Amir Mohommad Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.06.15 17:58:28 +0530

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2026:CGHC:23834

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Reserved for orders on :15-05-2026

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Order passed on : 15-06-2026

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WP227 No. 59 of 2026

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1 - Vindhyachal Singh S/o Late Shri Janak Singh, Aged About 79 Years, R/o ITI Colony, Ambikapur, Tahsil Ambikapur, Distt. Sarguja (C.G.)

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--- Petitioner

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versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Ambikapur Collectorate Office District Sarguja (C.G.)

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2 - Manoj Kumar Singh S/o Late Devraj Singh, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, Tehsil Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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3 - Asha Singh S/o Late Dinesh Singh, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, Tehsil Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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4 - Asha Jaiswal W/o Dhirendra Jaiswal, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, Tehsil Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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5 - Amir Mohammad S/o Late Sharif Mohammad, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, Tehsil Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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6 - Lakhan Agrawal S/o Late Ramchandra Agrawal, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, Tehsil Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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--- Respondents

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WP227 No. 100 of 2026

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1 - Manoj Kumar Singh S/o Late Devraj Singh, Aged About 55 Years, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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2 - Asha Singh D/o Late Dinesh, Aged About 52 Years, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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3 - Lakhan Agrawal S/o Late Ramchandra Agrawal, Aged About 61 Years, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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--- Petitioners

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Versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.)

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2 - Commissioner, Sarguja Division (Ambikapur), District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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3 - Collector, Sarguja Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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4 - Sub-Divsional Officer (Revenue), Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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5 - Tahsildar (Nazul), Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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6 - Vindhyachal Singh S/o Late Janak Singh, Aged About 72 Years, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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7 - Asha Jaiswal W/o Dhirendra Jaiswal, Aged About 56 Years, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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8 - Amir Mohammed S/o Late Sharif Mohammed, Aged About 55 Years, R/o I.T.I. Colony, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.)

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--- Respondents

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WP227 No. 146 of 2026

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1 - Amir Mohommad S/o Late Shareef Mohommad, Aged About 70 Years, R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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2 - Shayda Begum W/o Mo. Hameed, Aged About 52 Years, R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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3 - Fatimabegam Musalmana W/o Late Sharifamo Musalmana, Aged About 56 Years, R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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4 - Mumtaz Brgum W/o Rasheed Mohommad, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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5 - Kaisar Noor W/o Sameer Khan, Aged About 36 Years, R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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--- Petitioners

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Versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Revenue and Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Distt. Raipur (C.G.)

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2 - Collector, Surguja District- Surguja (C.G.)

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3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Sub Division Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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4 - Tahsildar Cum Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

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5 - Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur, District- Surguja (C.G.)

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6 - Station House Officer, Police Station Ambikapur, District- Surguja (C.G.)

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7 - Manoj Kumar Singh S/o Late Devraj Singh, (revision applicant no.01), R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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8 - Asha Singh D/o Late Dinesh Singh, (revision applicant no.02), R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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9 - Vindhyachal Singh S/o Late Janak Singh, (revision applicant no.03), R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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10 - Asha Jaiswal W/o Dhirendra Jaiswal, (revision applicant no.04), R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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11 - Lakhan Agrawal S/o Late Ramchandra Agrawal, (revision applicant no.06), R/o Near Gandi Chowk and ITI Colony, Behind Gulab Colony, P.O. Ambikapur, Police Station and Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt.- Surguja (C.G.)

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--- Respondents

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(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioners : Mr. Animesh Verma, Advocate (in WP227 No.100/2026).

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Mr. Gagan Pandey, Advocate (in WP227 No.146/2026) For State-Respondents : Mr. Ghanshyam Kashyap, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.

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C A V Order

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As all three writ petitions emanate from the same set of proceedings and challenge the legality and validity of a common order passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, raising substantially identical questions of fact and law, they were heard together and are being decided by this common order.

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Writ Petition (227) No. 59 of 2026 has been preferred by the petitioner, Vindhyachal Singh, Writ Petition (227) No. 100 of 2026 has been filed by the petitioners Manoj Kumar Singh, Asha Singh and Lakhan Agrawal, and the Writ Petition (227) No. 146 of 2026 has been instituted by the petitioners Amir Mohommad, Shayda Begum, Fatima Begam, Mumtaz Begum and Kaishar Noor. In the Writ Petition (227) No. 146 of 2026, the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5, namely Shayda Begum, Fatima Begam, Mumtaz Begum and Kaisar Noor, were not the parties before the Board of Revenue; however, they filed an application (I.A. No. 04/2026) in the present writ petition for permission to file a writ petition. It is pertinent to note that Smt. Asha Jaiswal, who was arrayed as Applicant No. 4 before the Chhattisgarh

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Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, has not assailed the impugned order and, therefore, has been impleaded as a respondent in the present writ petitions. 3. All the aforesaid writ petitions have been preferred, calling in question the legality and validity of the common order dated 07.01.2026, passed by the learned Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, in Revision Case No. RN/16/R/A-20(1)/81/2025, whereby the revenue revision preferred by the petitioners has been dismissed.

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In WP227 No.59/2026 , the petitioner prayed for the following relief(s):-

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“10.1 It is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for its kind perusal.

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10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order, direction thereby quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 07/01/2026 (Annexure P/1).

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10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order, direction thereby directing the respondents to grant patta to the petitioner for the subject plot.

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10.4 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order, direction thereby declaring the action of the respondents against the petitioners as without jurisdiction.

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10.5 Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also be granted to the petitioners.”

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In WP227 No.100/2026 , the petitioners prayed for the following relief(s):-

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“1] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions and the impugned order 07.01.2026 ( ANNEXURE P/1) passed by Board of Revenue , Bilaspur (C.G.), in Revision Case No. R.N./16/R/A20(1)/81/2025 in the matter of Manoj Kumar Singh and others

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v/s. State of Chhattisgarh may kindly be set-aside, in the interest if justice.

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2] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions and the order 30.12.2024 and 13.01.2026 passed by the Tehsildar NazulAmbikapur for the Eviction may kindly be set-aside, in the interest if justice

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3] That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.”

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In WP227 No.146/2026 , the petitioners prayed for the following relief(s):-

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“10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ setting-aside impugned notice dated 09.06.2025 and 13.01.2026 (Annexure P/3 colly), passed by Tahsildar cum Nazul Officer Ambikapur, Distt Surguja, in the interest of justice.

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10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ setting-aside impugned notice dated 12.12.2024 (Annexure P/8), passed by Tahsildar cum Nazul Officer Ambikapur, Distt Surguja, in the interest of justice.

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10.3 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ setting-aside impugned order of SDO (R) dated 17.01.2025 (ANNEXURE P/9) in the interest of justice.

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10.4 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ setting-aside impugned order of Commissioner dated 24.02.2025 (ANNEXURE P/10) in the interest of justice.

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10.5 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ setting-aside impugned order of Board of Revenue dated 07.01.2026 (ANNEXURE P/11) in the interest of justice.

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10.6 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ directing the respondent to regularize the occupation of the petitioners in khsra number 505/1 by granting lease hold right under the patta act.

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Alternatively,

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That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ directing the respondent to provide rehabilitation by allotment of houses under the Pradhan mantri aawas yojna, houses for all

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10.7 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem and proper in the present circumstances of the case.”

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WP227 No.59 of 2026 was filed by the petitioner, Vindhyachal Singh, through his counsel, Mr. Animesh Verma, Advocate. Subsequently, the petitioner withdrew the case file from the office of his counsel, whereupon Mr. Animesh Verma filed I.A. No.4 of 2026 on 13.03.2026 seeking permission to withdraw his Vakalatnama. When the matter was taken up for hearing on 27.03.2026, Mr. Animesh Verma expressed his inability to represent the petitioner any further. Thereafter, neither the petitioner nor any counsel on his behalf appeared before this Court to prosecute the writ petition. However, since WP227 No. 59 of 2026 arises out of the same proceedings and challenges the very same order which is under consideration in the connected writ petitions, this Court, instead of dismissing the petition for want of prosecution, considers it appropriate to

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examine and decide the same on merits. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are being heard and decided together by this common order.

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The brief facts, as projected in all three writ petitions, are that the petitioners claim to be in possession of portions of Nazul land bearing Khasara Number/Plot No. 505/1 (in the case of the petitioners in WP227 No. 100 of 2026, portions of Plot Nos. 505/1 and 505/5), situated at Sheet No. 2, Ward No. 14, Ambikapur, Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja. According to the petitioners, they have constructed their respective residential houses over the said land and have been residing thereon for the last 40 to 50 years. It is their case that they had submitted applications before the competent authority for the grant of lease under the Rajiv Gandhi Aashraya Yojana. However, the said applications were rejected by the Collector/Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, vide orders dated 07.02.2024 and 05.08.2024. The petitioners have further pleaded that certain other similarly situated persons residing in the vicinity have been granted permanent leases in respect of the land under their occupation. Being aggrieved by the rejection of their applications, the petitioners preferred appeals before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur, which also came to be dismissed vide orders dated 18.02.2025 and 19.05.2025. Thereafter, the petitioners approached the State Government by filing appropriate proceedings, which are stated to be pending consideration.

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It is the case of the petitioners that after rejection of the application of the petitioners for the grant of lease, the Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur, initiated proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and issued notices to the petitioners alleging unauthorized occupation of Government land and calling upon them to vacate the land in their possession.

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The Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur initiated proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, on 12.12.2024 and, upon

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consideration of the material available on record, passed an order of eviction on 30.12.2024. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners preferred appeals before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Ambikapur. The appellate authority, vide order dated 17.01.2025, dismissed the appeals holding that the petitioners were in unauthorized occupation of Government land and had failed to produce any document establishing their lawful possession over the subject land. Challenging the said order, the petitioners preferred second appeals before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur. However, the Commissioner, by order dated 18.02.2025, affirmed the findings recorded by the appellate authority and dismissed the second appeals.

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Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur, the petitioners preferred a revenue revision before the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur. The Board of Revenue, upon consideration of the matter, dismissed the revision vide the impugned order dated 07.01.2026, affirming the orders passed by the subordinate revenue authorities. It is this order that is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petitions.

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Mr. Animesh Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP227 No. 100 of 2026, would submit that the revenue authorities have proceeded in violation of the principles of natural justice and without affording the petitioners a fair and adequate opportunity of hearing. According to him, the proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, were initiated by the Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur, on 12.12.2024 and culminated in an order of eviction on 30.12.2024, thereby depriving the petitioners of a reasonable opportunity to effectively defend their possession. It is submitted that the order passed by the Tahsildar is founded upon reports and documents, particularly the report submitted by the Revenue Inspector (Nazul), without providing the petitioners any opportunity

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to test the veracity of such material or to seek cross-examination of the concerned officials. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioners have been in peaceful possession of the subject land for the last 40-50 years, having raised residential constructions thereon, and are willing to pay such lease rent or premium as may be determined by the Government for regularization of their occupation. It is argued that the land in question is essentially an Abadi land and, therefore, the Tahsildar, Nazul, lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 248 of the Land Revenue Code against the petitioners.

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It is further submitted that the petitioners have already instituted Civil Suit Nos. 52-A/2025, 58-A/2025, 59-A/2025 and 60-A/2025 asserting their rights over the subject property, and the said suits are presently pending adjudication before the competent Civil Court. Though the applications preferred by the petitioners under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking temporary injunction have been rejected by the learned trial Court as well as by the appellate Court, the orders passed therein are stated to be under challenge before this Court in WP227 No. 512 of 2025 and WP227 No. 659 of 2025, wherein notices have been issued.

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Learned counsel would also submit that the burden to establish encroachment upon Government land squarely lies upon the State authorities. However, the Tahsildar has proceeded merely on the basis of the report of the Revenue Inspector without any proper survey or demarcation of the land. According to him, the revenue records indicate alleged encroachment over Khasra No. 505/5, whereas the petitioners claim possession over land forming part of Khasra No. 505/1. It is, therefore, argued that in the absence of a duly conducted and legally sustainable demarcation establishing encroachment over either Khasra No. 505/5 or Khasra No. 505/1, the petitioners could not have been treated as unauthorized occupants and subjected to eviction proceedings. It is further

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argued that several similarly situated persons residing in the vicinity have been granted lease rights in respect of the land under their occupation, whereas the applications submitted by the petitioners have been rejected by the revenue authorities. Since the matter relating to the grant of lease is stated to be pending consideration before the State Government, it is submitted that coercive action for eviction ought not to have been taken against the petitioners. Learned counsel would emphasize that the orders directing removal of encroachment pertain to Khasra No. 505/5, whereas the petitioners are actually occupying land comprised in Khasra No. 505/1, thereby rendering the impugned proceedings factually unsustainable.

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In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decisions rendered in Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. Mohit Kumar and others (decided on 15.11.2019 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court), Olpherts Pvt. Ltd. v. Sarla Devi Mahila Mandal and Others (Civil Revision No.796 of 2023, decided on 13.02.2024 by the Madhya Pradesh High Court), Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another , (1982) 2 SCC 134, Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India and Another , (2019) 20 SCC 705, Western Coalfields Ltd. and Another v. Ballarpur Collieries Company and Others , (2019) 2 SCC 327, Smt. Rekha Singh and Others v. State of Bihar and Others , 1992 SCC OnLine Pat 203, Vishwanath Dubey v. State of Bihar and Others, 2012 SCC OnLine Pat 1498, and Jainarayan Bhagat and Another v. State of Bihar and Others , 2011 SCC OnLine Pat 1327.

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Mr. Gagan Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP227 No.146 of 2026, while adopting the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners in WP227 No.100 of 2026, would further contend that the revenue authorities have acted in complete disregard of the objectives underlying the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana and have arbitrarily directed the eviction of the petitioners from the subject land. According to

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him, by virtue of the provisions contained in the Nagariya Kshetro Ke Awasheen Vyaktiyon Ko Pattadhriti Adhikar Adhiniyam, 2023 and the Rules framed thereunder, the petitioners are entitled to be treated as deemed leaseholders of the land in their occupation. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioners are in possession of land comprised in Khasra No.505/1, whereas the impugned orders have proceeded on the premise that they have encroached upon land bearing Khasra No.505/5. It is argued that the petitioners have been residing on the subject land for the last four to five decades and have raised residential constructions thereon. Therefore, without providing any alternative accommodation or undertaking measures for their rehabilitation, their eviction from the land would amount to an infringement of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

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It is next submitted that the petitioners are already prosecuting Civil Suit No. 58-A of 2025 in respect of the subject property and, despite the pendency of the said civil proceedings, the revenue authorities have proceeded to exercise jurisdiction under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and directed their eviction. According to learned counsel, in the absence of a valid and legally acceptable demarcation report, the petitioners cannot be branded as encroachers merely on the basis of departmental reports alleging encroachment over Khasra No.505/5. Learned counsel would also submit that, pursuant to the order dated 22.04.2026 passed by this Court, a team of revenue officials was constituted to carry out demarcation of the subject land and the exercise was undertaken on 06.05.2026 and 07.05.2026. However, according to him, the demarcation proceedings were conducted in an arbitrary and unilateral manner without properly tracing the original boundary marks (chanda), which were stated to be unavailable at the site. It is contended that the objections raised by the petitioners and other persons present at the spot were neither duly

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considered nor reflected in the proceedings. As such, the demarcation report cannot be treated as a reliable basis for determining the actual nature and extent of possession of the petitioners.

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On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel would argue that unless a proper and lawful demarcation is undertaken and the precise location of the petitioners' possession vis-à-vis Khasra Nos. 505/1 and 505/5 is conclusively determined, no action for eviction can legally be sustained. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities suffer from material irregularity, non-consideration of relevant facts and procedural infirmities, rendering them unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside.

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Although none appeared on behalf of the petitioner in WP227 No. 59 of 2026 at the time of hearing, this Court, having regard to the fact that the petition involves a challenge to the same impugned order, this court proceeded to decide the case on the merits.

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Per contra, learned State counsel opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities are strictly in accordance with law and do not suffer from any jurisdictional error, perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. It is submitted that the petitioners are in unauthorized occupation of Government land comprised in Khasra No. 505/5 and, therefore, proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, were validly initiated against them. The competent revenue authorities, after considering the claims raised by the petitioners, the relevant revenue records and other material available on record, have concurrently recorded findings against the petitioners and directed their eviction from the Government land.

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Learned State counsel would further submit that even the demarcation carried out on 06.05.2026 and 07.05.2026 pursuant to the order of this Court

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passed on 22.04.2026, which has established that the petitioners are in occupation of portions of Government land falling within Khasra No. 505/5. It is argued that the petitioners' applications seeking the grant of lease over the subject land have already been rejected by the Collector/Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, as well as by the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur. Although the petitioners have approached the State Government against the said orders, no decision conferring any right or granting any lease in their favour has been placed on record. It is also contended that the petitioners have instituted civil suits in relation to the subject property, but their applications for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been rejected by the learned trial Court. The appeals preferred thereagainst have also been dismissed by the appellate Court. Though the petitioners have challenged the said orders before this Court by filing writ petitions, no interim protection has been granted in their favour. According to learned State counsel, these circumstances clearly demonstrate that the petitioners have consistently failed to secure any judicial protection with respect to their possession of the subject land.

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Learned State counsel would further submit that the petitioners have failed to produce any document evidencing lawful title, lease, allotment or authorization in respect of the land in question. In the absence of any legally recognizable right, they cannot claim equitable protection against eviction from Government land. It is argued that an encroacher upon public land cannot seek enforcement of an equitable claim in derogation of statutory provisions. The Board of Revenue, after considering the entire factual matrix and the applicable legal provisions, has rightly dismissed the revision preferred by the petitioners. As such, the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the writ petitions, being devoid of merit, deserve to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the records of the case and the orders passed by the revenue authorities, as well as the impugned order dated 07.01.2026, passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur.

