Kanchanmala Singh Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI

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2026:CGHC:13712

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPC No. 1020 of 2016

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1 - Smt. Kanchanmala W/o Shri Narayan Singh, Aged About 59 Years Caste- Gond, R/o Village And Post Office Mohla, TahsilMohla, Revenue District- Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Its Secretary, Department Of Revenue And Affairs, Ministry At Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, P. S. Rakhi, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Collector, Rajnandgaon, District- Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Sub Divisional Officer Revenue, Mohla, DistrictRajnandgaon Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Ajeet Vasant I A S, At Present Holding The Post Of Sub Divisional Officer, Mohla, District- Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Tahsildar, Mohla, District- Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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6 - Gram Panchayat, Mohla, Through- Its Secretary, TahsilMohla, District- Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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WPC No. 2032 of 2021

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1 - Kanchanmala Singh W/o Late Shri Narayan Singh Aged About 64 Years Caste Gond , R/o Village And Post Mohla Tahsil Mohla , District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner(s)

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Versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary , Department Of Revenue And Affairs Mahanadi Mantralaya , Naya Raipur , Post Office And Police Station Naya Raipur , District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Collector Rajnandgaon District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Mohla, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Tahsildar Mohla, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Gram Panchayat Mohla Through Its Secretary , Tahsil Mohla, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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6 - Saraswati Thakur Aged About 58 Years Sarpanch Village Mohla Tahsil Mohla, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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(Cause title is taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha, Advocate For State : Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel Lawyer

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SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Order on Board

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23.03.2026

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The petitioner has filed these writ petitions seeking following

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reliefs :

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WPC No. 1020 of 2016 :

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“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to call the entire records pertaining to this case.

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10.2 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue writ in the nature of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, thereby set aside and declare illegal, the impugned order dated 11-042016 passed by res, no 4 assuming authority of res. no 3.

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10.3 Hon'ble court may further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to not disturb the petitioner from farming on her bhumiswami land, as and how she is desired to do so in her better interest.

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10.4 Hon'ble court may further be pleased to take stern action against the res. no 4 who is unnecessary disturbing threatening under the robe of IAS officer and its authority to the petitioner from conducting farming on her bhumiswami land. Hon'ble court may also be kindly pleased to direct the respondent authorities to let give clear instructions and guidelines to the res. no 4 that he will not misuse his power either personally or through any one else for threatening the petitioner, pertaining to this case in present or in future.

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10.5 Hon'ble court may further be kindly pleased to pass any other relief(s) which it deems fit along with cost of the petition in the interest of justice.”

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WPC No. 2032 of 2021 :

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“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to stop the illegal fencing of the land of Khasara No. 189/3 and 194/1.

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10.2 That, this Hon'ble court may also be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to take the stringent legal action against the respondent no. 6.

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10.3 Cost of the petition may also be granted to the petitioner.

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10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.”

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Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner is a recorded bhumiswami of several parcels of land bearing Khasra Nos. 190/1, 192/1, 192/3, 194/5, and 194/2, admeasuring a total area of 9.575 hectares (hereinafter referred to as the “disputed land”). The petitioner, belonging to a Scheduled Tribe community, earns her livelihood through agriculture and has been cultivating crops on the said land. The revenue records, including the B-1 extract, reflect her ownership, and a joint enquiry conducted by the Nayab Tahsildar, Revenue Inspector, and Patwari, upon spot inspection and verification of records, also confirmed that the disputed land belongs to the petitioner. A dispute arose when the Gram Panchayat Mohla, through its Sarpanch, submitted a memorandum dated 28.03.2016 to the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), alleging that the petitioner was excavating a pond-like

