Dismissed¶63

Principal, v. Smt. Laxmi Tiwari

Chhattisgarh HC10 Feb 2026MAC/1542/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

condonation of delay; Section 5 Limitation Act; inordinate delay of 518 days; government appeal filed late; departmental approval; sanction date not disclosed; MAC appeal dismissed; State of Chhattisgarh appellants; Jahoor Khan ILR (2017) MP 93; Pathapati Subba Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513; Ramlal AIR 1962 SC 361; P.K. Ramachandran (1997) 7 SCC 556; Pundlilk Jalam Patil (2008) 17 SCC 448; Maniben Devraj Shah (2012) 5 SCC 157; High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur; neutral citation 2026:CGHC:7538; NAFR.

What did the court decide?

The appellants failed to explain the delay from 31.10.2023 till 29.05.2025; the application also did not state when sanction was accorded by the department, hence the delay was not properly explained. ¶24

Principal, Vs Smt. Laxmi Tiwari — Chhattisgarh HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶63

Issue for consideration

Whether the inordinate delay of 518 days in filing the MAC appeal ought to be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (I.A. No. 02/2025). +1 more

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Court's answer

In view of the inordinate delay of 518 days and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, there was no good ground to condone the delay; I.A. No. 02/2025 was rejected and, consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

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Ratio / Principle

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Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Chhattisgarh High Court, Bilaspur (Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J.), MAC No. 1542 of 2025, decided 11.02.2026 — Condonation of delay — I.A. No. 02/2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act sought condonation of 518 days' delay in filing this miscellaneous appeal against an award dated 31.10.2023. Held, rejecting the application and dismissing the appeal: the appellants (Principal, Government Industrial Training Institute, Kurud, and the State of Chhattisgarh) failed to explain the delay from 31.10.2023 till 29.05.2025, when the documents were forwarded to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, and the application did not state when departmental sanction was accorded. Relying on Jahoor Khan and Ors. Vs. Ramvaran and Ors., ILR (2017) MP 93, and Supreme Court authority reproduced therein and cited directly — Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361; P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556; Pundlilk Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., (2008) 17 SCC 448; Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157; and Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 INSC 286 — the Court applied the principle (per Pathapati Subba Reddy) that 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and 'cause for the advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation or revive stale or dead matters through Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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Digitally signed by SIDDHANT SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR TAMRAKAR Date: 2026.02.11 17:08:06 +0530

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2026:CGHC:7538

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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MAC No. 1542 of 2025

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Principal, Government Industrial Training Institute, Kurud, District - Dhamtari (C.G.)

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Collector, Bastar, District - Jagdalpur (C.G.)

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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Smt. Laxmi Tiwari W/o Late Abhishek Thakur Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp)

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Aarush Thakur S/o Late Abhishek Thakur Aged About 7 Years (Minor) Through Natural Guardian Smt. Laxmi Tiwari (Mother ) R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 21-07-2025

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Smt. Nisha Thakur W/o Rajkishor Thakur Aged About 65 Years R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp)

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Rajkishor Thakur S/o Late Swarup Lal Thakur Aged About 70 Years R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp)

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... Respondent(s)

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For State/Appellants : Mr. Anil S. Pandey, Government Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board

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11.02.2026

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Heard on I.A. No. 02/2025, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay occurred in filing of the MAC.

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Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that award was passed on 31.10.2023, thereafter documents were forwarded to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh on 29.05.2025. He would submit that approval was granted by the department, and

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thereafter, appeal was preferred. He would submit that the appellants have explained delay part properly.

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I have heard Mr. Pandey at length and perused the application for condonation of delay.

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Perusal of application would show that award was passed on 31.10.2023 and after one year and seven months, the documents were forwarded to the department seeking approval. The appellants have not explained part of delay from 31.10.2023 till 29.05.2025. It is also not stated in the application as to when sanction was accorded by the department. In my opinion, the appellants failed to explain delay part properly.

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5. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior Bench) in the matter of Jahoor Khan and Ors. Vs. Ramvaran and Ors. reported in ILR (2017) MP 93 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 29 of 2016 while dealing with the issue of delay in para 7, 8, 9 and 11 held as under :-

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“7. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361, Hon. Supreme Court in para 7 has held as under:-

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“7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and

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admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.”

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8. Hon. Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, has held in para 6 as under:-

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“6. law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”

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9. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 has held as under:

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“26. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury’s Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:

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“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.The courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely,

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(i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,

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(ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim,

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(iii) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”

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27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as ‘statutes of peace’. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed : (SCC p.712, para 18)

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“18. The object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches”.

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28. In Motichand vs. Munshi [AIR 1970 SC 898], this court observed that this principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression.

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29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

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11. Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:-

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“24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.”

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6 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy

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(Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported

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in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286, in para

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26, summarized the judgments and the same is reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law,as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. ”

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7 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy

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(supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented

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approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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8 . Considering inordinate delay of 518 days and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any good ground to allow the application for condonation of delay, accordingly, I.A. No. 02/2025 is hereby rejected . Consequently, appeal also fails and is hereby dismissed .

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Sd/-

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(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge

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$iddhant

Principal, v. Smt. Laxmi Tiwari

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Principal, v. Smt. Laxmi Tiwari

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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