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Since the controversy involved in the present writ petitions revolved around the exercise of powers by the revenue authorities under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, it would be apposite to reproduce the said provision for proper appreciation of the issues arising for consideration. Section 248 of the Code reads as under:- .

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“ 248. Penalty for unauthorisedly taking possession of land. - (1) Any person who unauthorisedly takes or remains in possession of any unoccupied land, abadi, service land or any other which has been set apart for any special purpose under Section 237 or upon any land which is the property of Government, may be summarily ejected by order of the Tahsildar and any crop which may be standing on the land and any building or other work which he may have constructed thereon, if no removed by him within such time a the Tahsildar may fix shall be liable to forfeiture. Any property so forfeited shall be disposed of as the Tahsildar may direct and the cost of removal of any crop, building or other work and of all works necessary, to restore the land to its original condition shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue from him. Such person shall also be liable at the discretion of the Tahsildar to pay the rent of the land for the period of unauthorised occupation at twice the rate admissible for such land in locality and to a fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees and to a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day on which such unauthorised occupation or possession continues after the date of first ejectment. The Tahsildar may apply the whole or any part of the fine to compensate persons, who may in his opinion have suffered loss or injury from the encroachment :

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Provided that the Tahsildar shall not exercise the powers conferred by this sub-section in regard to encroachment made by buildings or works constructed(i) in the Mahakoshal region —

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(a) in areas other than the merged States before the first day of September, 1917;

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(b) in the merged States, before the third day of April, 1950;

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(ii) in the Madhya Bharat region, before the fifteenth day of August, 1950;

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(iii) in the Vindhya Pradesh region, before the first day of April, 1955; (iv) in the Bhopal region, before the eighth day of November, 1933; and

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(v) in the Sironj region, before the first day of July, 1958. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section "Merged States" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Chhattisgarh Merged States Laws (State) Act, 1950 (XII of 1950).

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(1-A) On a resolution duly passed by the Gram Panchayat in respect of any unauthorised possession, the Tahsildar shall start and complete the proceedings under this section within thirty days from the date of receipt of the information of such resolution and shall communicate the action taken by him to the Gram Panchayat.

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(2) It shall not be competent to the Tahsildar to impose a fine of amount exceeding [ten thousand rupees] [Substituted by C.G. Act No. 14 of 2011, w.e.f. 11.5.2011.] but if in any case he considers that circumstances of the case warrant imposition of a higher fine, he may refer the case to the Sub-Divisional Officer who shall, then, after giving the party concerned an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders in respect of fine as he may deem fit.

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(2-A) If any person continues in unauthorised occupation or possession of land for more than seven days after the date of order of ejectment under sub-section (1), then without prejudice to the fine that may be imposed thereunder the Sub-Divisional Officer shall cause him to be apprehended and shall send him with a warrant to be confined in a civil prison for a period of fifteen days in case of first ejectment and three months in case of second or subsequent ejectment :

¶132

Provided that no action under this sub-section shall be taken—

¶133

(i) unless a notice in issued calling upon such person to appear before the Sub-Divisional Officer on a day to be specified in the notice and to show cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison;

¶134

17

¶135

(ii) [***] [Omitted by C.G. Act No.8 of 2023, w.e.f. 24-4-2023. Prior to omission clause (ii) stood as under:—

¶136

“(ii) in respect of encroachments on Government and Nazul lands of the settlement of which the Government have issued orders from time-to-time :”]:

¶137

Provided further that the Sub-Divisional Officer may order the released of such person from detention before the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrant if he is satisfied that the unauthorised possession has been vacated :

¶138

Provided also that no woman shall be arrested or detained under this sub-section.

¶139

(2-B) The State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sub-section (2-A).

¶140

[Added by C.G. Act No.8 of 2023, w.e.f.24-4-2023. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the State Government or any officer, authorized by the State Government, may do settlement of encroachments prior to the date fixed by the State Government time-to-time and the State Government may make rules in this relation.]”

¶141

The undisputed facts reveal that the petitioners claim possession over portions of Nazul land bearing Plot No. 505/1 and Plot No. 505/5 situated at Sheet No.2, Ward No.14, Ambikapur, Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners had applied for the grant of a lease under the applicable rehabilitation/housing schemes, and their applications were rejected by the competent authority, namely, the Collector/Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, vide orders dated 07.02.2024 and 05.08.2024. The appeals preferred before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, were also dismissed, and no order granting lease or regularization of possession has been placed on record by any of the petitioners. Thus, as on the date of initiation of proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, the petitioners were not holding any lease, patta or other authority of law recognizing their possession over the Government land.

¶142

18

¶143

It is also pertinent to note that the petitioners have not placed on record copies of the replies filed by them before the Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur, in the proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. However, a perusal of the orders passed by the Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur, dated 30.12.2024, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Ambikapur, dated 17.01.2025, the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur, and the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, indicates that the petitioners themselves had admitted in their replies that they are in possession of portions of land comprised in Khasra No. 505/5. In the absence of the replies being placed before this Court, there is no material available to dislodge or controvert the findings recorded by the revenue authorities in that regard. The said circumstance assumes significance in view of the petitioners' subsequent contention before this Court that they are in possession of land bearing Khasra No. 505/1 and not Khasra No. 505/5. The relevant observations recorded by the Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur, in the order dated 30.12.2024 are reproduced hereinbelow:- .

