Dismissed¶51

Lal Singh v. Babulal

Chhattisgarh HC16 Feb 2026SA/163/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Second appeal; Section 100 CPC; substantial question of law; concurrent findings of fact; perversity; proof of Will; Section 63 Indian Succession Act; attesting witness; suspicious circumstances; forged Will allegation; Gond Scheduled Tribe; tribal custom succession; Hindu Succession Act 1956 inapplicability; mutation; Tahsildar Baikunthpur; revenue appeal; Bhumiswami agricultural land; Khasra Nos. 76, 130, 146, 123/1, 317; Koriya Baikunthpur; counter-claim; declaration of title; permanent injunction; State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637.

What did the court decide?

None to the appellant; the second appeal was dismissed and the concurrent decrees in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 (declaration of title and permanent injunction over the suit land) stand confirmed. ¶51

Lal Singh Vs Babulal — Succession and Inheritance | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether the registered Will dated 11.05.1999 (Ex.D/4) was duly executed, attested and proved in accordance with the mandatory requirements of law. +2 more

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Court's answer

The Will dated 11.05.1999 (Ex.D/4) stands duly proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act; the testimony of attesting witness Roopchand (DW-2) remained intact and was not effectively demolished in cross-examination.

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Ratio / Principle

Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to examination of substantial questions of law; upon consideration of the submissions, this Court finds the appeal does not satisfy the parameters for interference with concurrent findings.

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Key takeaways

The findings of the trial Court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference; the plaintiff failed to adduce cogent evidence that Tijo Bai was not Ramcharan's daughter or that defendants No.1 and 2 were not his lawful heirs, while caste certificates (Ex.D/1, D/2), school certificate (Ex.D/3) and electoral record (Ex.D/13) showed the defendants belong to the Gond tribe and descend from Ramcharan through Tijo Bai.ratio¶45
Arguments seeking re-appreciation of evidence and substitution of this Court's view for concurrent findings of both Courts are impermissible in a Second Appeal.ratio¶47

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC — plaintiff Lal Singh, claiming as nephew of late Ramcharan under tribal custom (pleading Gond Scheduled Tribe status and non-applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956), challenged the registered Will dated 11.05.1999 (Ex.D/4) and the heirship of defendants Babulal and Raghunath as sons of Teejobai (Tijo Bai), daughter of late Ramcharan. Trial Court (Civil Suit No. 77-A/2019, decree dated 28/12/2019) dismissed the suit and allowed the defendants' counter-claim, holding the Will duly proved and the defendants lawful title holders; First Appellate Court (Civil Appeal No. 06A/2020, judgment dated 29/06/2021) affirmed. Held: jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law; concurrent findings were neither perverse nor illegal; plaintiff failed to disprove the defendants' Gond tribe lineage (caste certificates Ex.D/1, D/2; school certificate Ex.D/3; electoral record Ex.D/13) or the Will, whose execution stood proved through attesting witness Roopchand (DW-2) under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act; re-appreciation of evidence being impermissible in second appeal, and applying State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637, no substantial question of law arose; the revenue mutation order dated 16.03.2010 was not illegal. Appeal dismissed.

2026:CGHC:8427

NAFR

RAHUL JHA

Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.02.18 11:04:21 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 163 of 2021

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Lal Singh S/o Sundarsai Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Dodhibahara, Tahsil Baikunthpur District Koriya Chhattisgarh

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Appellant(s)

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Versus

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1 - Babulal S/o Chhotelal Panika Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Dodhibahara, Tahsil Baikunthpur District Koriya Chhattisgarh

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2 - Raghunath S/o Chhotelal Panika Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Dodhibahara, Tahsil Baikunthpur District Koriya Chhattisgarh

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3 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, District Koriya, Baikunthpur Chhattisgarh

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Respondent(s)

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rishikant Mahobiya, Advocate

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For Resp. No. 3 : Mr. Santosh Soni, GA

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru

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Judgment on Board

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17/02/2026

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The present Second Appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the plaintiff, who is the appellant herein, challenging the judgment and decree dated 29/06/2021 passed in Civil Appeal No. 06A/2020 (Lal Singh v. Babulal & Others) by the

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learned Additional District Judge, Koriya, Baikunthpur (C.G.). By the impugned judgment, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 28/12/2019 passed in Civil Suit No. 77-A/2019 by the learned Additional Judge to the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Baikunthpur (C.G.).

