Devendra Khanna Vs State of Chhattisgarh

3 - Smt. Santosh Khanna W/o Late R N Khanna Aged About 93 Years R/o B-7, Minocha Colony, Mungeli Road, Dist - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s)

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(Cause Title is taken from CIS System)

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For Petitioner : Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate

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For State : Mr. Amit Nayak, P.L.

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For Respondent No. : Mr. Rupesh Shrivastava, Advocate 3

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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CAV Order

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By way of the present petition, the petitioners are challenging the order dated 25/11/2024 passed by the District Magistrate-cum-Presiding Officer, Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 , whereby the Appellate Tribunal upheld the order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Maintenance Tribunal constituted under the said Act of 2007.

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Facts of the case are that the petitioners, who are husband and wife, are residing on the first floor of the house situated over land bearing Khasra Nos. 1608/10 and 1608/08 at Minocha Colony, Bilaspur, whereas respondent No. 3, who is the mother of petitioner No. 1, is residing on the ground floor along with the younger brother and sister-in-law of petitioner No. 1. Respondent No. 3 instituted proceedings under Section 5 read with Section 23 of the Maintenance

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and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 before the Maintenance Tribunal alleging, inter alia, that petitioner No. 1 was neglecting to maintain her, that the petitioners were harassing and abusing her, and that she apprehended danger to her life from them; on such allegations, she sought eviction of the petitioners from the first floor of the house, refund of Rs. 25,00,000/-, and compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/-. The petitioners contested the proceedings by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as well as a detailed reply, contending that respondent No. 3 was receiving pension and had her own source of livelihood. The proceedings were not maintainable under the Act of 2007 as no claim for maintenance had been made and the principal relief sought was eviction. The petitioner No. 2 is the title holder of land bearing Khasra No. 1608/08, having purchased the same prior to her marriage. The Khasra No. 1608/10 does not belong to respondent No. 3 as per revenue records and the proceedings had been initiated at the instance of the younger brother of petitioner No. 1 with an intention to dispossess the petitioners from the property. The petitioners also placed on record the registered sale deed dated 06/04/1984 pertaining to Khasra No. 1608/08 and the map of the constructed house. However, the

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Maintenance Tribunal, by order dated 12/09/2024, allowed the application of respondent No. 3 and directed eviction of the petitioners from the house. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners preferred an appeal under Section 16 of the Act of 2007, in which interim protection was granted on 30/09/2024; however, the Appellate Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 25/11/2024, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the Maintenance Tribunal. Hence the present petition.

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3. Following reliefs have been prayed in this petition:-

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“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ petition and quashed the impugned order dt 25/11/2024 (Annexure P/1 & order dt 12/09/2024 (Annexure P/2), in the interest of justice.

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10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be call for the records for its kind perusal which relates to petitioner's matter.

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10.3 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in favour of the petitioner.”

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Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal are wholly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the petitioners have

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been directed to be evicted from the disputed house despite the fact that the property in question does not belong to respondent No. 3 and the issue of title and possession could have been adjudicated only by a competent civil Court in accordance with law. It is contended that both the Tribunals erred in treating respondent No. 3 as owner merely on the basis of mutation entries in respect of Khasra Nos. 1608/08 and 1608/10, whereas mutation does not confer any right, title or interest over immovable property and only enables the State to collect land revenue. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners had already challenged the mutation entries by preferring an appeal under Section 44 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which is still pending consideration, and therefore the tribunals ought not to have proceeded on the assumption that respondent No. 3 had title over the property. It is further argued that the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 3 under Sections 5 and 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 were themselves not maintainable, as no case falling within the scope of Section 23 was made out and the application was essentially one seeking eviction from the property rather than maintenance. Learned counsel submits that the Act of 2007 does not

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empower the Tribunal to adjudicate disputed questions of title or to order eviction of a person from property which is neither ancestral nor self-acquired property of the senior citizen, particularly when petitioner No. 2 claims ownership over Khasra No. 1608/08 on the basis of a registered sale deed. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal acted in gross violation of the procedure prescribed under the Act of 2007 and the Chhattisgarh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, inasmuch as the application filed by the petitioners under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was never decided, no proper enquiry as contemplated under Sections 5(3) and 8(1) of the Act was conducted, and the mandatory procedure under Rule 10 requiring consideration of conciliation was completely ignored. Instead, the Tribunal adopted an unknown procedure by constituting a two-member team, recording only the statement of respondent No. 3 and not that of the petitioners, and then relied upon such material to pass the order of eviction. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunals failed to consider that the petitioners themselves are senior citizens and respondent No. 3 is already residing in the same house on the ground floor and therefore no question of denial of residence arises. It is submitted that