¶144

“—vukosnd eukst dqekj flga }kjk izLrqr tokc esa ys[k fd;k gS fd vkosnd ds LokfeRo ,ao vkf/kiR; ds utwy gd dh Hkwfe vfEcdkiqj flfoy dksVZ ds ikl xqykc dkWyksuh ds ckmUMªh ds fnoky ds ckgj fLFkr gS] ftldk [kljk dz0 505@5 jdck 3-94 ,dM+ gS A ftlesa ls vkosnd o"kZ 1966 ls 397-98 oxZehVj Hkwfe ij edku fuekZ.k dj vfrdze.k fd;k gSA vukosfndk vk’kk flga }kjk izLrqr tokc esa ys[k fd;k gS fd utwy gd dh Hkwfe 505@5 esa ls vkukosfndk o"kZ 1966 ls 173 oxZehVj Hkwfe ij ’khV;qDr edku fuekZ.k dj vfrdze.k fd;k x;k gSA

¶145

—vukosnd fo/;kpy flag }kjk izLrqr tokc esa ys[k fd;k gS fd vkosnd xka/khpkSd] fjax jksM+ ds ikl utwy Hkw&[kaM dz0 505@5 ds 156 oxZehVj Hkwfe ij edku esa jg jgs gSa A vkosnd ds ikl mijksDr edku gh mlds jgus dk ,d ek= lgkjk gS A vkosnd yxHkx 39 o"kksZ ls dkfct gSaA

¶146

—vukosnd vk’kk tk;loky ,ao vehj eksgEen ds }kjk izLrqr tokc esa ys[k fd;k gSa fd uksfVlxzfgrk dk edku o"kZ 1970 ls cuk gS ftlesa ifjokj lfgr uksfVlxzfgrk fuokljr gSA uksfVlxzfgrk ds ikl mDr edku ds vfrfjDr dksbZ vU; edku ;k Hkwfe ugha gSA csn[kyh dh fLFkfr esa uksfVlxzfgrk cs?kj gks tk;sxhA

¶147

—vukosnd y[ku yky vxzoky }kjk izLrqr tokc esa ys[k fd;k gS fd vkosnd ds LokfEkRo ,ao vkf/kiR; ds utwy gd dh Hkwfe vfEcdkiqj flfoy dksVZ ds ikl xqykc dkWyksuh ds ckmUMªh ds fnoky ds ckgj fLFkr gS] ftldk [kljk dz- 505@5 jdck 3-94 ,dM+ gS A ftlesa ls vkosnd o"kZ 1966 ls 343-2 oxZehVj Hkwfe ij edku fuekZ.k dj vfrdze.k fd;k gSA

¶148

19

¶149

izdj.k esa miYkC/k nLrkostksa dk voyksdu ,ao ifj’khyu fd;k x;k A

¶150

izdj.k ds voyksdu ls ;g fu"d"kZ fudyrk gS fd%&

¶151

vukosndx.k }kjk ’kkldh; utwy “wfe “w&[k.M dz0 505@5 jdck 3-94 ,dM+ “wfe ij edku fuekZ.k dj vfrdze.k fd;k x;k gSaA lkFk gh vukosndx.k ds }kjk is’k tokc esa dksbZ oS/k nLrkost ¼vkcaVu gqvk gks ½ Hkw&[kaM dza- 505@5 dk is’k ugha fd;k x;k gSa A vr% Hkw&[kM+ dz0 505@5 esa vukosndx.k dk voS/k dCtk gksuk ik;k tkrk gSA vr% NRrhlx<+ Hkw&jktLo lafgrk 1959 dh /kkjk 248 ¼1½ ds rgr~ dk;Zokgh djrs gq, vukosndx.k dks vfrdzfer Hkwfe ls csn[ky fd;s tkus dk vkns’k ikfjr fd;k tkrk gSaA vukosnd dks fnukad 10@01@2025 rd mDr of.kZr Hkwfe ij ls vukf/kd`r dCtk gVkus dk vkns’k fn;k tkrk gSA”

¶152

A careful consideration of the record further reveals that at no stage of the proceedings before the Tahsildar, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the Commissioner, or the Board of Revenue did the petitioners dispute that they were in possession of land comprised in Khasra No. 505/5. On the contrary, as reflected from the orders passed by the revenue authorities, the petitioners proceeded on the premise that they were occupying portions of Khasra No. 505/5 and sought regularization of their possession thereon. The said position is further corroborated by the report submitted by the Revenue Inspector (Nazul), Ambikapur, dated 02.12.2024, as well as by the demarcation carried out on 06.05.2026 and 07.05.2026 pursuant to the directions of this Court, both of which indicate occupation of Government land falling within Khasra No. 505/5. It is only before this Court, for the first time, that the petitioners have attempted to contend that they are in possession of land bearing Khasra No. 505/1 and not Khasra No. 505/5. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to accept such a belated and inconsistent stand, which lacks bona fides and is unsupported by any cogent material.

¶153

The proceedings in the present case were initiated on the basis of a report dated 02.12.2024 submitted by the Revenue Inspector (Nazul), Ambikapur, to the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, regarding alleged encroachment upon Government Nazul land bearing Khasra No. 505/5, admeasuring 3.94 acres. In the said report, the Revenue Inspector specifically recorded the alleged

¶154

20

¶155

encroachment made by the petitioners over portions of the aforesaid land. Acting upon the said report, the Tahsildar (Nazul), Ambikapur, commenced proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, for the removal of the alleged unauthorized occupation. The report dated 02.12.2024 submitted by the Revenue Inspector (Nazul), Ambikapur, which has been brought on record in W.P.(227) No. 100 of 2026, along with the covering memo dated 15.04.2026, which reads as under:—

¶156

“dk;kZy; jktLo fujh{kd utwy vfEcdkiqj ftyk ljxqtk ¼N-x-½ dzekad@D;w@jk-fu-@utwy@2024 vfEcdkiqj fnukad 02@12@2024 izfr]

¶157

utwy vf/kdkjh egksn;

