Krishna Verma Vs State of Chhattisgarh

2 - Suman Kujur W/o Kamlesh Bhagat Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Ward No 7 Gandhinagar, P.S.- Ambikapur Dehat (Gandhinagar), District Sarguja (C.G.)

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s) :	Ms. Krishna Verma and Ms. Aastha Verma, Petitioners in Person.
For State/Respondent :	Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Govt.
No.1	Advocate.
For Respondents No.2 :	Mr. Aditya Sharma, Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 16/06/2026

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1 . Heard Ms. Krishna Verma and Ms. Aastha Verma, Petitioners in

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Person. Also heard Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned Govt. Advocate, appearing for the Respondent/State, Mr. Aditya Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2.

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The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer:

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“I. That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ to set aside the impugned F.I.R. bearing crime no. 32/2024 dated 19.01.2024 registered by police station Ambikapur Dehat(Gandhinagar) under Sections 427, 294, 506, 447 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3- 1(R-S), 3(2)(va) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the petitioner no. 1 and petitioner no. 2 being apparently bad in law, and as such liable to be set aside by this Hon’ble Court.

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II. Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court deems, fit in the facts and circumstances may also be granted in favour of the petitioner.”

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The present petition has been filed seeking quashment of FIR bearing Crime No. 32/2024 dated 19.01.2024 registered at Police Station Ambikapur Dehat (Gandhinagar), District Surguja, under Sections 427, 294, 506, 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r),(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989( in short “SC/ST Act”). Petitioner No.1 is a single mother working as Lecturer in

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Government Higher Secondary School, Bandana (Mainpat), and petitioner No.2 is her 22-year-old unmarried daughter, both having no criminal antecedents. It is the case of the petitioners that the impugned FIR has been lodged due to a long-standing land dispute between the parties and that the private respondent and her family members have given a criminal colour to a purely civil dispute in order to harass the petitioners. According to the petitioners, in the year 2014 petitioner No.1 had advanced a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the husband and mother-inlaw of the private respondent on the assurance that in case of nonrepayment, 5 decimals of land would be transferred in her favour, however, the said persons allegedly deceived her by preparing documents relating to Nazul land, upon which petitioner No.1 later constructed her house. The petitioners further submit that petitioner No.1 had earlier made several complaints against the family members of the private respondent regarding assault, nuisance and criminal intimidation and had also filed a complaint case before the competent Court, which is pending consideration. Thereafter, as a counterblast to the said proceedings, the impugned FIR came to be registered alleging damage to property, abusive language, caste-related remarks and criminal intimidation. The petitioners contend that even if the allegations made in the FIR are accepted in entirety, no offence is made out against them and the continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law.

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Petitioners in person submits that the impugned FIR bearing Crime No.32/2024 dated 19.01.2024 registered at Police Station

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Ambikapur Dehat (Gandhinagar) under Sections 427, 294, 506, 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r),(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act is false, baseless and has been maliciously lodged only to harass the petitioners and to convert a purely civil dispute into a criminal proceeding. Petitioner No.1 is a government lecturer and a single mother residing with her 22-year-old unmarried daughter, petitioner No.2, and both petitioners have no criminal antecedents whatsoever. The allegations levelled in the FIR do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged, as there is no material to show any intentional insult, intimidation or humiliation on the basis of caste, nor any unlawful act committed by the petitioners. The dispute between the parties arose out of a monetary transaction and landrelated issues after petitioner No.1 had advanced a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the family members of respondent No.2 on humanitarian grounds for medical treatment, which amount was never returned. Instead, false and fabricated allegations have been levelled against the petitioners with mala fide intention to pressurize them and tarnish their reputation.

