Ramnarayan Vs Vishal Ram

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2026:CGHC:17559

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 103 of 2017

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Digitally signed by JYOTI JYOTI SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2026.04.17 17:17:55 +0530

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1. Ramnarayan S/o Sukhram, Aged About 55 Years Caste Teli, R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2. Rukhmani Bai W/o Shri Ramnarayan, Aged About 51 Years R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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1. Vishal Ram S/o Late Sukhram, Aged About 65 Years Caste Teli, R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2. Khileshwari @ Ahilya W/o Vishal Ram, Aged About 60 Years Caste Teli, R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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3. Bimla Bai W/o Vishal Ram, Aged About 57 Years Caste Teli, R/o Ghorda, Tehsil Bhanupratappur, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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4. The State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, District North Baster Kanker, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant(s)	:	Mr. Rajkumar Pali, Advocate
For Respondent/ State	:	Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L.

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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17.04.2026

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Perusal of the earlier order sheets reveals that the appeal was referred to the Mediation Centre, however, the mediation failed on account of non-participation of the parties. Accordingly, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard on admission.

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The plaintiffs/appellants, who are the husband and wife, have preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 14.12.2016 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, Bhanupratapur, District North Bastar Kanker, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 14-A/2016 (Ramnarayan & Anr. Vs. Vishal Ram & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 28.04.2016 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 24-A/2013 (Ramnarayan & Anr. Vs. Vishal Ram & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/ appellants. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.

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The plaintiffs instituted a Civil suit seeking declaration, partition, possession, and other consequential reliefs in respect of ancestral and joint family properties pleading inter

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alia that one Sukhram, father of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1, was the original owner of agricultural lands situated at Village Ghodda, Tahsil Bhanupratappur, District Uttar Bastar Kanker. Sukhram had two wives. From his first wife Bhagwati, a daughter namely Ghurai Bai was born, and from his second wife Leelabai, plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 were born. The family was governed by Hindu Law and Mitakshara School, and all properties were treated as joint Hindu family properties. It is pleaded that during his lifetime, Sukhram executed a registered gift deed dated 05.12.1975 in favour of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 in respect of certain ancestral lands, and after his death on 07.02.1976, the remaining lands were mutated jointly in the names of plaintiff No.1, defendant No.1, Leelabai, and Ghurai Bai. Thereafter, some portion was given to Ghurai Bai and the remaining lands continued jointly between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. The plaintiffs further averred that certain additional lands at Village Jampara were purchased from the income of the joint family, though the sale deed was executed in the name of defendant No.1, being the elder brother and karta of the family. Likewise, an ancestral house situated at Village Ghodda was also claimed to be joint family property. It is further stated that an oral/consensual partition took place between plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 on 22.02.2001. However, disputes subsequently arose regarding unequal

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and improper partition made by the revenue authorities in proceedings before the Naib Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer, Additional Commissioner, and Board of Revenue. According to the plaintiffs, fertile lands and valuable properties such as the ancestral house and Jampara lands were allotted entirely to defendant No.1, while the plaintiffs were given barren and uncultivable lands. The plaintiffs contend that despite various revenue proceedings and remand orders, proper equal partition by metes and bounds was not effected. Therefore, the present suit has been filed seeking:

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Equal half share partition of the properties mentioned in Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’;

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Declaration of half ownership in the Schedule ‘C’ property at Village Jampara as joint family property;

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Half share in the ancestral house described in Schedule ‘D’;

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Declaration that the order dated 15.04.2013 passed by the Naib Tahsildar is null and void; and

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Costs and other appropriate reliefs.

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Defendants No. 1 to 3 filed joint written statement admitting the averments made in paragraphs 2 to 11 and 13 of the

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plaint, while denying the remaining allegations. The defendants contended that the land bearing Khasra No. 515/5 admeasuring 600 sq. meters is government land, and therefore, the State of Chhattisgarh is a necessary party to the suit. It was further pleaded that the agricultural lands situated at Village Jampara, bearing Khasra Nos. 546 and 548 admeasuring total area 1.040 hectares, are not joint family properties but the self-acquired properties of defendant No.1 Vishalram. According to the defendants, the said lands were purchased by defendant No.1 through a registered sale deed dated 29.01.1983 from the income/resources of his wife’s parental family. Hence, the plaintiffs have no right, title, or interest over the said Jampara lands. It was also pleaded that the patta relating to Khasra No. 515, Plot No. 16, area 600 sq. meters was granted in favour of defendant No.1 in the year 2001 on the basis of his exclusive possession for a period of ten years. Since the same has not been renewed, the said land presently remains government land. The defendants further submitted that in earlier revenue partition proceedings before the Naib Tahsildar, the plaintiffs themselves sought equal partition, and despite equal partition having been made by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the plaintiffs remained dissatisfied and continued filing appeals before higher authorities on varying grounds. It was specifically denied that there was any unequal partition of

