M/S. Awadhesh Singh Gautam Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:809-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPC No. 6625 of 2025

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M/s. Awadhesh Singh Gautam Place Of Business At Village- Nakulnar, District South Bastar- Dantewada, Chhattisgarh- 494552, Through Its Authorized Partner, Mr. Abhishek Singh Gautam, S/o Mr. Awadhesh Singh Gautam.

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Vikas Bhawan, Ground Floor, Sector 19, North Block, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Raipur C.G. 492102.

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2. The Chief Engineer, Chhattisgarh Rural Road Development Agency (Cgrrda), Vikas Bhawan, Civil Lines, District Raipur C.G. 492001

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3. The Executive Engineer Cum Member Secretary, Project Implementation Unit (Piu)- 01, Chhattisgarh Rural Road Development Agency (Cgrrda), District South Bastar Dantewada (C.G.)

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4. The Superintending Engineer, Project Implementation Unit (Piu)01, Bastar, Chhattisgarh Rural Road Development Agency (Cgrrda), District Bastar C.G.

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5. The Nodal Officer, Jila Nirman Samiti Dantewada, District South Bastar Dantewada (C.G.)

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...Respondent(s)

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN BRIJMOHAN MORLE MORLE Date: 2026.01.08 10:37:36 +0530

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For Petitioner : Mr. Harshwardhan Parganiha, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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07.01.2026

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1. Heard Mr. Harshwardhan Parganiha, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State.

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2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following reliefs :-

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“10.1 Quash and set aside the order dated 27.09.2025

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issued by the respondent No. 3;

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10.2 Direct the respondent authorities to forthwith initiate the refund/release of Rs. 38,00,000/- to the designated bank account of the petitioner firm, along with interest till date of realization of amount by the petitioner firm;

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10.3 Pass any other order or issue such directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the interest

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of justice. ”

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a Partnership Firm duly registered with the Public Works Department, Chhattisgarh, as a Class-A Contractor bearing Unique Identification Number (UIN) CGeR17944, and is engaged in the execution of largescale and complex construction projects. The petitioner firm is duly authorized to institute and prosecute the present writ petition through its competent partner. He further submits that Respondent No. 3 issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) bearing Reference No. 961 / Tech. / CGRRDA / 2024 dated 20.08.2024, inviting bids from eligible bidders for execution of Package No. CG-03-163 (Balance Work), namely PalnarPermapara Road (24.00 Km) to Mirchipara under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY).

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4. It is further contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner firm, having fulfilled all eligibility criteria, submitted its bid at 12.10% above the PMGSY Schedule of Rates (effective from 22.02.2018), which was duly accepted by the respondent authorities. The acceptance of the bid was communicated vide Letter of Acceptance dated 18.10.2024, followed by issuance of a Work Order dated 05.11.2024 in favour of the petitioner firm. He further submits that pursuant to issuance of the said Work Order, the petitioner firm promptly mobilized men, machinery, and materials at the site and commenced execution of the work without any delay. Upon completion of approximately 40% of the work, the petitioner firm raised its second running bill amounting to Rs. 45,62,000/- in accordance with the contractual terms.

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5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that despite completion of substantial work, the respondent authorities failed to release payment of the said running bill within a reasonable period. Owing to the inordinate delay, the petitioner firm addressed reminder communications dated 22.09.2025 and 25.09.2025 requesting release of the pending payment; however, no action was taken by the respondents. He further submits that instead of settling the legitimate dues of the petitioner firm, Respondent No. 3 issued an order dated 27.09.2025 intimating deduction of a total sum of Rs. 84,17,003/- from the running bills payable to the petitioner firm under various packages, including a sum of ₹38,00,000/- from Package No. CG-03-163. The said deduction has purportedly been made on the basis of an inspection report prepared by Respondent No. 4 in respect of two distinct and completed works executed under Work Orders dated 03.01.2023, pertaining to construction of roads from Madkamiras to Hiroli Health Centre and from Hiroli Health Centre to Dokapara.

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6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the said inspection report is patently illegal and has been prepared in gross violation of the terms and conditions of the NIT and the Conditions of Contract governing the said works. He submits that no reasonable notice of inspection was ever issued to the petitioner firm or its partners, as mandatorily required under Clause 16 of the Conditions of Contract, which stipulates that the contractor or its authorized representative must be present at the time of inspection. He further submits that Clause 36 of the Conditions of Contract, which permits audit and technical

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examination by the State, specifically mandates that an opportunity be afforded to the contractor to explain its position before any adverse action is taken; however, no such opportunity was granted to the petitioner firm in the present case. It is further submitted that as per the Special Conditions of Contract, which prevail over the general conditions of the NIT, Clause 4(ii) requires that defects, if any, must first be notified to the contractor and reasonable time be granted for rectification, and only upon failure thereof can recovery proceedings be initiated. Admittedly, no defect was ever communicated to the petitioner firm.

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7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in respect of the works executed under the work orders dated 03.01.2023, substantial amounts towards security deposit and performance guarantee are already lying with the respondent authorities, and further, payment towards the pending bitumen work bill remains unpaid. In such circumstances, the respondents acted wholly arbitrarily and without jurisdiction in effecting recovery from the running bills pertaining to an entirely separate and independent contract. Thus, being aggrieved by the arbitrary, unilateral, and high-handed action of the respondent authorities, the petitioner firm submitted a detailed representation dated 09.10.2025 before Respondents No. 2 to 4; however, the said representation has neither been acknowledged nor decided till date, compelling the petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

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8. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition as framed and filed are not maintainable as the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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9. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ petition.

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10. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts.

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11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) & Others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) & Another, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case observed as under:

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“ 6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that

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"admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995. "

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(emphasis supplied)

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12. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana & Others ,

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reported in (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows:

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“ 16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution."

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(emphasis supplied)

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13. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam , reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under:

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“ 26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable. "

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14. Subsequently, in Union of India vs. Puna Hinda , reported in (2021) 10 SCC 690 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed:

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“ 24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken

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only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads. ”

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15. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd. , reported in (2023) 2 SCC 703 , while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated:

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“ 82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit.” (emphasis supplied)

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16. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper.

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17. In the present cases, the relief of compensations sought by the petitioner is contingent upon the resolution of the disputed question of facts raised, and these questions cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the present writ petitions as there are disputed questions of fact involved.

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18. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, further considering the disputed questions of fact involved in this writ petition, the reliefs sought by the petitioner and in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good ground to entertain this writ petition.

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19. Accordingly, the present writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed . However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies available to him under the law. No cost(s).

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Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Brijmohan

M/S. Awadhesh Singh Gautam v. State of Chhattisgarh

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M/S. Awadhesh Singh Gautam v. State of Chhattisgarh

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