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She further submits that prior to registration of the impugned FIR, petitioner No.1 had repeatedly approached the police authorities with complaints regarding assault, criminal intimidation, nuisance and objectionable acts committed by the private respondent’s family members, including an incident wherein Rakesh Bhagat allegedly attempted to assault petitioner No.1 with a tangi while under the influence of alcohol. Despite several complaints and calls made to the

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police authorities, no effective action was taken. On the contrary, the present FIR has been registered as a retaliatory measure after the petitioners initiated proceedings against the respondent party. The respondent’s allegations regarding possession over the land and the alleged incident are false and unsupported by any documentary or independent evidence. The continuation of the impugned criminal proceedings, which are manifestly attended with mala fide intention, would amount to abuse of the process of law and would cause serious prejudice and harassment to the petitioners. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed in the interest of justice.

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Learned State counsel submits that the present writ petition seeking quashment of FIR bearing Crime No.32/2024 dated 19.01.2024 registered at Police Station Ambikapur Dehat (Gandhinagar) under Sections 427, 294, 506, 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r),(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. The FIR came to be registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by respondent No.2 alleging that the present petitioners damaged the complainant’s bathroom with an intention to dispossess her from the land in question, abused her and her family members in filthy language, and threatened them with dire consequences. Upon receipt of the complaint, the police authorities, being duty bound in law, registered the FIR and conducted investigation in accordance with law. During the course of investigation, statements of the complainant and witnesses were recorded, the spot was

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inspected, relevant documents were collected, and evidence regarding commission of cognizable offences under Sections 427, 294, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act was found against the petitioners. Though upon investigation Section 447 IPC and Section 3(1)(r)(s) of the SC/ST Act were deleted, sufficient material was collected against the petitioners for filing of charge-sheet and accordingly charge-sheet has already been prepared before the competent Court.

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He further submits that allegations raised by the petitioners in the present petition pertain to disputed questions of fact and constitute their defence, which cannot be adjudicated upon in proceedings under Article 226/Section 482 jurisdiction at the threshold stage. The petitioners seek a detailed appreciation of evidence and a pre-trial determination of disputed facts, which is impermissible in law. The investigation has been conducted strictly in accordance with law and there exists prima facie material connecting the petitioners with the alleged offences. Merely because there exists a civil dispute between the parties would not by itself extinguish criminal liability where the ingredients of cognizable offences are disclosed from the FIR and material collected during investigation. The petitioners shall have ample opportunity to raise all grounds available to them before the Trial Court at the stage of framing of charge, discharge, or during trial. At this stage, no exceptional circumstance is made out warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed.

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Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the present writ petition is misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. The answering respondent belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community and the land in question is situated in a notified Fifth Schedule Area, where transfer or creation of any interest in favour of a non-tribal person is strictly prohibited under law. The petitioners, by taking undue advantage of the poor financial condition and vulnerable social status of the respondent’s family, obtained an illegal and fraudulent agreement in respect of the land occupied by the respondent and thereafter started interfering with the peaceful possession of the respondent and her family members. It is submitted that the petitioners, on several occasions, forcefully entered upon the land occupied by the respondent for decades, caused damage to structures standing thereon, abused and threatened the respondent and her family members and attempted to illegally grab the land under the guise of a purported civil dispute. The respondent had repeatedly approached the authorities and submitted several complaints regarding the unlawful acts of the petitioners, pursuant to which the impugned FIR came to be registered. The allegations made in the FIR clearly disclose commission of cognizable offences and there is sufficient material available on record against the petitioners. The petitioners are trying to portray the matter as a mere civil dispute in order to evade criminal liability, whereas the allegations involve serious acts of intimidation, illegal trespass, destruction of property and atrocities committed against a member of the Scheduled Tribe community. Hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed

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and the petitioners are liable to face trial in accordance with law.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with the petition.

