Sanju Soni Vs Smt. Rashmi Soni

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2026:CGHC:6136-DB NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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FA(MAT) No. 139 of 2024

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Sanju Soni S/o Resham Lal Soni Aged About 33 Years R/o Ward No. 13 Tikrapara Shivrinarayan District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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Smt. Rashmi Soni W/o Sanju Soni and D/o Nagendra Soni, Aged About 27 Years R/o Quarter No. MQ-597, Azad Chowk, Dipka, P.S. Dipka, District Korba Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent

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For	Appellant	:	Ms. Shivangi Agrawal, Advocate
			appears on behalf of Mr. Shashwat Mishra, Advocate
For	Respondent	:	Ms. Astha Sharma, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Ujjal Choubey, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Judgment on Board

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A rvind Kumar Verma, J.

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03/02/2026

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Heard.

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The instant appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 07.03.2024 passed in Civil Suit No.309A/2022 by the learned

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Digitally
ASHUTOSH signed by
MISHRA ASHUTOSH
MISHRA

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Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Janjgir, District Janjgir-

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Champa, C.G. whereby the application filed by the husband under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for declaring the marriage solemnized between the parties null and void was dismissed. The present appeal is by the husband.

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The brief facts of the case are that the husband leveled allegation that the marriage in between the parties solemnized on 04.02.2018 in Korba (Dipka) and out of the said wedlock no child was born. According to the plaintiff, after the marriage, she learned that the applicant/respondent had a condition called PCDO and was infertile. The applicant/respondent was already aware of this fact, but the marriage was consummated by concealing it. Upon learning of this fact, the plaintiff convened a family meeting, where the respondent admitted to the matter. According to the plaintiff, after the social meeting, the applicant/respondent began to constantly quarrel and harass the applicant without reason. In an attempt to humiliate her, she went to the applicant's college and began questioning the applicant and his colleagues about his conduct and began falsely slandering him. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the applicant with the Family Counseling Center and the Superintendent of Police, Raigarh. Based on this complaint, the applicant was taken to the Women's Counseling Center Case No. 135/2018 was registered and proceedings were conducted from 20.08.2018 to 29.10.2018 and the same was sent to the non-

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applicant.

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According to the applicant/plaintiff, the non-applicant/respondent

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began demanding a family partition and acquiring a house in Raigarh in her name. Upon refusal, she threatened to implicate him in a false case. The non-applicant arrived in Shivrinarayan and began creating a ruckus, prompting the applicant/plaintiff to file a complaint at the Shivrinarayan police station, and proceedings were initiated under Sections 107 and 116 (3) of the CrPC under Case No. 178/2018. Fed up with the non-applicant/respondent's harassment, the applicant/plaintiff's mother filed a domestic violence case against the non-applicant and her family before the Judicial Magistrate, Pamgarh, on September 13, 2019. The non-applicant/respondent continued to treat the applicant cruelly and threatened to implicate him in a false case. She left for her parents' home on February 20, 2019, which the applicant reported to the Chakradhar Nagar police station. After that, when called, she stayed with them and after staying for a few days, she again went to her maternal home. Troubled by the applicant/plaintiff, a petition was filed under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act. On 18.09.2019, the respondent left the house with the Raigarh police along with all her belongings and since then the non-applicant is residing at her maternal home. A report was filed by the non-applicant/respondent under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. In which the applicant and her old parents, brother

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Sandeep and sister Nisha Soni were named.

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The non-applicant/respondent objected, but he was granted anticipatory bail. The non-applicant/respondent insults the applicant by unnecessarily linking his name with students and falsely accusing him of having an affair. This causes him to be humiliated in front of his superiors and juniors. Therefore, the applicant has requested a decree of divorce.

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In her reply, the non-applicant denied all the facts beyond the admitted facts and stated that it is impossible for a young woman's family members to know whether she can become a mother before marriage. According to the applicant/respondent, one month after the marriage, the applicant took the nonapplicant to a rented house in Raigarh where the applicant/plaintiff worked. The plaintiff's parents, siblings, and other family members also visited there, and the non-applicant also lived with the applicant's parents in the Shivrinarayan house. For four months after the marriage, their married life was going on happily. Thereafter, the applicant's behavior suddenly changed. When questioned by the non-applicant, the applicant stated that he had a love affair with a woman named Neetu before marriage and that he had married the non-applicant for the sole purpose of obtaining dowry. According to the nonapplicant, the applicant demanded a car, 10 tolas of gold and Rs 5 lakh from her parents as dowry and the non-applicant/wife