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the petitioners had themselves lodged a prior police complaint regarding assault and abuse by the younger son of respondent No. 3, which probabilises the petitioners’ case that the proceedings were initiated at the behest of the younger son only to dispossess them from the property. It is argued that the complaint lodged by respondent No. 3 was merely a counterblast to the earlier complaint made by the petitioners and that the authorities failed to appreciate the material placed on record in its proper perspective. Learned counsel would further submit that the impugned orders are contrary to the object and scheme of the Act of 2007, which is intended to secure maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens and not to deprive another senior citizen

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of his property or residence without due process of law. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed on the decisions in M.P. Tej Babu v. State of Telangana 2017 5 RCR (Civ) 724 , Mohan Lal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others WPC No.3139/2017 and Krishna Kumar v. State of U.P. 2023 0 Supreme(All) 992, to contend that the Tribunal has limited jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Act, that mutation does not create title, and that eviction affecting proprietary rights cannot be ordered in a summary manner under the Act of 2007 without authority of law.

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Learned State counsel, at the outset and without entering into the merits of the matter, submits that none of the averments made in the writ petition shall be deemed to have been admitted unless the same are specifically and categorically admitted by the answering respondents in their reply. Learned State counsel further submits that a bare perusal of the relief clause would demonstrate that the principal challenge in the present petition is to the order passed by the Presiding Officer of the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 , whereby the appellate authority has affirmed the order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal, and that the said authority is an independent adjudicatory forum represented through separate counsel. It is, therefore, contended that no specific relief has been claimed against the State respondents and no substantive allegations have been levelled against them in the petition, and as such they are merely formal parties to the present proceedings, as such, the same deserves to be dismissed qua the answering respondents.

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Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 submits that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed, as the impugned

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orders passed by the learned Maintenance Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Appellate Tribunal are legal, justified and based on proper appreciation of the material available on record. It is submitted that respondent No. 3 is a widow senior citizen aged about 95 years who has been residing in the subject residential premises for the last several decades and had approached the Tribunal under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 only after being subjected to continuous harassment, intimidation and interference by the petitioners in her peaceful residence and dignity. Learned counsel submits that before the Tribunal respondent No. 3 had produced sufficient documentary material, including revenue records, construction-related documents, labour payment details, electricity bills standing in her name, affidavit of the contractor, financial documents, demand drafts and complaint/FIR papers, to establish her long settled possession over the premises, construction of the house from her own funds and the fact that the petitioners were merely permissive occupants who entered the premises only in the year 2022 and thereafter started asserting illegal rights over the property and harassing respondent No. 3. It is further submitted that the petitioners are attempting to

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convert welfare proceedings under the Act of 2007 into a civil title dispute by raising issues regarding ownership and demarcation of Khasra Nos. 1608/08 and 1608/10, whereas the proceedings before the Tribunal were not for declaration of title but for protection of a senior citizen from abuse, neglect and unlawful interference in her residence. Learned counsel would contend that the power to direct eviction is incidental and necessary for effective enforcement of the provisions of the Act of 2007 so as to secure peaceful residence and dignity of senior citizens, and therefore the contention of the petitioners that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the eviction order is wholly untenable. It is also submitted that even if any dispute regarding title or extent of land is alleged by the petitioners, the same cannot defeat the welfare jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal, particularly when both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal have concurrently recorded findings of fact regarding the long settled possession of respondent No. 3, the permissive occupation of the petitioners and the harassment caused to respondent No. 3. Learned counsel further submits that merely because the petitioners themselves claim to be senior citizens, no right accrues in their favour to continue occupying the premises of

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respondent No. 3 against her wishes or to subject her to mental harassment and intimidation. It is thus argued that the impugned orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of principles of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and as such the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with costs. Reliance has been placed upon the various judgments like Urmila Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Others 2025 INSC 20, Sunny Paul vs. State NCT of Delhi (2017) 4 AIRDelR 257, Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional Collector & Ors. SLP(Civil) D. No. 42786/2025 & Neeraj Baghel vs. Collector Raipur (2023) AIR (Chhattisgarh) 70.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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The principal challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and the appellate order dated 25/11/2024 affirming the same, whereby the petitioners have been directed to vacate the portion of the residential house occupied by them, upon the complaint made by respondent No. 3, who is the mother of petitioner No. 1 and a senior citizen aged about 93 years. The core submission of the petitioners is that the learned

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Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to direct eviction, particularly when the petitioners have raised a dispute with regard to title and ownership over the property in question and when, according to them, respondent No. 3 is not the true owner of the house. The petitioners have further sought to contend that the proceedings under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short, “the Act of 2007”) were not maintainable in the absence of a claim for maintenance and that the dispute, being essentially one concerning immovable property, could only be decided by a competent civil Court.