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For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

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Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff has instituted the present civil suit seeking declaration of title, permanent injunction and for setting aside the order of mutation passed in favour of the defendants in respect of the suit land stating inter-alia that the plaintiff belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community, namely Gond, and therefore the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are not applicable to the parties. It was pleaded that late Dirpal had four sons, all of whom have expired. The plaintiff, Lalsingh, is the nephew of late Ramcharan (son of Ramcharan’s brother). It was further pleaded that Ramcharan was initially married to Budhni, who subsequently left him. Thereafter, Ramcharan married one Khurmutiya. From Khurmutiya, a daughter named Teejobai was born. Teejobai was married in Village Bodar to a person belonging to the Panika caste. From the wedlock of Teejobai and Chhotelal Panika, two sons, namely Babulal and Raghunath (defendants No.1 and 2), were born. According to the plaintiff, the defendants belong to the Panika caste, which falls under the general category, and are not members of the Gond Scheduled Tribe. It was averred that late Ramcharan has the recorded Bhumiswami of agricultural lands situated

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at Village Dhodhbahra, Tehsil Baikunthpur, bearing Khasra Nos. 76, 130 and 146, admeasuring 1.650, 0.210 and 0.520 hectares respectively, total area 2.380 hectares under one account, and Khasra No. 123/1 admeasuring 0.330 hectares under another account. After the death of Ramcharan, the plaintiff claims to be his sole legal heir in accordance with tribal custom and succession, and thereby entitled to succeed to his movable and immovable properties.

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(b) It was alleged that after the death of Ramcharan, defendants No.1 and 2, claiming themselves to be members of the Gond tribe, preferred an application before the Tahsildar, Baikunthpur, seeking mutation of their names on the basis of an alleged registered Will dated 11.05.1999 said to have been executed by late Ramcharan in their favour in respect of Khasra Nos. 76, 146, 130 and 317, total area 2.63 hectares. The plaintiff filed objections to the said mutation proceedings. In Revenue Case No. 3/3-6/2006-2007 (Babulal vs. Lalsingh), the Tahsildar, by order dated 30.04.2007, rejected the mutation application of the defendants.

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(c) Being aggrieved, the defendants preferred a revenue appeal No. 50-120/A-6/2007-2008. The appellate authority, by order dated 16.03.2010, allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated 30.04.2007, and directed mutation of the defendants’ names over the suit land. On account of the said order, the plaintiff has instituted the present suit.

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(d) The defendants, in their written statement, denied the averments of the plaint and contended that Ramcharan had only one daughter, Teejobai, and that defendants No.1 and 2 are her sons. The defendants No.1 and 2 have also filed a counter-claim, wherein it is pleaded that late

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Ramcharan had only one daughter, namely Teejobai, and that defendants No.1 and 2 are her sons and thus the natural heirs of late Ramcharan. It is further contended that late Ramcharan had executed a registered Will dated 11.05.1999 in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 in respect of the suit land, whereunder they acquired valid right, title and interest over the disputed property. On the basis of the said Will, they claim lawful entitlement and seek affirmation of their title over the suit land.

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(e) The plaintiff has filed his reply to the counter-claim, denying the entire pleadings therein and reiterating that the alleged Will dated 11.05.1999 is forged, fabricated and not binding upon him. The plaintiff, in his rejoinder, denied the execution and validity of the alleged Will and pleaded that the same is forged and fabricated. The plaintiff also denied the existence of any other legally wedded wife of late Ramcharan as alleged by the defendants.

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After due appreciation of the pleadings and evidence available on record, the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant holding that the plaintiff failed to establish his right, title and interest over the suit property and also failed to prove that the registered Will dated 11.05.1999 was forged or invalid. The trial Court further held that defendants No.1 and 2 had successfully proved due execution and validity of the said Will and their lawful entitlement over the suit land. Consequently, the plaintiff’s suit for declaration, permanent injunction and possession was dismissed, whereas the counter-claim filed by defendants No.1 and 2 for declaration and permanent injunction was allowed. It was declared that defendants No.1 and 2 are the title holders

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and persons in lawful possession of the land situated at Village Dhodhbahra, Tehsil Baikunthpur, District Korea, bearing Khasra Nos. 76, 146 and 130, admeasuring 1.65, 0.52 and 0.24 hectares respectively, and they are entitled to permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff from making any unauthorized interference over the suit property.

