranting interference with the statutory process of investigation or grant of the reliefs sought, this Court finds no merit in the present writ petition. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed.

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Sd/Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Aadil

Mohammad Hakeem Rayeen v. the State of Chhattisgarh

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Mohammad Hakeem Rayeen v. the State of Chhattisgarh

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