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Having considered the rival submissions, this Court is unable to persuade itself to accept the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The Act of 2007 is a beneficial and welfare-oriented legislation enacted with the avowed object of ensuring maintenance, protection, dignity and security of parents and senior citizens who, in the evening of their lives, are often exposed to neglect, abuse, harassment and deprivation even at the hands of their own children and relatives. The provisions of the statute, therefore, have to receive a purposive and liberal construction so as to advance the object sought to be

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achieved by the legislation rather than to frustrate it by adopting a narrow or hyper-technical approach.

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The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (MWPSC Act, 2007) plays a crucial role in promoting the well-being and dignity of senior citizens in India. It provides a legal framework for ensuring financial security, health care access and property protection for the elderly. By holding children and relatives accountable for the maintenance of their elderly family members, the act discourages neglect, abandonment and abuse of senior citizens. The Constitution of India also recognises the need for State intervention in taking measures to create suitable framework for the protection of elderly persons. As per the Article 41 under Directive Principles of State Policy:“the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing right to work, to education and to public assistance in case of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in other cases of undeserved want”.

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The Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is based on the vision of Article 41 of the Constitution. It was enacted by the Parliament to protect the rights and interests of senior citizens and enable them to lead a life with dignity and

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respect. It further aims to provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the well-being of senior citizens in India. The parliament enacted the Senior Citizens Act to uphold the dignity and respect of a senior citizen at the time of old age. State had serious concern about the challenges faced by the people in their old age. Apart from physical vulnerabilities, they face emotional and psychological challenges. On account of these frailties, they are totally dependent. The moral laws formulated through the legislation is necessary to rationalise the well-being of all in the society. The moral values that prevailed in the society in the past have been accepted as universal values. The State in its wisdom, considering the acceptance of these values,

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seeks to promote the common good through the Senior Citizens Act. These values carried duties and obligations. The preamble of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 underscores the need for effective provisions to secure the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, as guaranteed under the Constitution. Being a beneficial piece of legislation, it is necessary to interpret it liberally to ensure that the intent of the legislation is fulfilled and the rights and dignity of senior citizens are effectively protected.

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The Supreme Court in S. Vanitha v. Deputy

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Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors. , (2021) 15 SCC 730 , while interpreting the provisions of the Act of 2007, recognized the statute as a social welfare legislation intended to protect the maintenance and welfare of senior citizens and observed that the remedies under the Act must be construed in a manner that furthers the legislative purpose of securing dignity, maintenance and protection to elderly parents and senior citizens.

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Likewise, in Arun Kumar Nayyar v. State of Haryana & Ors. , (2022) 6 SCC 629 , the Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of the enactment is to ensure that senior citizens are not left destitute, neglected or at the mercy of their children or relatives, and that the provisions of the Act must be implemented in a manner consistent with its beneficial object.

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It is true that the Act of 2007 is not a substitute for a civil suit for declaration of title and that the Maintenance Tribunal does not function as a civil Court for adjudication of complex questions of ownership. However, that is not the true issue which arose for determination before the Tribunal in the present case. A careful reading of the application preferred by respondent No. 3 before the Maintenance Tribunal would

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show that her grievance was essentially one of harassment, neglect, intimidation and disturbance of her peaceful possession and residence in the house in which she has admittedly been residing for decades. The relief sought by her was in the nature of protection of her person and residence against the petitioners, who, according to her, had become a source of constant threat and mental harassment. The proceedings before the Tribunal were, therefore, not in the nature of a title suit, but were welfare proceedings initiated by an aged mother seeking protection against the conduct of her son and daughter-in-law. In such proceedings, the Tribunal was required to examine whether respondent No. 3, being a senior citizen, had established a case warranting protection of her residence and peaceful enjoyment of the property, and whether the continuance of the petitioners in the premises was inconsistent with such protection.

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In Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684 in para 13, the Supreme Court made an observation as under; (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

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“14. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the

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senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal.”

