Gopal Rajput Vs Smt. Gulapa Bai Rajput

¶1

1

‘

2026:CGHC:17026

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶6

WP227 No. 522 of 2019

¶7

1 - Gopal Rajput S/o Late Ramkali Rajput Aged About 57 Years R/o Village Pandarbhatta, Police Station Mungeli, Tahsil Mungeli, DistrictMungeli, Chhattisgarh...........(Defendant), District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶8

... Petitioner(s)

¶9

versus

¶10

1 - Smt. Gulapa Bai Rajput D/o Late Ramkali Rajput W/o Shri Birsingh Rajput, R/o Village Kathakoni, Tahsil- Takhatpur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

¶11

2 - Smt. Milapa Bai Rajput D/o Late Ramkali Rajput W/o Shri Ishwar Rajput, R/o Village Kawrakapa, Tahsil, Navagarh, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

¶12

3 - Smt. Shail Kumari Rajput D/o Late Ramkali Rajput W/o Vishnu Rajput, R/o Village Parsada, Tahsil Pathariya, District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶13

4 - Smt. Jageshwari Rajput D/o Late Ramkali Rajput W/o Shri Subhash Rajput, R/o Village Lamti, Tahsil Pathariya, District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶14

5 - Smt. Santoshi Rajput D/o Late Ramkali Rajput W/o Shri Dushyant

¶15

2

¶16

Kumar Rajput R/o Village Dalpurva, Tahsil Pathariya, District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶17

6 - Ramgulam S/o Late Ramkali Raput Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Chamari (Chitragupta), Police Station And Tahsil Mungeli, DistrictMungeli, Chhattisgarh., District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶18

... Respondent(s)

¶19

For Petitioner(s)	: Shri Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate
For Respondent(s)	: Nonepresent

¶20

(Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)

¶21

Order on Board

¶22

13/04/2026

¶23

The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order dated 13.02.2019 passed by the learned Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge, Mungeli in MJC No. 03/2017 whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been dismissed and consequently, the Miscellaneous Appeal preferred by him has also been dismissed.

¶24

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had instituted a civil suit (C.S. No. 1-A/2022) for declaration of title and permanent injunction before the learned trial Court. The said Civil Suit was dismissed for want of prosecution on 03.02.2006. Within the stipulated time frame, the petitioner filed an application under Order IX Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking restoration of the suit however, the said application came to be rejected by the learned trial

¶25

3

¶26

court vide order dated 3.10.2009 passed in MJC No. 02/2006.

¶27

Thereafter the petitioner preferred a Miscellaneous Appeal against the said order dated 03.10.2009 before the learned Additional Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge, Mungeli along with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of about 7 ½ years. He further submits that the delay occurred as the petitioner had gone outside the State to earn his livelihood and the counsel engaged by him was seriously ill and could not inform him about the proceedings. He submtis that sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay and the Appellate Court ought to have taken a liberal view in the interest of substantial justice. It is further argued that dismissal of the appeal on the ground of limitation has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner, as he may be deprived of prosecuting the civil suit. Therefore, the impugned order may be set aside and the learned Appellate Court be directed to decide the appeal on its own merits.

¶28

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition.

¶29

It is not in dispute that the application filed by the petitioner under Order IX Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the CPC before the learned trial Court in MJC No. 02/2006 was dismissed on 03.10.2009. Instead of promptly challenging the said order, the petitioner remained silent for about 7 ½ years and thereafter he filed the Miscellaneous Appeal along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The reasons

¶30

4

¶31

assigned by the petitioner for condonation of delay, namely that he had gone outside the State to earn his livelihood and that his counsel was seriously ill, does not appear to be sufficient hence, delay of 7 ½ years is inordinate and no satisfactory or plausible explanation has been furnished to justify such prolonged inaction.

¶32

Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 INSC 932, while considering the issue of delay has been pleased to issue certain directions and has observed as follows:

¶33

“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

¶34

"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

¶35

“15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to

¶36

5

¶37

explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

¶38

Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

¶39

5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a

¶40

6

¶41

member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

¶42

“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not 8 convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

¶43

It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

¶44

The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the

¶45

7

¶46

appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial 9 justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

¶47

We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

¶48

xxx xxx xxx

¶49

In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under

¶50

8

¶51

Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

¶52

In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

¶53

For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

¶54

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

¶55

6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning

¶56

in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the

¶57

9

¶58

Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s)concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

¶59

There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for

¶60

10

¶61

filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to e13 ptxpire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. 12 State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”

¶62

Remaining silent for about 7 ½ years, itself shows that he was negligent in prosecuting his case and the learned Appellate Court upon due consideration, has rightly held that the petitioner has failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 7 ½ years.

¶63

From perusal of the impugned order as well as the material placed on record, this Court is also of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the Appellate Court does not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting interference under writ jurisdiction.

¶64

Accordingly, the petition failed and is hereby dismissed.

¶65

Sd/-

¶66

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

¶67

Digitally signed by SUGUNA SUGUNA DUBEY DUBEY Date:2026.04.17 18:22:29 +0530

Gopal Rajput v. Smt. Gulapa Bai Rajput

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Gopal Rajput v. Smt. Gulapa Bai Rajput

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Akansha Lal Vs Jyothsna George

Siddique Khan Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Abc Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Hetram Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Pramod Dansena Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Loknath Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh