Pawan Verma, Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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CGHC010294332021

2026:CGHC:28333

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPC No. 5021 of 2021

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Pawan Verma, S/o Late Shri MD Verma Aged About 52 Years Presently Posted As Public Information Officer And Deputy Commissioner, Nagar Palika Nigam, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Department Of Urban Administration And Development, 4th Floor D-Block Indravati Bhawan, Atal Nagar Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Chhattisgarh State Information Commission, Through Its Commissioner, Sector-19, North Block, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, District Raipur - 492002 Chhattisgarh

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3 - Municipal Corporation, Korba, Through Its Commissioner, Saket Bhawan, Opposite District And Sessions Court, Korba, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Dr. Utpal Agrawal, R/o Purana Bus Stand, Korba, District Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

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	... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner	: Ms. Juhi Jaiswal, Advocate
For Resp. No.1	: Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer
For Resp. No.2	: Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocate
For Resp. No.3	: Mr. PankajAgrawal,Advocate

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S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge

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Order on Board

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Digitally signed by PRAVEEN KUMAR SINHA Date: 2026.07.13 10:58:36 +0530

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08/07/2026

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Petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs:-

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“(10.1) It is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the present case, for its kind perusal.

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(10.2) This Hon'ble Court may kindly Pleased to issue an appropriate Writ and set-aside the impugned order dated 19.10.2020 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent no 2.

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(10.3) Any other relief / relief's which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition may also be pleased to be granted to the petitioner.”

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner while working on the post of Deputy Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Korba and also holding post of Public Information Officer. Respondent No.4 filed application under Right to Information Act, 2005 (in short “Act of 2005”) seeking information on the points as mentioned therein. Information as sought for by respondent No.4 could not be provided because the petitioner was not in possession of relevant records. He had issued letters in this regard to the concerned Sections and Department of the Municipal Corporation, Korba and has further informed to respondent No.3/Municipal Corporation of non-availability of the information with him as sought for by the applicant. She also submits that as soon as petitioner came in possession of the records and documents by which information could be provided, the information

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was sent to respondent No.4 through registered post which he refused to accept. She contended that respondent No.2 while passing the impugned order on 19.10.2020 of imposing penalty under Section 20 (1) and making recommendation for initiation of disciplinary proceeding against petitioner under Section 20 (2) of the Act of 2005, had not given proper opportunity of hearing to him. Referring to para-9 of the proceeding dated 19.10.2020, it is argued that in the proceeding dated 19.10.2020 extracted the order sheet dated 18.09.2019 wherein direction was issued to concerned Clerk to forward the copy of order sheet as also to issue show cause notice as to why action under Section 20 (1) and 20 (2) of the Act of 2005 be not taken against the petitioner. However, copy of notice was not received. She also submits that show cause notice was issued in the proceeding dated 18.09.2019, however, without ascertaining the fact that as to whether the notice issued by respondent No.2 was served upon the petitioner or not, only observing that reply has not been submitted, respondent No.2 has passed the order impugned, which is in violation of principle of natural justice. In support of her submission, she places reliance upon the decision in the case of Manohar S/o Manikrao Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr . reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14.

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Learned counsel for respondent No.2 would vehemently oppose the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that pursuant to observation made by this Court on the last date of hearing, along with reply he has enclosed documents to show that notice as ordered was dispatched to the petitioner on 25.10.2019

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through registered post and he has also enclosed copy of entries of the letter booked by MBC, Raipur RMS. Letter sent to Municipal Corporation Korba is mentioned at Sr. No.141 and date of booking is shown as 26.10.2019. Therefore, submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice is not dispatched is not correct. From the impugned order, it is reflecting that the petitioner after receipt of notice which was forwarded through registered post has not replied and therefore respondent No.2/Information Commission has passed the impugned order and there is no arbitrariness or illegality in the order passed by respondent No.2. Hence, it does not call for any interference.

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Learned counsel for respondent No.3/ Municipal Corporation Korba submits that in the reply filed by respondent No.3, there is specific pleading that information as sought for by respondent No.4 has been supplied to the petitioner vide letter dated 20.09.2019 and, thereafter, it is the job of the petitioner being a Public Information Officer to supply relevant information to respondent No.4.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with the writ petition.

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From the order sheet, the fact which is emerging is that application under the Act of 2005 was filed by respondent No.4 before the Public Information Officer on 18.03.2015. According to reply submitted by Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Korba information sent to the Public Information Officer only on 20.09.2019. It is the plea of petitioner that after receipt of relevant

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information he has forwarded the said information through registered post to respondent No.4 which he refused to accept.

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One of the submission and argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to passing of punitive order of imposition of penalty as also making recommendation for initiating disciplinary proceeding against him is in violation of principles of natural justice as show cause notice sent under Section 20 (1) and 20 (2) of the Act of 2005 was not served upon the petitioner.

