Rohit Patel Vs Smt. Devkunwar

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2026:CGHC:17975

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Digitally signed by JYOTI JYOTI SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2026.04.22 10:56:46 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 584 of 2016

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Rohit Patel S/o Mansharam Patel, Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Raimuda, Post Raitum, Police Station Tumgaon, Tahsil And District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1. Smt. Devkunwar Wd/o Late Shri Bharat Aghariya, Aged About 52 Years R/o Village And Post Achanakpur, Police Station Tumgaon, Tahsil And District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant(s)	:	Mr. P.K. Patel, Advocate
For Respondent/ State	:	Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. G.A.

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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21.04.2026

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The plaintiff/appellant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 12.02.2016

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passed by the Learned District Judge, Mahasamund, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 118-A/2014 (Rohit Patel Vs. Smt. Devkumar & Anr.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2010 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 34-A/2009 (Rohit Patel Vs. Smt. Devkumar & Anr.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.

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The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking a decree of permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from interfering with or entering upon the suit land bearing Khasra No. 284, admeasuring 0.41 hectare, situated at Village Achanakpur, Patwari Halka No. 6, Ranim, Patewa, Tahsil and District Mahasamund pleading inter alia that the plaintiff purchased the suit land from Gangaram Patel by a registered sale deed dated 22.07.2008 and thereafter got the land mutated in his name. Since then, he claims to be in peaceful possession and cultivating the land. It is further averred that the defendant forcibly ploughed the suit land and sowed paddy thereon, thereby causing interference in the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and obstructing his use and enjoyment of the agricultural land.

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Defendant No.1, in her written statement, denied the averments made in the plaint and specifically disputed the

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plaintiff’s title and possession over the suit land. It was pleaded that the suit land was jointly owned and possessed by defendant No.1 and her son Gangaram. It was further averred that after the death of Gangaram on 20.01.2009, defendant No.1 and Gangaram’s widow, Chitrarekha, continued in possession of the suit land. The defendant further alleged that Gangaram had committed suicide on 20.01.2008 on account of threats and harassment. It was also pleaded that, upon inquiry conducted by the Additional Tahsildar, Patewa, a report was submitted stating that mutation of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff had been effected without following the prescribed rules. On such grounds, it was contended that the plaintiff had no title over the suit land and the suit deserved to be dismissed.

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After framing the issues, the Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, held that though the plaintiff relied upon a registered sale deed dated 22.07.2008 executed by Gangaram Patel and mutation entries in his favour, he failed to produce any material to establish that prior to the sale, the entire suit land had fallen exclusively to the share of Gangaram Patel. The Court found that after the death of Bharat, the suit land remained joint property of defendant No.1 and her son Gangaram. Consequently, Gangaram was competent to transfer only his own share and

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had no authority to alienate the share of defendant No.1. On such reasoning, the issue of title was held to be only partially proved. With regard to possession, the Trial Court recorded that in cross-examination the plaintiff himself admitted that defendant No.1 had sown and harvested the crop over the suit land and had been in possession for about four months prior to the suit. The plaintiff also admitted that he had not lodged any report regarding the alleged dispossession. On the basis of such admissions, coupled with the defendant’s evidence asserting long possession, the Trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his possession over the suit land and that defendant No.1 was in possession thereof. The Trial Court further held that since the plaintiff was not in possession and had sought only the relief of permanent injunction without seeking recovery of possession or any appropriate consequential relief, a mere decree of injunction could not be granted. Relying upon the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it was observed that where a plaintiff is capable of seeking further relief but omits to do so, such relief cannot be granted. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.

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Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 01.02.2010, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned

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First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts have erred in law and on facts in dismissing the suit without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record. It is contended that the evidence and surrounding circumstances clearly establish the appellant’s case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. It is further submitted that the appellant had acquired title over the suit land by virtue of a registered sale deed and his name stands recorded in the revenue records. The appellant also claims to be in possession of the suit land and, therefore, was entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. Learned counsel further argues that the Trial Court itself recorded a finding that the appellant had title to the extent of the share of Gangaram, yet the suit was illegally dismissed. It is, therefore, contended that the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned

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First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

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The submissions of learned counsel for the appellant are untenable, as both the Courts have concurrently held that the appellant/plaintiff failed to prove his possession over the suit land. The suit was filed for permanent injunction on the plea of peaceful possession, but the plaintiff himself admitted in evidence that the defendant had sown and harvested the crop and was in possession prior to the suit. In absence of proof of possession, mere reliance on the sale deed or revenue entries did not entitle the appellant to injunction. Since no relief of possession was sought, the dismissal of the suit by both the Courts was justified.

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Further, the learned First Appellate Court, upon reappreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The Appellate Court held that although the appellant/plaintiff relied upon a registered sale deed dated 22.07.2008 and revenue entries, the evidence on record established that the suit land was joint family property standing in the names of deceased Bharat Agharia’s widow, defendant No.1 Devkunwar Patel, and his son Gangaram Patel. It was found that Gangaram alone had no authority to transfer the entire suit land without the consent of defendant No.1. The Court further noticed that the mutation order

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passed in favour of the plaintiff had already been set aside by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mahasamund, on 11.12.2009, holding that the mutation was not made in accordance with law. The Appellate Court also observed that the sale deed appeared to have been executed on the basis of incomplete and misleading revenue documents showing only the name of Gangaram. On the question of possession, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove actual possession over the suit land, whereas defendant No.1 was found to be in continuous possession and cultivation thereof. Since the plaintiff sought only a decree of permanent injunction and failed to establish either lawful possession or exclusive title, no relief could be granted. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court concluded that the Trial Court had committed no legal or factual error in dismissing the suit and, therefore, affirmed the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2010.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First

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Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :-

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“31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails.

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Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for

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the High Court to upset the same.

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In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others , a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence.

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Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion.

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Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands

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vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case.”

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or

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perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference.

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Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court.

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SD/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru)

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Judge

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Jyoti

Rohit Patel v. Smt. Devkunwar

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Rohit Patel v. Smt. Devkunwar

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