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The Supreme Court of India in the recent case of Urmila

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Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit (2025) 2 SCC 787 the Supreme Court clarified that Section 23 of Senior Citizens is not a standalone provision, as Section 23 cannot be read in isolation as it directly reflects the statutory purpose of safeguarding senior citizens, thus demanding a purposive approach. The court held, if a gift deed does not explicitly mention maintenance, it should be interpreted pragmatically to prevent neglect of the elderly. The Hon’ble Court interpreted Section 23(1) of the Act to hold that express condition in the deed may not be required and nonmaintenance of a senior citizen per se would result in invoking the implied condition for which such gift or settlement deed has been executed by the senior citizen out of love and affection, which is relatable to human conduct. In

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the said judgment, the Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the Senior Citizens Act in paras 23, 24 and 25,

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which reads as under : (SCC p. 796, paras 23-25)

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“23. The appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh Chhikara case6 must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the Tribunals below had rightly held the Gift Deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the wellbeing of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.

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24. Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the observations made vide the impugned order¹ qua the competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the property. In S. Vanitha v. Commr., (2021) 15 SCC 730, this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted

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under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.

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25.Another observation of the High Court that must be clarified, is Section 23 being a standalone provision of the Act. In our considered view, the relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of our country, in some cases, are not being looked after. It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee.”

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Further, in the matter of Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional

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Collector and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2077 , the Supreme Court emphasized that the provisions of the Act of 2007 must be construed in a manner that meaningfully protects the life, property and dignity of senior citizens, and upheld the authority of the Tribunal/Appellate Authority to secure eviction of children/legal heirs whose occupation had become detrimental to the senior citizens’ peaceful

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enjoyment of their own property. The ratio emerging from the aforesaid decisions is that the power of the Tribunal cannot be reduced to a sterile power to merely award money; where the facts justify, the Tribunal can grant effective relief to secure the senior citizen’s right to live peacefully and with dignity. Relevant para reads as under:-

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“7. The framework of the Act clearly notes that the law was enacted to address the plight of older persons, for their care and protection. Being a welfare legislation, its provisions must be construed liberally so as to advance its beneficent purpose. This Court on several occasions has observed that the Tribunal is well within its powers to order eviction of a child or a relative from the property of a senior citizen, when there is a breach of the obligation to maintain the senior citizen.2 In the present case, despite being financially stable, the respondent has acted in breach of his statutory obligations in not allowing the appellant to reside in the properties owned by him, thereby frustrating the very object of the Act. High Court fell in error in allowing the writ petition on a completely untenable ground.”

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In the considered opinion of this Court, once the proceedings are viewed in the correct statutory perspective, the principal argument of the petitioners that the Tribunal

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could not have passed an order of eviction merely because title is disputed, loses much of its force. It is now well settled that the jurisdiction exercised by the authorities under the Act of 2007 is not confined to directing payment of a monthly amount by way of maintenance, but extends to passing such incidental, ancillary and consequential directions as may be necessary to secure the maintenance, protection, residence and dignity of a senior citizen.

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In S. Vanitha (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal under the Act of 2007 may, where necessary and expedient, mould relief so as to protect the senior citizen and ensure that the statutory object is not defeated.

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The legal position, as narrated in the aforementioned paragraphs, in the context of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of India and High Courts, makes it clear that the conditions under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act need not be explicit, but might be implied. The love and affection being the consideration, which can be traced out in the settlement deed, would be sufficient to hold that such love and affection is an implied condition that the senior citizen will be taken care of by the beneficiary of the settlement deed or gift deed. In the event of neglecting the senior citizen, the deed of settlement or gift is liable to be

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annulled.

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In the present case, the material placed on record shows that respondent No. 3 is an aged widow and a senior citizen. The Tribunal has recorded a finding, on appreciation of the documentary material produced before it, that respondent No. 3 has been residing in the subject premises for a considerable length of time and that the petitioners were occupying a portion thereof in circumstances which did not confer upon them any independent indefeasible right to continue against the wishes of respondent No. 3. The reply and documents filed by respondent No. 3 before the Tribunal, as noticed in the impugned order and reiterated before this Court, included revenue records, electricity bills, construction-related documents, affidavit of the contractor, financial documents and complaints/FIR papers. The Appellate Tribunal has independently considered the same and affirmed the findings recorded by the Maintenance Tribunal. Thus, what emerges is that both the statutory authorities, upon appreciation of the material available before them, have concurrently accepted the case of respondent No. 3 regarding her possession, residence and the need for protection under the Act.

