Sohan Lal Meshram, Vs Executive Engineer

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SOURABH BHILWAR

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Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.02.05 10:32:41 +0530

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2026:CGHC:5914

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 157 of 2021

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Sohan Lal Meshram, S/o Late Parasram Meshram, Aged About 70 Years Retired Inspector, Water Resource Department, Ambagarh Chowki, At Present R/o Kilapara Ward No. 03, Dongargaon, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - Executive Engineer, Water Resource Department District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Superintendent Engineer, Shivnath Mandal, Water Resource Department Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Chief Engineer Mahanadi Godavari Kachar Besin, Near Bhagat Singh Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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4 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh., District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh

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…. Respondent(s)

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(Cause title is taken from CIS)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Santosh Soni, Govt. Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru

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Judgment on Board

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03/02/2026

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The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.02.2021 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (FTC), Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 12-A/2018, affirming the judgment and decree dated 03.11.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-I, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 23-A/2014, whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/ plaintiff. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

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The appellant/plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking declaration and consequential reliefs, pleading inter alia that he was born on 01.07.1951 at 12:35 a.m. and, due to conversion under the English calendar, his date of birth came to be recorded as 02.07.1951 in official records. It was pleaded that the appellant served in the respondent-department and retired from the post of Revenue Inspector. Despite official memoranda dated 12.05.2010 and 16.11.2011 reflecting his correct date of retirement as 31.07.2011, he was prematurely retired on 30.06.2011, which is illegal and arbitrary. It was further pleaded that during his entire service career he was granted only one promotion, though he was

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entitled to Kramonnati, which was not extended to him. After issuance of a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and failure of the respondents to redress his grievance, the suit was filed seeking declaration that the retirement dated 30.06.2011 is illegal, that he be deemed to have retired on 31.07.2011, and for consequential benefits including revision of pay, pensionary benefits and grant of promotion/Kramonnati.

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The respondents/defendants No.1 to 4 remained ex parte and did not choose to file their written statements; consequently, the averments and contentions raised by the appellant/plaintiff stand unrebutted in terms of Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove his claim for declaratory relief regarding his retirement date and consequential service benefits, including promotion and pension. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 03/11/2017, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts

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erred in dismissing the suit despite the pleadings and evidence remaining uncontroverted, in rejecting applications for production of necessary documents, and in failing to consider the appellant’s entitlement to correct date of retirement and consequential benefits including promotion/Kramonnati. It is further submitted that the findings of the Appellate Court are perverse, suffer from non-application of mind, and give rise to substantial questions of law warranting interference by this Court.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

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In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, after due appreciation of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, have concurrently held that the plaintiff has failed to prove his claim for declaration of retirement date, consequential claim of pensionary benefits, and promotion/Kramonnati. Both the Courts have also recorded that the respondents remained ex parte and the pleadings of the appellant/plaintiff remained unrebutted; however, the evidence adduced was insufficient to establish the entitlement claimed. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or illegality is apparent in the concurrent findings, and no ground has been made out to warrant interference with the judgments and decrees of both the Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of

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Civil Procedure.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ plaintiff failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled

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proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and

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legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference.

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Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.

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Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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$. Bhilwar

Sohan Lal Meshram, v. Executive Engineer

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Sohan Lal Meshram, v. Executive Engineer

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