¶158

vfEcdkiqj ftyk ljxqtk N-x-

¶159

fo"k;%& LFky tkap izfrosnu izLrqr djus ckcr~A

¶160

lanHkZ%& vkidk U;k-Kk-dz- 1939A@utwy@okpd@2024 vfEcdkiqj fnukad 30@08@2024

¶161

lanfHkZr i= ds ifjikyu esa dk;kZy; vfHk;Urk yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx ¼Hk@l½ vfEcdkiqj }kjk ftyk U;k;ky; Hkou vfEcdkiqj ds uohu fuekZ.k gsrq orZeku jdck 2-59 ,- ds vfrfjDr 1-5 ls 2 ,dM+ vfrfjDr Hkwfe dh vko’;drk ftyk U;k;ky; vfEcdkiqj Hkou ls yxh 'kkldh; vkoklh; xqykc dkyksuh ds lkFk mlls yxh gqbZ vU; 1-8 ,dM+ Hkwfe fpUgkfdr dj ftyk ds uohu Hkou fuekZ.k gsrq ekuuh; iz/kku ftyk ,oa l= U;k;k/kh’k vfEcdkiqj dks vkoafVr djus dk ekax fd;s tkus ij Hkw&[kaM dzekad 505@5 jdck 3-94 ,- ds Hkkx ij fufeZr Hkw&[kaM dk uki fd;k x;kA ftldh pkSgnh & mRrj esa nsohxat jksM nf{k.k esa iDdh lM+d tks fjax jksM ls dksVZ ds fiNs fufeZr gS iwoZ esa dksVZ ifjlj ,oa if’pe esa ueukdyk fjax jksM gS] uki djus ij 1-95 ,- Hkwfe gksuk ik;k x;kA ftldk fooj.k fuEukuqlkj gS%&

¶162

1& dksVZ ifjlj ds vUnj 0-20 ,- 2& xqykc dkyksuh fuekZ.k {ks= 0-73 ,- 3& uxj ikfyd fuxe dk nqdku ,oa 0-23 ,- izrh{kky;

¶163

4& 'kkldh; vf/kdkfj;ksa dk vkokl 0-28 ,- 5& vfrdze.k dk fooj.k I- vfrdzked vkbZ-Mh-frokjh@nqdku edku & 0-03½ ,- IIeukst dqekj flag@nqdku] edku 0-08 ,- IIIvk’kk flag@ edku 0-05 ,- IVfoU?;kpy flag nqdku edku 0-15 ,- V- vk’kk tk;loky @ edku 0-03½ ,- VIvehj eksgEen @ edku 0-08 VIIy[ku vxzoky@nqdku] edku 0-07

¶164

21

¶165

vr% izfrosnu la/kkj.k [kljk dh izfr] utjh uD’kk lfgr ftyk ,oa l= U;k;ky; dks 0-93 ,- Hkwfe vkosnu gsrq Jheku~ ds lsok esa lknj izLrqr gSA

¶166

gLrk- ¼vLi"V½ vkj-ch- flag jk-fu-utwy”

¶167

The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that they are residing on the subject land for the last 40 to 50 years and, therefore, they ought not to have been treated as unauthorized occupants. This submission of the petitioners cannot be accepted for the reason that mere long possession over Government land does not create any legal right, title or interest in favour of an occupant unless such possession is recognized by a valid grant, lease, settlement or any statutory provision. The record would demonstrate that, despite claiming long possession, the petitioners have failed to produce any document showing allotment of the subject land in their favour. On the contrary, the competent authorities, while considering their applications for the grant of lease, have already declined to regularize their possession. Therefore, the petitioners cannot derive any legal benefit merely on the basis of their alleged long occupation of Government land.

¶168

The further contention that the Tahsildar, Nazul, Ambikapur, proceeded with undue haste and did not provide adequate opportunity of hearing also does not merit acceptance. The record of the proceedings indicates that notices were issued to the petitioners and the matter was considered by the Tahsildar on the basis of the revenue records, spot inspection reports and material available on record. The petitioners participated in the proceedings and thereafter availed the statutory remedies of first appeal, second appeal and revision. The orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the Commissioner, Surguja Division and the Board of Revenue disclose due consideration of the objections raised by the petitioners. No prejudice of such nature has been demonstrated before this Court which would vitiate

¶169

22

¶170

the entire proceedings. Mere dissatisfaction with the conclusion arrived at by the authorities cannot be equated with denial of the opportunity of hearing. 30. Much emphasis has been laid by the petitioners on the plea that they are in possession of land comprised in Plot No. 505/1, whereas the proceedings were initiated with reference to Plot No. 505/5 and that no proper demarcation was conducted. The said contention also does not persuade this Court to interfere. Considering the issue involved in the case, this Court has directed the Collector, Surguja, vide order dated 22.04.2026, to constitute a team of revenue authorities not below the rank of SDO (Revenue) for demarcation of the land of Kh. No. 505/5 and 505/1, situated at Ambikapur, and to submit a report before this Court. Pursuant to the order dated 22.04.2026, the demarcation was carried out on 06.05.2026 and 07.05.2026, and the State Counsel submitted a copy of the demarcation report in the case along with an application for taking the document on record. The relevant part of the demarcation report 11.05.2026 is necessary to reproduce here, which is as under:-

¶171

“3- ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds lanfHkZr fjV fiVh'ku ds funsZ'k ds ikyu esa lhekadu ds fy, xfBr Vhe fnukad 06-05-2026 dks ekSds ij fu;r le; ij miLfFkr gq, ,oa ;kfpdkdrZkx.k dh vksj ls eukst dqekj flag Lo;a ] y[kuyky dh vksj ls iq= furs'k] foa/;kpy flag dh vksj ls T;ksfr flag] vehj eksgEen dh vksj ls Lo;a] vk'kk flag dh vksj ls eukst flag] eqErkt csxe] Qkfrek] ds'kj uqjh] 'kk;nk csxu miLfFkr gq,A