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At this stage, it would be apposite to note that the

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jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, while examining orders passed by statutory authorities under a welfare legislation, is supervisory and not appellate. This Court does not sit in appeal over the factual appreciation undertaken by the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. Interference would be warranted only if the impugned orders are shown to suffer from patent lack of jurisdiction, perversity, violation of principles of natural justice or manifest error apparent on the face of the record. Merely because another view may also be possible on facts, this Court would not substitute its own appreciation for that of the statutory authorities, particularly where the authorities have concurrently recorded findings on the basis of material placed before them. In the present case, the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate that the findings recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal are perverse or based on no evidence.

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Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the petitioners on the plea that respondent No. 3 is not the owner of the property and that the authorities have proceeded only on the basis of mutation entries in her favour. In this regard, there can be no quarrel with the proposition that mutation by itself does not confer title over

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immovable property and is primarily meant for fiscal purposes. Equally, there can be no dispute that questions of title, if seriously and substantially raised, are to be finally adjudicated by a competent civil Court. However, in the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the issue of title sought to be projected by the petitioners does not render the proceedings before the Tribunal nonmaintainable for more than one reason. First, the relief granted by the Tribunal was not a declaration of ownership in favour of respondent No. 3, but a protective direction under the Act of 2007 to secure her peaceful residence and dignity. Secondly, even according to the petitioners, the house in question is a common residential structure standing over Khasra Nos. 1608/08 and 1608/10 and respondent No. 3 is admittedly residing therein. Thirdly, the mere pendency of mutation appeal under Section 44 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, or the assertion of title by petitioner No. 2 on the basis of a sale deed, would not denude the Tribunal of its welfare jurisdiction to protect a senior citizen from harassment and to secure her residence. At the highest, such disputes may remain open for adjudication before the competent civil/revenue forum, but they cannot be permitted to obstruct the statutory protection

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available to respondent No. 3 under the Act of 2007.

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The argument that since respondent No. 3 is receiving pension and had not sought monthly maintenance, the very proceedings under the Act of 2007 were not maintainable, also does not merit acceptance. The concept of “maintenance” under the Act is not to be understood in a narrow monetary sense alone. The statute is designed to secure not merely financial support but also the broader welfare of parents and senior citizens, which includes food, residence, protection and the ability to live in peace and dignity. A senior citizen who is financially secure may yet be subjected to harassment, coercion, abuse or unlawful interference in her residence by her children or relatives, and it would be wholly contrary to the object of the Act to hold that in such a situation she is remediless merely because she does not seek a quantified amount of monthly maintenance. The legislative concern is with maintenance and welfare in a holistic sense. If the continuance of the petitioners in the premises is found by the Tribunal to be destructive of the senior citizen’s peace, safety and dignity, the Tribunal cannot be rendered powerless merely because the senior citizen is in receipt of pension.

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The further submission of the petitioners that petitioner Nos.

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1 and 2 are themselves senior citizens and therefore could not have been directed to vacate, is equally misconceived. The Act of 2007 protects senior citizens from neglect and abuse. It does not create a superior or overriding right in favour of one senior citizen to occupy the residential premises of another senior citizen against the latter’s wishes. The status of the petitioners as senior citizens may be a relevant circumstance in assessing equities, but it does not confer upon them an indefeasible right to remain in occupation of premises if their occupation is found to be inconsistent with the right of respondent No. 3 to live peacefully and securely. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal have proceeded on the factual premise that respondent No. 3, an aged widow, had approached the statutory forum because of persistent harassment and interference caused by the petitioners. Once that factual foundation is accepted, the mere age of the petitioners cannot by itself operate as a bar to the relief granted.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners also assailed the impugned orders on the ground of procedural irregularity, contending that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC filed by the petitioners was not separately decided, that the procedure contemplated under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh

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Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 regarding conciliation was not followed, and that no proper enquiry as contemplated under Sections 5(3) and 8(1) of the Act was held. Having gone through the orders impugned and the pleadings placed on record, this Court is unable to hold that any such infraction has occasioned failure of justice so as to warrant interference under Article 226. Proceedings before the Tribunal under the Act of 2007 are summary in nature and are not required to conform to the technicalities of a civil suit. The non-disposal of an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, by itself, would not vitiate the final order if the objections raised therein have, in substance, been considered while adjudicating the main case. In the present case, the principal objections raised by the petitioners namely, want of title of respondent No. 3, maintainability of the application, and absence of jurisdiction to order eviction have all been dealt with by the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal while rendering the final decision. As regards conciliation, though Rule 10 contemplates an attempt at settlement, such provision is directory and intended to facilitate amicable resolution where feasible; its non-invocation in a given case would not ipso facto render the proceedings void,

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particularly when the parties were heard, replies were filed, documents were produced and the matter was decided on merits. No material prejudice is shown to have been caused to the petitioners on account of the alleged non-compliance.