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structure on the disputed land, which the villagers claimed to be Nistari land. Acting upon this complaint, the Tahsildar passed an interim order dated 28.03.2016 restraining the petitioner from carrying out excavation work and initiated revenue proceedings by issuing notices to the petitioner and directing a detailed spot enquiry. Pursuant to such directions, a joint enquiry was conducted, and the report dated 02.04.2016 concluded that although a pond-like structure existed on the land, it formed part of the petitioner’s bhumiswami land, and no such structure was recorded in the official revenue records. After considering the enquiry report, documents, and hearing both parties, the Tahsildar, by a reasoned order dated 06.04.2016, held that the disputed land belongs to the petitioner and that she is entitled to use it, including for excavation purposes. Consequently, the earlier interim restraint order was set aside. However, despite the said order attaining finality, the SDO, Mohla (Respondent No. 4), allegedly acted without jurisdiction and passed an impugned order dated 11.04.2016, interfering with the Tahsildar’s decision without following due process of law. The impugned order neither disclosed the provision under which it was passed nor indicated whether it was in exercise of appellate or revisional powers. It also contained apparent inconsistencies, including reference to proceedings dated 12.04.2016 despite the order being passed on 11.04.2016. The petitioner contends that no opportunity of hearing was granted and that the action was arbitrary, mala fide, and in

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violation of principles of natural justice. It is further alleged that the concerned officers acted in undue haste, and even personally approached the petitioner to enforce the impugned order with threats. The petitioner, being a Scheduled Tribe woman dependent on agriculture for livelihood, asserts that the impugned action has deprived her of her lawful rights over her land and is contrary to the constitutional mandate of protection to vulnerable sections. During the pendency of the said writ petition, related disputes arose, forming the subject matter of WPC No. 2032 of 2021. In the connected matter, it is alleged that Respondent No. 6 carried out illegal fencing and alterations on adjoining lands bearing Khasra Nos. 189/3 and 194/1, which are used as a common pathway by villagers, thereby causing obstruction and hardship to the petitioner and the general public. It is further stated that despite knowledge of the pendency of WPC No. 1020 of 2016 and an interim stay granted therein, as well as directions issued by the competent authority to maintain status quo, Respondent No. 6 continued with the illegal activities. The petitioner alleges that such actions are arbitrary, politically motivated, and carried out with mala fide intent, particularly in light of alleged political influence wielded by Respondent No. 6. Repeated representations made by the petitioner to the authorities failed to yield any effective action. Thus, the dispute essentially revolves around the petitioner’s lawful ownership and use of the disputed land, the alleged illegal interference by revenue authorities without jurisdiction, and subsequent acts of

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encroachment and obstruction by private respondents despite pendency of proceedings and subsisting interim protection granted by the Court.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the actions and omissions of the respondent authorities are wholly unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that the petitioner is the recorded bhumiswami of the disputed land, which stands conclusively established from the revenue records, including Annexure P/2, as well as the enquiry report submitted by the competent authorities before the Tahsildar. It is further submitted that the joint enquiry conducted by the Nayab Tahsildar, Revenue Inspector, and Patwaris, after spot inspection and verification of records, clearly records that there is no mention of any pond-like structure in the revenue records pertaining to the disputed land, and that the petitioner was carrying out excavation work on her own bhumiswami land. Based on such enquiry and after affording due opportunity of hearing to all parties, the Tahsildar passed a well-reasoned and lawful order dated 06.04.2016, declaring the petitioner’s rights over the land and permitting her to utilize the same in accordance with law. Learned counsel submits that the said order passed by the Tahsildar is a competent and jurisdictional order, which attains finality unless set aside by a duly constituted appellate or revisional authority in accordance with law. However, Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, without there being any appeal or revision preferred before them, and

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without any authority of law, have illegally interfered with the said order by passing the impugned order, thereby exceeding their jurisdiction. It is further contended that the impugned order suffers from patent illegality and non-application of mind, inasmuch as it refers to proceedings dated 12.04.2016 while having been passed on 11.04.2016, which is an apparent impossibility. The impugned order does not disclose any statutory provision under which it has been passed, nor does it indicate the existence of any appellate or revisional proceedings. The respondents have failed to assign any reasons or deal with the findings recorded by the Tahsildar, and have, in a hurried and arbitrary manner, declared the petitioner’s conduct to be wrongful without any legal basis. Learned counsel further submits that the conduct of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is wholly arbitrary and high-handed, as they not only passed the impugned order without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, but also personally visited her residence along with subordinate officials, served a copy of the order, and threatened her with adverse consequences in case she continued work on her own land. Such actions, it is argued, demonstrate a complete disregard for the rule of law and amount to misuse of official authority for extraneous considerations. It is emphatically argued that such arbitrary exercise of power by public authorities, particularly by senior officers entrusted with implementation of welfare schemes, strikes at the very foundation of the rule of law. The petitioner, being a Scheduled Tribe woman dependent on