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Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred a first appeal before the Appellate Court; however, the learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal, thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed in favour of defendants No.1 and 2. Hence, the present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff/appellant challenging the concurrent findings of both the Courts below.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and decree are contrary to law and the evidence available on record. It is contended that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have committed a substantial error of law in holding the Will deed dated 11.05.1999 (Ex.D/4) to be duly proved, despite non-compliance of the mandatory requirements for proving a Will and in the absence of reliable and cogent evidence of its due execution and attestation. It is submitted that material contradictions and suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged Will have been ignored, resulting in a perverse finding. It is further argued that serious error has been committed in holding defendants No.1 and 2 to be the legal heirs of late Ramcharan without

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proper proof of their lineage. The finding that Tijo Bai was the daughter of late Ramcharan is also assailed as being unsupported by trustworthy documentary evidence and based on misreading of the record. Learned counsel submits that the counter-claim has been decreed on erroneous grounds, contrary to the evidence on record, and that relevant admissions and revenue entries in favour of the plaintiff were not properly appreciated. Hence, according to the appellant, the impugned findings give rise to substantial questions of law warranting interference in the present second appeal.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission and have carefully perused the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts as well as the material available on record.

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At the outset, it is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to the examination of substantial questions of law. Interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts is permissible only where such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or founded on an erroneous application of law. Upon consideration of the submissions advanced, this Court does not find that the present appeal satisfies the aforesaid parameters.

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Upon due consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial Court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court do not suffer from

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perversity or illegality warranting interference in second appeal. The plaintiff failed to adduce cogent evidence to establish that Tijo Bai was not the daughter of late Ramcharan or that defendants No.1 and 2 were not his lawful heirs. On the contrary, the defendants produced caste certificates (Ex.D/1 and D/2), school certificate (Ex.D/3), electoral record (Ex.D/13) and other public documents showing that they belong to the Gond tribe and are descendants of Ramcharan through his daughter Tijo Bai. These documents, being issued by competent authorities, remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination.

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So far as the Will dated 11.05.1999 (Ex.D/4) is concerned, the same stands duly proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and the settled legal principles. Roopchand (DW-2), one of the attesting witnesses, has categorically stated that the testator Ramcharan executed the Will in his presence and affixed his signature thereon, and that he and the other attesting witness signed in the presence of the testator. Though it was argued that reference was made to thumb impression, a perusal of the testimony shows that the witness ultimately clarified that the testator had signed the Will in his presence; and the document itself bears the signature of Ramcharan. His testimony remained intact and was not effectively demolished in crossexamination.

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The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant essentially seek reappreciation of evidence and substitution of this Court’s view for that concurrently taken by both the Courts, which is impermissible in a Second Appeal.

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It is well settled, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in S tate of Rajasthan and Others v. Shiv Dayal and Another, (2019) 8 SCC 637 , that interference in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact is permissible only when such findings are shown to be based on misreading of material evidence, contrary to pleadings, or such as no reasonable judicial mind could have arrived at. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court suffer from any such infirmity.

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In view of the consistent documentary evidence and trustworthy testimony of the attesting witness, the execution and attestation of the registered Will stand proved. The plaintiff, apart from making bald allegations of forgery, failed to produce any convincing rebuttal evidence. The revenue order dated 16.03.2010 mutating the names of defendants No.1 and 2 was passed on proper consideration of material placed before the authority and cannot be said to be illegal.

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Accordingly, the concurrent findings that defendants No.1 and 2 are the lawful successors of late Ramcharan and entitled to the suit property on the basis of the registered Will are findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not give rise to any substantial question of law. The appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

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Rahul/Gowri

Lal Singh v. Babulal

Case brief

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Lal Singh v. Babulal

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