Dismissed¶17

Lalli Bai v. Maha Singh

Chhattisgarh HC4 Feb 2026SA/520/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Chhattisgarh High Court Bilaspur; SA 520/2024; Section 100 CPC; substantial question of law; concurrent findings of fact; perversity; second appeal dismissed in limine; re-appreciation of evidence; Will Ex.P/1 Luggibai; mutation orders 11.09.2015 and 05.02.2018; Section 34 Specific Relief Act incidental relief; counter-claim dismissed; State of Rajasthan v Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637; Justice Bibhu Datta Guru; 05/02/2026.

What did the court decide?

The concurrent findings of both lower courts — that a dispute over possession existed and that defendant No.1 failed to adduce cogent evidence of her claimed agricultural work — are based on proper appreciation of evidence, suffer no perversity, misreading or legal infirmity, and the appellant failed to establish any substantial question of law calling for interference under Section 100 CPC.

Lalli Bai Vs Maha Singh — Specific Performance | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are perverse, erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record, warranting interference in this Second Appeal. +1 more

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Court's answer

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Ratio / Principle

The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is extremely limited; interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law.

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Key takeaways

Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.ratio¶10
The questions sought to be raised in the Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact, and do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 CPC.ratio¶12

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Second Appeal (SA No. 520 of 2024) under Section 100 CPC filed by defendant No.1 (Lalli Bai) dismissed in limine by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (Bibhu Datta Guru, J.; judgment on board 05/02/2026), upholding the concurrent findings of the Civil Judge, Class-II, Marwahi in Civil Suit No. 4-A/2018 (decree dated 08.04.2024 — plaintiff Maha Singh's suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction over Khasra No. 10, admeasuring 2.209 hectares, Village Andi, based on Will Ex.P/1 executed by late Luggibai, allowed in part; counter-claim of defendants No.1 to 4 dismissed) and of the District Judge, Pendraroad in Civil Appeal No. 25-A/2024 (decree dated 24.09.2024). Held: the questions raised amounted to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact, not substantial questions of law; the findings were neither perverse nor legally infirm; reliance placed on State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637.

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SOURABH BHILWAR

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Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.02.06 17:08:27 +0530

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2026:CGHC:6556

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 520 of 2024

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Lalli Bai D/o Jethu Aged About 60 Years Caste Gond, R/o Village - Andi, Tehsil - Marwahi, District – Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - Maha Singh S/o Heerasai Aged About 68 Years R/o Village - Dumarkherwa, Police Station - Pendra, Tehsil - Marwahi, District - Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi Chhattisgarh

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2 - Ganeshiya Bai W/o Gendlal Aged About 50 Years Caste Gond, R/o Sarkhor, Police Station And Tehsil - Pendra, District - Gaurela-PendraMarwahi Chhattisgarh

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3 - Rakesh S/o Gendlal Aged About 30 Years Caste Gond, R/o Sarkhor, Police Station And Tehsil - Pendra, District - Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi Chhattisgarh

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4 - Nanbai D/o Gendlal Aged About 27 Years Caste Gond, R/o Sarkhor, Police Station And Tehsil - Pendra, District - Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi Chhattisgarh

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5 - Fagna Singh S/o Jethu Aged About 65 Years Caste Gond, R/o

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Village - Andi, Police Station - Pendra, Tehsil - Marwahi, District - Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi Chhattisgarh

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6 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, District - Gaurela-PendraMarwahi Chhattisgarh

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…. Respondent(s)

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(Cause title is taken from CIS)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Dhirendra Prasad Mishra, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru

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Judgment on Board

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05/02/2026

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The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.09.2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Pendraroad, District Bilaspur (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 25-A/2024 ( Lalli Bai vs. Maha Singh & Ors .), whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/ defendant No.1 was dismissed, affirming the judgment and decree dated 08.04.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-II, Marwahi, District Bilaspur (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 4-A/2018 ( Maha Singh v Lalli Bai & Ors. ), whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff has been allowed in part and the counter-claim filed by the defendants No.1 to 4 was dismissed. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/ defendant No.1. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

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The plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 10, admeasuring total area 2.209 hectares, pleading inter alia that the suit lands situated at Village Andi, Patwari Halka No. 19, Tahsil Marwahi, District Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi, originally belonged to late Luggibai, who had acquired the same through her husband’s lineage and remained in peaceful possession thereof during her lifetime. It was pleaded that late Luggibai, being issueless and pleased with the care and services rendered by the plaintiff, executed a Will in his favour. After her death on 02.07.2014, the plaintiff came into possession of the suit land on the strength of the said Will and his name was duly mutated by order dated 11.09.2015 passed by the Naib Tahsildar, Marwahi. It was further pleaded that the defendants, in collusion with revenue authorities, illegally got the suit land mutated in their favour vide order dated 05.02.2018 and thereafter started threatening to dispossess the plaintiff and alienate the suit property, necessitating the filing of the present suit.