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agriculture for her livelihood, has been unlawfully deprived of her legitimate rights, and therefore deserves protection of this Hon’ble Court to ensure enforcement of her fundamental and legal rights. In continuation, with respect to the connected matter, learned counsel submits that the actions of Respondent No. 6 in illegally fencing and encroaching upon the adjoining land are equally arbitrary and unlawful. It is contended that the said land is being used as a common pathway by the petitioner and the villagers, and such obstruction infringes their right of way, recognized under the law of easements. It is further submitted that despite the fact that the subject matter of the land is pending consideration before this Hon’ble Court in the present writ petition, and despite clear directions issued by the competent authority on 27.03.2021 to maintain status quo, Respondent No. 6 has proceeded with illegal fencing and alterations in blatant disregard of such orders. Even repeated advisories, as reflected in the panchnama dated 27.03.2021, were ignored by Respondent No. 6. Learned counsel submits that the said actions are not only illegal but are also actuated by mala fide and political considerations, as Respondent No. 6 is allegedly wielding political influence and using the administrative machinery to harass the petitioner. It is further contended that there exists no urgency or governmental scheme warranting such actions, which further reinforces the arbitrary nature of the conduct. It is also submitted that the petitioner, who is a widow and suffering from health issues, has been subjected to

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undue harassment, and the actions of the respondents are intended to frustrate her rights for extraneous and political reasons. The entire sequence of events clearly reflects malice in law as well as in fact. In light of the above submissions, it is urged that the impugned actions of the respondents are liable to be set aside, and appropriate relief be granted in favour of the petitioner.

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Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is contended that the petitioner has an efficacious and alternative statutory remedy available under the law, which she has failed to avail. Learned State counsel submits that under Section 44 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, the petitioner has the remedy to approach the competent authority, i.e., the Collector, by way of appeal/revision for redressal of her grievance against the orders passed by the revenue authorities. However, without exhausting the said alternative remedy, the petitioner has directly invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that it is a settled principle of law that when a statutory alternative remedy is available, the writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised, particularly in matters involving disputed questions of fact arising out of revenue proceedings. The petitioner, instead of following the procedure prescribed under law, has chosen to bypass the statutory mechanism,

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and therefore, the present petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. Accordingly, learned State counsel submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine, leaving it open for the petitioner to avail the appropriate remedy as provided under the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code.

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Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the record, this Court finds that the core dispute pertains to the rights of the petitioner over the disputed land and the legality of the orders passed by the revenue authorities.

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The petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 11.04.2016 primarily on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, violation of principles of natural justice, and arbitrariness. On the other hand, learned State counsel has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the present writ petitions on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code.

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It is a settled principle of law that where a statutory remedy is available, the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily refrains from entertaining a writ petition, unless exceptional circumstances are made out.

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Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Leelavathi N. and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2253 has held as under :

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“35. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, (2024) 6 SCC 579, has held as under:

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“37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them are thus:

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(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question;

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(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure;

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(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and

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(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.

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It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. ”

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(Emphasis Supplied)”

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In the present case, the petitioner has an alternative remedy available under Section 44 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code to challenge the impugned order before the competent authority. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter and further considering the availability of the alternative remedy

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available under the law, this Court is not inclined to examine the merits of the case at this stage.

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Accordingly, the present petitions are disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy available under the law. While considering the aforesaid aspect, the petitioner is granted four weeks’ time to approach the concerned authority and to file an appropriate appeal/revision or application against the impugned order along with an application for interim stay. In the event such an application for interim relief is filed, the concerned authority is directed to consider and decide the same in accordance with law, keeping in view the order dated 06.04.2016, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two weeks from the date of filing. Till such time, and for a period of two weeks thereafter or till consideration of the interim application, whichever is earlier, the respondent authorities are directed not to take any coercive steps against the petitioner.

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11.With the aforesaid observations and directions, both the writ petitions stand disposed of.

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No order as to costs.

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Sd/-

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(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge

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Shayna

Kanchanmala Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Kanchanmala Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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