¶172

4- ekSdk ij ;kfpdkdrZkx.k }kjk vkifRr djrs gq, pkank ls feyku dj lhekadu fd;k tkus dh ckr dh xbZ fdarq ?kuh vkcknh {ks= gksus ds dkj.k pkank] equkjk ekSdas ij miyCèk ugha gksus ds dkj.k Hkw&[k.M Øekad 506] 673 ,oa 505 ds fresMk ls feyku dj iwoZ fn'kk dh vksj pydj Hkw&[k.M dekad 507] 505 ,oa 514 ds fresM+k dk feyku fd;k x;k tks 56 eh0 ij lgh gksuk ik;k x;kA fQj mRrj dh vksj Hkw&[k.M dekad 507] 505 ,oa 498 ds fresM+k dk feyku fd;k x;k tks 166 eh0 ij lgh gksuk ik;k x;kA blh fcUnw ls if’pe dh vksj 90 eh0 pydj Hkw&[k.M dekad 498] 505@5] 505@13 ds fresM+k ij igq¡pdj Hkw&[k.M dekad 505@5 dk lhekadu fd;k x;kA fu;r frfFk dks Hkw&[k.M dekad 505@1 dk lhekadu iw.kZ ugha gks ikus ds dkj.k iqu% fnukad 07-05-2026 dks lhekadu ny rFkk ;kfpdkdrZkx.k ekSds ij miLfFkr gq, ,oa Hkw&[k.M dekad 505@1 dk lhekadu iw.kZ dj ekSds ij iapukek rS;kj fd;k x;kA

¶173

5- Hkw&[k.M dekad 505@5 ,oa 505@1 ds lHkh vko';d LFkkuksa ij fpUg yxkdj ;kfpdkdrZkx.k dks iFkd&iFkd crk;k x;kA

¶174

23

¶175

6- Hkw&[k.M dekad 505@5 ,oa 505@1 esa ik;s x;s fLFkfr dk fooj.k i`Fkd ls lwph cukdj layXu gSA

¶176

7- ;kfpdkdrZkx.k ds }kjk fd;s x;s vfrØe.k ftl ij iwoZ esa dk;Zokgh dj rksM+k x;k gS] og Hkkx Hkw&[k.M dekad 505@5 dk va'k Hkkx gksuk ik;k x;kA

¶177

8- ;kfpdkdrZkx.k ds uke ij orZeku utwy vfHkys[k esa Hkw [k.M dekad 505@5 vFkok 505@1 ij dksbZ LoRo vafdr ugha gksuk ik;k x;kA”

¶178

xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx

¶179

“Hkw[k.M	dz0 505@5esa iwoZ dCtk/kkjh ftu ij dk;Zokgh fd;k x;kA
dz0	iwoZ HkwdCtk/kkjh dk uke dCts dh Hkwfe dk jdck
	1 y[kuyky vxzoky 0-09
	2 vehj eksgEen 0-06¾
	3 vk’kk tk;loky 0-03
	4 foa?;kpy 0-13
	5 eukst flag 0-11¼
	6 vk’kk flag 0-05
	;ksx 0-48

¶180

.”

¶181

The report submitted before this Court indicates that the petitioners were found occupying portions of Government land falling in Plot No. 505/5. Merely because the petitioners dispute the methodology adopted during demarcation or contend that certain traditional marks were not available at the site would not render the demarcation non est, particularly when no contrary technical material has been placed by them. The findings recorded by the revenue authorities are based on official records and measurements, and this Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would not re-appreciate such factual findings as an appellate Court.

¶182

Another aspect of the case is that the petitioners are prosecuting their civil suits before the learned trial Court at Ambikapur. The pendency of civil suits instituted by the petitioners also does not advance their case. It is evident from the record that in the said civil suits, the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking temporary injunction have already been rejected by the learned trial Court and the appellate Court. The writ petitions preferred against the said orders are stated to be pending, but admittedly, no interim protection has been granted

¶183

24

¶184

in favour of the petitioners. More importantly, mere pendency of a civil suit does not operate as a bar against proceedings under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code when the revenue authorities are dealing with unauthorized occupation of Government land. In the absence of any declaration of right, title or lawful possession in favour of the petitioners by a competent civil court, the authorities cannot be prevented from exercising statutory powers vested in them.

¶185

The submission founded upon parity with certain other persons who are stated to have been granted lease over nearby lands is equally misconceived. Grant of lease by the State is governed by statutory provisions and policy considerations. A person claiming regularization cannot seek a writ compelling the State to perpetuate an illegality or to extend a benefit merely because another person may have been granted such benefit. The legality of the petitioners' occupation is required to be examined on the basis of their own entitlement and not on the basis of alleged benefits extended to third parties. Since no enforceable right has been established by the petitioners, the plea of discrimination is of no assistance to them.

¶186

The reliance placed by the petitioners (in WP227 No. 146/2026) on the provisions and objectives of the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana is also misconceived and would not benefit the petitioners. A plain reading of the Scheme would show that the said scheme is essentially a welfare and housing assistance scheme intended to facilitate access to affordable housing for eligible beneficiaries belonging to the EWS, LIG and MIG categories who do not own a pucca house and satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed therein. The Scheme lays down conditions for the identification and selection of beneficiaries and provides for financial assistance or support for the acquisition/construction of residential houses. The controversy involved in the present case, however, is entirely different. The

¶187

25

¶188

issue before this Court is not whether the petitioners satisfy the eligibility criteria under Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana or whether they are entitled to any benefit under the said Scheme, but whether they can lawfully continue in occupation of Government Nazul land despite the concurrent findings of the competent revenue authorities that they are unauthorized occupants liable to be evicted under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Eligibility under a housing welfare scheme does not, by itself, create any right, title or interest over Government land, nor does it confer immunity from proceedings initiated under the statutory provisions governing removal of encroachments. The Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana neither regularizes unauthorized occupation nor restricts the powers of the revenue authorities to remove encroachments in accordance with law. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners may otherwise satisfy the eligibility conditions prescribed under the Scheme, such eligibility cannot be construed as a legal defence against eviction proceedings validly initiated under Section 248 of the Land Revenue Code.

