Narrottam Dhruw Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Since an identical issue and facts of law are involved in bunch of these cases, they are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order.

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Petitioners have filed these writ petitions seeking following relief (s) :-

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“10.1 Issue a writ of mandamus and quash the impugned notice dated 10.12.2025 (P-3) issued to the petitioner, and the action to be taken by the respondent in view of their activity dated 10.12.2025, where the petitioner but has been told by the R/3 herein, that the petitioner has been directed to evacuate the premises or would be done forcefully may kindly be stopped.

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10.2 Direct the respondents not to proceed further, pursuant to issuance of the impugned notice dated 10.12.2025 to the petitioner, and the action to be taken by the respondent.

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10.3 Any other relief as deemed fit by this Hon’ble Court in circumstances of this case.”

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Learned State counsel submits that encroached Government land by the petitioners is to be used for construction of Railway Over Bridge (ROB) and Railway Under Bridge (RUB). PIL challenging the construction of ROB and RUB was dismissed in WP(PIL) No. 52 of 2023, which was filed by one of the residents of the area.

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Learned counsel for the State has produced the record of the case under Section 248 of the Code, 1959 proceeded against petitioners, who were noticed and also participated in the proceedings.

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Perusal of the record would show that the order dated 12.06.2025 is passed by Tahsildar in a proceedings initiated under Section 248 of the C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (In short ‘the Code, 1959’) and thereafter, when encroachment is not removed, eviction warrant was issued on 10.12.2025, which is put to challenge. Petitioners have not challenged the order of eviction dated 12.06.2025 passed under Section 248 of the Code, 1959. The order passed by the Revenue Officer in exercise of powers under Section 248 of the Code, 1959 is appealable under the Code of 1959.

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In the aforementioned facts of the case, I am not inclined to entertain these writ petitions as the petitioners are having the efficacious alternate remedy available under the law to challenge the order passed by Tahsildar in a proceeding under Section 248 of the Code,

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1959, before the first appellate authority as provided under the Code of 1959.

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