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This Court also does not find any substance in the plea that since respondent No. 3 is residing on the ground floor and the petitioners on the first floor, no issue of denial of residence or welfare could arise. The right protected by the Act of 2007 is not merely a right to a roof over one’s head in the abstract; it is a right to live in peace, security and dignity, free from intimidation, harassment and coercive interference. A senior citizen may well be physically residing in a portion of the house and yet be exposed to a hostile and oppressive atmosphere created by children or relatives occupying another portion of the same house. Whether such a situation exists in a given case is essentially a matter of factual assessment. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, after considering the pleadings, complaints and material placed on record, have accepted the version of respondent No. 3 that the continuance of the petitioners in the premises was inimical to her peaceful living. This Court does not find any perversity in such conclusion.

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The reliance placed by the petitioners upon their own police

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complaint against the younger son of respondent No. 3, and the allegation that the proceedings have been initiated at his behest to dispossess the petitioners, also does not advance the petitioners’ case. At best, the said material discloses that there are inter se disputes within the family. Such disputes, however, do not eclipse the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to examine the complaint of respondent No. 3 on its own merits. The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal were conscious of the competing allegations and, upon appreciation of the material, have chosen to accept the case of respondent No. 3. This Court cannot re-appreciate such disputed factual issues in exercise of writ jurisdiction as though sitting in appeal over the findings of the authorities.

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Another aspect which deserves emphasis is that the petitioners have attempted to read Section 23 of the Act in an unduly restrictive manner. While it is true that Section 23 specifically deals with transfer of property by a senior citizen subject to the condition of providing basic amenities and physical needs, the present case cannot be decided by isolating Section 23 from the broader scheme of the Act. The Tribunal in a given case may exercise jurisdiction to secure maintenance and protection of a senior citizen even where the matter is not confined to cancellation of a transfer

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under Section 23, provided the relief granted bears nexus to the statutory object of maintenance, welfare and protection. The Supreme Court decisions referred to above clearly underscore that the Act of 2007 is not to be reduced to a mere debt-recovery mechanism for monthly allowance; it is a welfare statute intended to secure meaningful protection to elderly persons. Once the factual foundation of neglect, harassment and threat to peaceful residence is established, the Tribunal is not powerless to grant effective relief.

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Insofar as the petitioners have sought to invoke Article 300A of the Constitution and contend that they are being deprived of property without authority of law, this Court is unable to accept the submission in the facts of the present case. The impugned orders have not been passed dehors law; they have been passed by statutory authorities constituted under the Act of 2007 in exercise of jurisdiction vested in them by a welfare legislation. The petitioners have been heard in the proceedings; they filed reply, documents and appeal; and the matter has been adjudicated by two forums. If the petitioners claim an independent title over any part of the property, it is always open to them to avail appropriate remedies before the competent civil forum in accordance with law. But so long as the impugned orders are traceable

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to statutory power exercised for protection of a senior citizen and do not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error, the challenge on the basis of Article 300A cannot be accepted.

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On an overall consideration of the matter, this Court is of the view that the controversy sought to be projected by the petitioners as a pure title dispute is, in substance, an attempt to dislodge the concurrent findings recorded by the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal in proceedings undertaken for the welfare and protection of an aged mother under the Act of 2007. The material on record demonstrates that respondent No. 3 is a senior citizen who approached the statutory forum alleging harassment and interference in her peaceful residence. The Tribunal, after considering the rival material, granted relief in her favour and the Appellate Tribunal, upon independent consideration, affirmed the same. The petitioners have failed to make out any case of jurisdictional error, perversity, violation of natural justice or manifest illegality so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

¶122

Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition. The same deserves to be and is hereby dismissed . The order dated 12/09/2024 passed by the learned Maintenance

¶123

32

¶124

Tribunal, Bilaspur, as affirmed by the appellate order dated 25/11/2024 passed by the District Magistrate-cum-Presiding Officer, Appellate Tribunal, Bilaspur, does not call for interference.

¶125

No order as to costs.

¶126

Sd/-

¶127

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge

¶128

Vishakha

Devendra Khanna v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Devendra Khanna v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

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