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From perusal of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, it appears that the genesis of the dispute between the parties is a long-standing land and monetary dispute arising out of an alleged loan transaction and possession over the land in question. The record further reflects that petitioner No.1 had earlier made several complaints against the family members of respondent No.2 alleging assault, nuisance and criminal intimidation and had also instituted separate proceedings before the competent Court prior to registration of the impugned FIR. The allegations made in the FIR primarily relate to damage to property and disputes regarding possession over land, which are intrinsically connected with the pre-existing civil dispute between the parties. Significantly, during investigation, Section 447 IPC and Section 3(1)(r),(s) of the SC/ST Act have already been deleted by the investigating agency itself, which demonstrates that the allegations regarding unlawful trespass and caste-based abuse were not substantiated during investigation.

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This Court is conscious of the settled position of law that the extraordinary jurisdiction for quashment of criminal proceedings is to be exercised sparingly; however, where the criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide intention and where a predominantly civil dispute has been given a criminal colour for the purpose of

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harassment, the Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process of law. In the present case, even if the allegations made in the FIR are taken at their face value, the essential ingredients constituting offences under Sections 427, 294 and 506 IPC read with Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act are not prima facie made out against the petitioners. Except bald and omnibus allegations, there is no independent material on record indicating intentional caste-based humiliation or criminal intimidation attributable to the petitioners. The entire dispute appears to have emanated from the underlying land dispute and monetary transaction between the parties and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to permitting criminal law to be used as a weapon for settling personal and civil disputes.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others1 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC/ 528 of B.N.S.S should be exercised, which are as under: -

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"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under

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1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent

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person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding is a instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

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In the matter of Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of

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Maharashtra and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 , the Apex Court has observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability, genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.) is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. The Apex Court has emphasized that though the Court has the power to quash

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the FIR in suitable cases, the Court, when it exercises power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), only has to consider whether or not the allegations of FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider the case on merit. Further, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.) , final conclusions are as under:-

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“ i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

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ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

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iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

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iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

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v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

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vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

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vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

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viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other

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sphere;

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ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

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14. x) Save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

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xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

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xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

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xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

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xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

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xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to

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consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

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xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/ disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of

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mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

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xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

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Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025) , while reiterating the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, has once again emphasized that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised with great caution, circumspection and only in exceptional circumstances.

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The Apex Court has held that while considering a prayer for quashing of an FIR, charge-sheet or criminal proceedings, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected during investigation. The scope of judicial scrutiny at such stage is confined to examining whether the allegations made in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet, if accepted at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and make out a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Court,

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while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the BNSS), cannot enter into disputed questions of fact, evaluate the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations, assess the evidentiary value of witness statements, or adjudicate upon the probable defence available to the accused. Such an exercise falls squarely within the province of the trial Court, which alone is competent to appreciate evidence after the parties have led their respective cases. The Apex Court cautioned that where the allegations disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences and the investigating agency has collected material in support thereof, criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold merely because the accused has raised a plausible defence or disputes the correctness of the prosecution case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:

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“20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

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(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

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(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

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(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted prosecution/complainant; and/or the material that justifiably refuted it cannot be by is by the such, the

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prosecution/complainant?

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(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

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If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.

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[(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)] ”

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In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the material available on record, and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and other subsequent decisions, this Court is of the considered opinion that the dispute between the parties is predominantly civil in nature arising out of a long-standing land and monetary dispute. The allegations made in the FIR, even if accepted at their face value, do not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners. The record further reveals that the allegations pertaining to caste-based abuse and criminal trespass were not substantiated during investigation, resulting in deletion of the offences under Section 447 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r),(s) of the SC/ST Act. The criminal proceedings appear to have been initiated in the backdrop of the pre-existing dispute between the parties and their continuation would amount to abuse of the process of law. This case, therefore, falls within the categories

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enumerated in Bhajan Lal warranting exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to secure the ends of justice.

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Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed . FIR bearing Crime No.32/2024 dated 19.01.2024 registered at Police Station Ambikapur Dehat (Gandhinagar), District Surguja, for offences under Sections 427, 294, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including the charge-sheet, are hereby quashed .

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The petition stands disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Alok

Krishna Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Krishna Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

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