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Per contra , defendants No.1 to 4, in their written statement, while denying the claim of the plaintiff, contended that late Luggibai remained in exclusive possession of the suit land during her lifetime but, after the death of her husband, she continuously resided with the defendants, who looked after her, cultivated the suit land and performed her last rites. It was pleaded that Luggibai was issueless and treated defendants No.1 to 4 as her legal heirs.

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The alleged Will propounded by the plaintiff was specifically denied as forged, fabricated and false. It was further pleaded that, after the death of Luggibai, defendants No.1 to 4 were lawfully recorded as her legal heirs by order of the Tahsildar, and the plaintiff has been attempting to interfere with their possession by force. Accordingly, the defendants asserted that they are the true owners in possession of the suit land and prayed for dismissal of the suit.

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Along with the written statement, defendants No.1 to 4 also filed a counter-claim, pleading that the suit land is their ancestral property inherited through their forefathers and was earlier recorded in the name of Dokri, whose lineage culminated in Luggibai. It was contended that upon the death of Luggibai, defendants No.1 to 4 alone succeeded as her legal heirs and were duly mutated in the revenue records by order dated 05.02.2018. The defendants further pleaded that the parties belong to the Gond community governed by customary law and not Hindu law and the Will relied upon by the plaintiff is forged. Hence, they sought declaration of title in their favour by way of counter-claim.

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The reply filed by the plaintiff to the counter-claim, in brief, is that the defendants No. 1 to 4 are neither the lawful legal heirs of deceased Luggibai nor did they perform her last rites. It is pleaded that during her lifetime, Luggibai validly executed a Will in favour of the plaintiff in the presence of witnesses, which was duly

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notarized. It is further contended that, in view of the said Will, defendants No. 1 to 4 have no right, title or interest over the suit land. Accordingly, the plaintiff prayed for dismissal of the counterclaim.

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After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court partly allowed the plaintiff’s suit while dismissing the counter-claim of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff has not prayed for any incidental relief as required under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, however, it has been observed by the trial Court that the Naib Tahsildar vide its order dated 05/02/2018 committed an error directing mutation of questioned land in the name of the defendant No.1 to 4 treating the same as ancestral property whereas the plaintiff was entitled for the suit land on the basis of the Will Ex.P/1 executed by Luggi Bai in his favour, but, the trial Court declined to declare the title in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that no incidental relief was sought for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 08/04/2024, the defendant No.1 preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgments and

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decrees passed by both the learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court are perverse, erroneous, and contrary to the evidence on record. It is contended that the plaintiff’s claim is based on a Will dated 07.05.2014, which has not been duly proved before the trial Court and no proper issue was framed to examine the validity, execution, or authenticity of the said Will. It is further argued that the Trial Court, despite recording that all issues were decided against the plaintiff, has inconsistently observed that the suit was partly allowed, which demonstrates a misreading of evidence and non-application of judicial mind. Learned counsel also submits that both the learned Courts failed to consider the substantial legal principles governing succession and ownership under customary law applicable to the parties, and erred in dismissing the appeal of the defendant No.1 and the counter-claim filed by the defendants. Accordingly, the appellant prays that the concurrent findings be interfered with in this Second Appeal on substantial questions of law.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

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In the present case, both the learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, have concurrently held that there exists a dispute between the parties

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with regard to possession over the suit land. Both the learned Courts have recorded a clear finding that the defendant No.1 has taken a plea that during the life time of her parents, she used to do the agricultural work over the suit land, however, in respect of that contention she had not adduced any evidence to establish the fact that on what basis, she has been doing the agricultural work on the said land by placing sufficient and cogent evidence. Though the learned trial Court affirmed the Will executed by Luggi Bai in favour of the plaintiff, however, declined to grant the relief on the ground that the plaintiff has not prayed for any incidental relief as per Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, at the same time, rejected the counter-claim of the defendant No.1 to 4. The findings so recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from perversity, misreading of material evidence or legal infirmity and as the appellant failed to establish any substantial question of law, so as to call for interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ defendant No.1 failed to establish her case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for

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the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference.

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Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.

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$. Bhilwar

Lalli Bai v. Maha Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Lalli Bai v. Maha Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

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