¶189

The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners (in WP227 No. 146/2026) that they are entitled to protection under the provisions of the Nagariya Kshetro Ke Awasheen Vyaktiyon Ko Pattadhriti Adhikar Adhiniyam, 2023, also does not merit acceptance. A conjoint reading of the provisions of the Act would reveal that the statute does not confer an automatic or vested right upon every person occupying Government land in an urban area. The Act merely creates a statutory framework enabling the competent authority to grant Pattadhriti Adhikar in favour of a “homeless eligible person” subject to fulfilment of the eligibility conditions prescribed under Section 2(d) and in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The grant of such right is dependent upon a positive determination by the authorized officer and an order of settlement passed under Section 3 of the Act. Until such settlement

¶190

26

¶191

is made, no person can claim the status of a pattadhriti holder merely on the basis of occupation or long possession of Government land. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to place on record any order passed under Section 3 of the Act settling the land in their favour, nor have they established that they have been declared eligible persons under the statutory scheme. On the contrary, the material available on record demonstrates that their applications seeking regularization/lease have already been rejected by the competent authorities. Significantly, Section 12 of the Act itself contemplates that where land is found to be under occupation, and no pattadhriti right has been granted in accordance with law, the competent authority may either consider the case in accordance with the prescribed eligibility criteria or proceed under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Thus, the Act itself recognizes the continuance of the statutory power to remove unauthorized occupation in appropriate cases. Therefore, in the absence of any order conferring pattadhriti rights upon the petitioners, they cannot claim the benefit of the Act as a shield against proceedings validly initiated under Section 248 of the Code.

¶192

The Tahsildar, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the Commissioner, Surguja Division and ultimately the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue have concurrently recorded findings that the petitioners are in unauthorized occupation of Government Nazul land and are liable to be evicted under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Such findings are based on the appreciation of the revenue records and material available on record. No jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity or violation of principles of natural justice has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Court in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

¶193

27

¶194

In the case of “ Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil ”, 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-

¶195

“ 40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena [(1991) 3 SCC 141], wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent" the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447]. The decision in Chandavarkar is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and Nagendra Nath [Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398] discussed above.

¶196

41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC 576]. In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice.

¶197

42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under

¶198

28

¶199

Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC 717]. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Almedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnandis [(1972 1 SCC 898].

¶200

43^***** . In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], a two-Judges Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], this Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views.

¶201

44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] and they are set out:

¶202

"38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have

¶203

Ed. : Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 2608-2010.

¶204

29

¶205

or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction."

¶206

45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case [Surya Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], SCC pp. 695-96)

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"38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

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(6) * *

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(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and

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entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene b would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.

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(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character."

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49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:

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(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different.

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(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

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(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with

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the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

¶219

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

¶220

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215], followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority".

¶221

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and a courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

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(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has

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been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

¶225

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

¶226

(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

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(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

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(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

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(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

¶231

(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

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(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”

¶233

In the case of “ Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel ”, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 15 of its judgment that :-

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“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment Craft, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. [Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 69] The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.”

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The judgment relied upon by the petitioners in Ashok Kumar Tiwari (supra), is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the said case, the dispute primarily pertained to the legality and correctness of a demarcation proceeding, where the Court found that the prescribed statutory procedure for re-establishment of boundary marks (Chanda/Traverse Station) and demarcation had not been duly followed, thereby necessitating a fresh demarcation in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and the Land Record Manual. In the present case, the petitioners admittedly do not possess any document of title, lease, allotment or lawful authorization in respect of the Government Nazul land. Their applications for grant of lease have already been rejected by the competent

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authorities, and the findings regarding their unauthorized occupation have been concurrently recorded by the Tahsildar, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. Moreover, during the pendency of these writ petitions, a fresh demarcation was also carried out pursuant to the directions of this Court. Therefore, the ratio of Ashok Kumar Tiwari (supra) does not advance the case of the petitioners and is of no assistance to them.

¶239

So far as the decision in Olpherts Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the same was rendered in the context of disputed civil rights and competing claims relating to possession, where the Court emphasized the necessity of adjudication by a competent forum on the basis of evidence. In the present case, however, the petitioners have failed to establish any legally recognizable right over the Government Nazul land and, therefore, the said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In Thummala Krishna Rao and Another , (supra), and Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji , (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where a bona fide dispute regarding title exists, and the occupant asserts an independent right to the property, the State cannot dispossess such person through summary proceedings. In the present case, no bona fide dispute of title has been demonstrated by the petitioners. The land stands recorded as Government Nazul land, and the petitioners have not produced any document showing title, allotment or lease in their favour. Consequently, the ratio of the said judgment is inapplicable. Likewise, Western Coalfields Ltd. and Another , (supra), dealt with disputes concerning proprietary and contractual rights requiring detailed adjudication. The present proceedings, however, arise from action taken under Section 248 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code against persons found to be in unauthorized occupation of Government land. The judgment in Smt. Rekha Singh and Others (supra) was rendered in the peculiar facts of that case, where the Court found that the claim of possession and

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entitlement raised by the occupants required due consideration before coercive action could be taken. In the present case, the petitioners' claim for regularization and lease has already been examined and rejected by the competent authorities, and no legal right has been found to exist in their favour. Hence, the said decision is also of no assistance to them. Similarly,

¶242

in Vishwanath Dubey (supra) and Jainarayan Bhagat and Another (supra) the Court was concerned with the protection of possession founded upon an arguable claim of right which required adjudication in accordance with law. The petitioners herein have failed to establish any such arguable legal right over the land in question, and therefore, the ratio of the said decision cannot be extended to the facts of the present case.

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Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 07.01.2026 passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, does not call for interference, and all the writ petitions being devoid of merit deserve to be, and are hereby dismissed . No order as to costs.

¶244

Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

¶245

All the pending applications, in all the writ petitions, are hereby disposed of.

¶246

It is made clear that the Civil Suit filed by the respective petitioners shall be decided by the learned trial Court in accordance with law, on its own merits, without being influenced by any observation made in this order.

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Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)

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Judge

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Aadil

Amir Mohommad v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

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Amir Mohommad v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

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