Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. Vs Sardar Fancy Stores

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SOURABH BHILWAR

2026:CGHC:17483

NAFR

Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.04.17 10:42:18 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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MA No. 82 of 2019

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1 - Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. Through Its Authorized Representative Shri Vrushal S. Uttarde, Aged About 37 Years, S/o Shambhu Uttarde, Parle Products Pvt. Ltd., North Level Crossing, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai (Maharashtra) 400057.

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2 - Area Sales Manager Parle Products Private Limited, Behind Jayka Automobiles, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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1 - Sardar Fancy Stores Through Its Prop. Baljit Singh Chhabda, Manav Mandir Chowk, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.

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…. Respondent(s)

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(Cause title is taken from CIS)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Abhinav Kardekar, Advocate alongwith Ms. Neha Baid, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Nitesh Jain, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru

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Judgment on Board

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15/04/2026

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The appellants/ defendants have preferred the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, being aggrieved by the order dated 18.07.2019 passed by the

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learned Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in M.J.C. No. 70/2019 (Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Sardar Fancy stores), whereby the learned trial Court rejected the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as the appellants failed to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

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The plaintiff has instituted the suit against the defendants for recovery of Rs.9,50,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs Fifty Thousand only) along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realization, pleading inter alia that he was appointed by defendant No.1 in the year 2010 as an A-Group wholesale dealer for sale of Parle biscuits at Rajnandgaon, pursuant to which an agreement was executed between the parties and a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was deposited by him with defendant No.1. It is further pleaded that although the said agreement has since been terminated and the deposit amount has been refunded, the plaintiff had returned 728 cartons of expired biscuits to the company on 22.04.2014, valuing Rs.5,68,902/-, and an additional 414 cartons worth Rs.3,75,265/-, but the claim amounts in respect thereof have not been paid till date. Despite issuance of legal notices dated 03.03.2014, 14.10.2015 and 05.05.2016, the defendants failed to make payment, compelling the plaintiff to file the suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount with interest.

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The defendants have remained ex parte from the initial stage of the proceedings.

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After hearing the plaintiff and upon consideration of the facts and material available on record, the learned trial Court decreed the suit ex parte in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff had successfully proved, on the basis of unrebutted oral and documentary evidence, that a sum of Rs.9,44,167/- towards the claim of expired biscuit stock was payable by the defendants, and accordingly directed the defendants to pay the said amount along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realization. Aggrieved by the said ex parte judgment and decree, the defendants preferred an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court, upon consideration of the record, held that though the defendants participated in the execution proceedings initiated pursuant to the ex parte decree and despite having due knowledge of the proceedings failed to furnish any sufficient cause for the delay, and accordingly dismissed the application for condonation of delay and consequently the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Hence, the present appeal.

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(a) Learned counsel for the appellants/ defendants submits that the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court is wholly erroneous both on facts and in law, and is liable to be set aside. He submits that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the explanation furnished by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was sufficient, bona fide, and deserved to be accepted. The dismissal of the application

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has resulted in denial of an opportunity to the appellants to contest the suit on merits, including the right to cross-examine the plaintiff’s witnesses, thereby causing serious prejudice and deprivation of their valuable rights. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court ought to have taken a liberal approach while considering the application, particularly when no serious prejudice would have been caused to the plaintiff by affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellants.

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(b) Learned counsel further submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in holding that the appellants had prior knowledge of the ex parte judgment and decree merely on the basis of their participation in execution proceedings, without properly appreciating the circumstances under which such participation occurred. He contends that there existed a bona fide communication gap between the appellants and their counsel, coupled with unavoidable circumstances, including personal difficulties faced by the authorized representative, which prevented timely action. The learned Trial Court also failed to consider that improper or ineffective service of summons constituted a sufficient cause for non-appearance.

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(c) Learned counsel submits that the notice were not duly served upon appellant and the service of summons could not have been effected in the manner adopted in the present case, particularly as proper service, according to law, is required to be effected through court process, particularly as the appellants are stated to be residing outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court at Rajnandgaon, and according to them, the jurisdiction lies at Mumbai. The

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summons issued to defendant No.2 were allegedly refused by one P.S.N. Rao, who was not the in-charge or authorized representative of the company, and hence such refusal cannot be treated as valid service of notice. He also contends that even assuming some lapse on the part of the appellants or their counsel, the same ought to have been condoned in the interest of justice, possibly by imposing costs. The approach adopted by the learned Trial Court is stated to be contrary to the settled principles governing condonation of delay, which require a liberal and fair approach so that the case can be decided on merits and substantial justice is done rather than rejecting the matter on technical grounds.

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Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants and has supported the order impugned passed by the learned Trial Court. He submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the facts and evidence on record, which do not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in the present appeal.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the impugned judgment, decree and consequential order with utmost circumspection.

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After careful consideration of the entire material available on record, it is evident that the learned Trial Court passed an ex parte judgment and decree. Being aggrieved by the said ex parte judgment and decree, the defendants/ appellants herein preferred an application

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under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for setting aside the ex parte decree as well as for condonation of delay in filing the said application.

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The learned Trial Court, while considering the said application, has dealt with the issue of service of summons in detail and recorded a clear finding that summons were duly issued and served upon the appellants through registered post, and in respect of appellant No.2, service was refused by the concerned official, which amounts to valid service in the eyes of law. The Court has further taken note of the subsequent conduct of the appellants, who had earlier participated in execution proceedings through counsel and had knowledge of the decree, thereby negating their plea of non-service and lack of knowledge of the ex parte judgment.

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The Trial Court has further held that the explanation offered for condonation of delay was neither bona fide nor satisfactory, and the appellants failed to explain the delay in a convincing manner as required under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In absence of sufficient cause, the Trial Court rightly refused to condone the delay and consequently rejected the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

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It is pertinent to mention here that in the present case, proper notice was issued to the defendants, and defendant No.2 refused to accept the same for the reasons best known to him. Even there is no pleading about Mr. P.S.N. Rao who was present in the Office of defendant No.2 and refused to accept the summon issued by

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learned trial Court. It further appears that after passing of the ex parte judgment and decree, the defendants also participated in the execution proceedings, which clearly indicates that they had knowledge of the proceedings and, therefore, cannot now take the plea of lack of knowledge of the decree. It is evident that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the defendants to contest the suit, which they failed to avail. It is well settled that condonation of delay is not a matter of mere generosity but is to be considered strictly in accordance with law so as not to defeat the cause of substantial justice. Thus, the order impugned passed by the learned Trial Court is a well-reasoned and speaking order, warranting no interference by this Court.

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In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court finds no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court. The findings are based on proper appreciation of facts, evidence, and settled principles of law. This Court is of the considered view that the learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and no interference is warranted.

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Accordingly, the instant appeal, being devoid of merit, liable to be and is hereby dismissed .

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Consequently, the interim relief granted earlier shall stand vacated.

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$. Bhilwar

Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Sardar Fancy Stores

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Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Sardar Fancy Stores

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