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ancestral lands. It was also stated that no prayer for partition by metes and bounds was made by the plaintiffs before the appellate revenue authority. The defendants denied that the Board of Revenue had declared the Schedule ‘C’ and Schedule ‘D’ properties to be joint family properties. They asserted that the order dated 15.04.2013 passed by the Naib Tahsildar in Revenue Case No. 4/A-27/11-12 was legal, proper, and passed with the consent of the plaintiffs. It was further contended that no cause of action had arisen for filing the present suit. The Schedule ‘C’ property was claimed to be the self-acquired property of defendant No.1, and the Schedule ‘D’ property was stated to be government land. The defendants also objected that the suit had not been properly valued and adequate court fees had not been paid, particularly in respect of the Jampara lands over which title was claimed. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs.

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After framing the issues and the Trial Court, upon appreciation of the pleadings, oral evidence and documentary records, dismissed the suit filed for declaration of title, partition and possession. It held that the properties described in Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ had already been partitioned between the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1, who are the real brothers, through a mutual partition deed

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dated 22.02.2001 (Ex.D/1), which was executed with consent of the parties. The plaintiff himself admitted such partition and challenged the same only after several years. The Trial Court further held that any challenge to the said partition deed was barred by limitation, as it was not questioned within the prescribed period, and therefore the partition had attained finality and the plaintiff was estopped from disputing it. So far as the property described in Schedule ‘C’ (Jampara land) is concerned, the Trial Court found that the same was purchased under a registered sale deed exclusively in the name of defendant No.1 and the plaintiff failed to prove any financial contribution towards its purchase or that it was acquired from joint family funds. Accordingly, the said property was held to be the self-acquired property of defendant No.1. With regard to Schedule ‘D’ property, the Trial Court recorded that the land was government land in respect of which a temporary patta had been granted to defendant No.1 for a limited period and, in absence of renewal, the land continued to be government property. Consequently, neither party could claim partition or declaration of ownership over the said land without establishing any legal right therein. On these findings, the Trial Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish joint ownership, entitlement to equal partition, or any right to declaration and possession. Consequently, the suit was

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dismissed with costs.

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Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 24.04.2016, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the Courts erred in dismissing the suit despite clear evidence that the parties were living jointly and that defendant No.1, being the elder brother, was managing the ancestral agricultural lands admeasuring about 21 acres. It is contended that the property described in Schedule ‘C’, having been purchased during the continuance of the joint family, ought to have been treated as joint family property. He further submits that a specific plea was taken in the plaint that the said property was purchased from the joint family income, and therefore the burden lay upon defendant No.1 to establish by cogent and reliable evidence that the same was his self-acquired property, which he failed to discharge.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned

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First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

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This Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission. Mere averments made in the plaint that the parties constituted a joint family and that the suit properties were joint family properties are not sufficient in law. The plaintiff was required to lay foundational evidence to establish the existence of a joint family nucleus and that the property described in Schedule ‘C’ was acquired from such joint family income. Only upon discharge of such initial burden would the onus shift upon defendant No.1 to prove that the property was his self-acquired property.

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In the present case, the plaintiff failed to adduce cogent and reliable evidence to establish that the Schedule ‘C’ property was purchased from joint family funds or that there existed sufficient ancestral nucleus from which the acquisition could have been made. In absence of such proof, no presumption of joint family property could be drawn merely because the parties were related or residing jointly. Therefore, the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants does not merit acceptance.

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The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal holding that no infirmity was made out in the findings recorded by the Trial Court. It held that the plaintiffs failed to establish by reliable

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evidence that the property described in Schedule ‘C’ was purchased from the income of the joint family. Mere assertion that the family was joint or that defendant No.1, being the elder brother, managed the family properties was held insufficient in absence of documentary proof showing contribution of the plaintiff or availability of surplus joint family nucleus. The Court further found contradictions in the plaintiffs’ own evidence regarding the source of funds and the financial condition of the family in the year of purchase, whereas the defence version that defendant No.1 purchased the property from funds received from his wife’s parental side remained unshaken in cross-examination. With regard to the properties in Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’, the Appellate Court held that they had already been partitioned through a mutual partition deed dated 22.02.2001, which had been acted upon, and the challenge thereto was belated and barred by limitation. As regards Schedule ‘D’, the Court held that the land was government land granted on temporary patta, the renewal of which was not proved, and therefore no declaration of joint ownership or partition could be granted in favour of the plaintiffs. On the overall appreciation of the evidence, the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove any subsisting joint title or right of partition in the suit properties and therefore upheld dismissal of the suit.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv

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Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial

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question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference.

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Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court.

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SD/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru)

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Judge

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Jyoti

Ramnarayan v. Vishal Ram

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Ramnarayan v. Vishal Ram

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