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To examine said argument, I have perused the records available. Documents filed along with reply by respondent No.2 of dispatch register and the document of postal department receipt of booking, registered post shows that some letter has been dispatched from the office of respondent No.2 and one of the letter is also booked in the postal department for Municipal Corporation Korba. Perusal of the impugned order would show that though in the order, respondent No.2 has extracted its earlier order dated 18.09.2019 of sending notice under Section 20 (1) and 20 (2) to the petitioner. However, in order sheet dated 19.10.2020 when the order is passed imposing penalty upon the petitioner under Section 20 (1) and further order under Section 20 (2) of the Act of 2005, respondent No.2 has not recorded his satisfaction with regard to service of notice sent to petitioner under Section 20 (1) and 20 (2) of the Act of 2005.

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In absence of satisfaction of service of notice as to why punishment be not imposed and why initiation of disciplinary proceeding be not recommended against the petitioner, order

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passed by respondent No.2/Information Commission of imposing penalty on petitioner and also making recommendation for initiation of disciplinary proceeding against him, in the opinion of this Court, is in violation of principles of natural justice and therefore it is not sustainable in law.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Manohar (supra) while dealing with the similar issue observed thus:-

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“ 21 . Referring to the requirement of adherence to principles of natural justice in adjudicatory process, this Court in Namit Sharma v. Union of India [(2013) 1 SCC 745 : (2013) held as under: (SCC p. 799, para 99)

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“99. It is not only appropriate but is a solemn duty of every adjudicatory body, including the tribunals, to state the reasons in support of its decisions. Reasoning is the soul of a judgment and embodies one of the three pillars on which the very foundation of natural justice jurisprudence rests. It is informative to the claimant of the basis for rejection of his claim, as well as provides the grounds for challenging the order before the higher authority/constitutional court. The reasons, therefore, enable the authorities, before whom an order is challenged, to test the veracity and correctness of the impugned order. In the present times, since the fine line of distinction between the functioning of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies is gradually becoming faint, even the administrative bodies are required to pass reasoned orders. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 981] and CCT v. Shukla & Bros. [(2010) 4 SCC 785] ”

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22. We may notice that proviso to Section 20(1) specifically contemplates that before imposing the

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penalty contemplated under Section 20(1), the Commission shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the officer concerned. However, there is no such specific provision in relation to the matters covered under Section 20(2). Section 20(2) empowers the Central or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal for the reasons stated in that section, to recommend for disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the relevant service rules. Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may impose penal consequences. When such a recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a “recommendation” and not a “mandate” to conduct an enquiry. “Recommendation” must be seen in contradistinction to “direction” or “mandate”. But recommendation itself vests the delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major penalty.

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23. Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the provisions of Section 20(2). It is a settled canon of civil jurisprudence including service jurisprudence that no person be condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action is an order in the form of recommendation which has far reaching civil consequences. It will not be permissible to take the view that compliance with principles of natural

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justice is not a condition precedent to passing of a recommendation under Section 20(2).

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24. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 786] the Court stressed upon compliance with the principles of natural justice in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Absence of such specific requirement would invalidate the order. The Court, reiterating the principles stated in the English Law in R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex p London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [(1924) 1 KB 171 : 1923 All ER Rep 150 (CA)] , held as under: (Udit Narain case [AIR 1963 SC 786] , AIR pp. 788-89, para 8)

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“8. … The following classic test laid down by Lord Justice Atkin, as he then was, in R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex p London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [(1924) 1 KB 171 : 1923 All ER Rep 150 (CA)] and followed by this Court in more than one decision clearly brings out the meaning of the concept of judicial act: (KB p. 205)

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‘Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.’

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Lord Justice Slesser in R. v. London County Council, ex p Entertainments Protection Assn. Ltd. [(1931) 2 KB 215 (CA)] dissected the concept of judicial act laid down by Atkin, L.J., into the following heads in his judgment: (KB p. 243)

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‘Wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority—a writ of certiorari may issue.’

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It will be seen from the ingredients of judicial act that there must be a duty to act judicially. A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of a party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void. As a writ of certiorari will be granted to remove the record of proceedings of an inferior tribunal or authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial acts, ex hypothesi it follows that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction shall also act judicially in disposing of the proceedings before it.”

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25. Thus, the principle is clear and settled that right of hearing, even if not provided under a specific statute, the principles of natural justice shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded. It is more so when exercise of authority is likely to vest the person with consequences of civil nature.”

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In the aforementioned facts of the case and decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to above, where there is no material to suggest that petitioner was served with the notice of imposing punishment under Section 20 (1) and making recommendation for initiation of disciplinary proceeding under Section 20 (2) of the Act of 2005, impugned order passed by respondent No.2 so far as it relates to imposing penalty and making recommendation for initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, is in violation of principles of natural justice and hence it is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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Accordingly, impugned order dated 19.10.2020 (Annexure P-1) so far as it relates to imposition of penalty upon the petitioner under Section 20 (1) and making recommendation for initiation of disciplinary proceeding against him under Section 20 (2) of the Act of 2005 is concerned, is hereby set aside.

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Matter is remitted back to respondent No.2/Information Commission for passing order in this regard afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

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Writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent and in the manner indicated above.

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Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge

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Praveen

Pawan Verma, v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Pawan Verma, v. State of Chhattisgarh

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