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denied that her family was poor, but they began harassing her in the name of dowry, and she silently endured the harassment. According to the respondent, the plaintiff used to lock the house and leave, leaving her alone, depriving her of daily necessities. On 5.09.2019, the plaintiff subjected her to cruelty, including abuse and assault, in the name of dowry, and drove her out of the house. The non-applicant/respondent filed a complaint at Chakradhar Nagar, Police Station, Raigarh and also filed a case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code at Shivrinarayan Police Station, which is currently pending. According to the respondent, she still wishes to reconcile and live a happy married life. Therefore, requested that the application be dismissed.

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Learned family Court framed two issues which are as under :-

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1- Whether the defendant/non-applicant tortured the appellant and committed cruelty?

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2- Whether the defendant/non-applicant has deserted the appellant since 2019?

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On behalf of the husband/appellant, four witnesses were examined namely Sanju Soni i.e. the husband himself as PW-1, Nisha Soni (PW-2), Goutam Singh Choudhary (PW-3) and Santosh Sahu (PW-4). Whereas on behalf of the wife, she examined herself as DW-1, Smt. Nirmala Soni (DW-2) and Amit Kumar Soni (DW-3). The learned family Court after evaluating

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the facts & evidence, dismissed the application of the husband. Being aggrieved by such judgment and decree, the present appeal is by the husband.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/husband would submit that the learned family Court failed to appreciate the fact that the wife treated the husband with cruelty and the evidence as adduced by the husband would prove that the husband was treated with cruelty by the wife. She would next contend that the wife has leveled allegations of illicit relationship with some other lady without any evidence and therefore, the character assassination and false acquisition made by one spouse i.e. the Respondent against the other would amount to cruelty. She would next contend that before marriage the wife suppressed the fact of her disease i.e. PCOD and the fact that she cannot bear a child and the marriage was an outcome of suppression of material fact. She would next contend that the wife used to extend threat to the appellant with regard to implication in a false case and the report was also filed before the Police Station Shivrinarayan. She would next contend that even the complaints with regard to extra marital affair were made to the employer and she also created a scene in the college premises of the appellant because of which the image of the appellant was tarnished. In support of her contention she would place reliance upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sau. Jiya Vs.

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Kuldeep¹ ; Joydeep Majumdar Vs. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar² ; Sivasankaran Vs. Santhimeenal³ ; Debananda Tamuli Vs. Kakumoni Katkay⁴ and the law laid down by this Court in the matter of Dr. Ramkeshwar Singh Vs. Smt. Seela Singh @ Madhu Singh⁵ and would lastly contend that in view of the above the finding of the Court below requires interference.

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Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the wife wants to live with the appellant and she will withdraw all the cases filed by her against the appellant. He would next contend that the cumulative reading of the evidence produced would show that the finding arrived at by the learned family Court is well merited which do not call for any interference.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the respective statements and documents exhibited.

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The first question for determination in this appeal is, “whether the Family Court is justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act holding that the ground of cruelty on the part of

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1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 213

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2 (2021) 3 SCC 742

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3 (2022) 15 SCC 742

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4 (2022) 5 SCC 459

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5 {FAM No.94 of 2013, decided on 16.06.2022}

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respondent/defendant has not been proved and established by the appellant/plaintiff ?”

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At this stage, it would be relevant to notice the provision contained under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955, which provides as under :-

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“ 13. Divorce. - (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party -

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(i) XXX XXX

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(ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty, or”

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The word ‘cruelty’ has not been specifically defined in the Act of

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However, the Supreme Court in the matter of Samar

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Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh 6 has laid down some situations or instances of human behaviour that would constitute mental

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cruelty. Paragraph 101 of the report states as under :-

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“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive:

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(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty

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(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party

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6 (2007) 4 SCC 511

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cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.

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(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.

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(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

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(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

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(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.

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(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.

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(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty

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(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

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(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

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(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the

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consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

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(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty

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(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.

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(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.”

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It is doubtless that burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case for, ordinarily, the burden lies on the party which affirms a fact, not on the party which denies it. This principle accords with common sense as it is so much easier to prove a positive than a negative. The petitioner must therefore, prove that the respondent has treated him with cruelty within the meaning of Section 10(1)(b) of the Act. [ See : Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane⁷ para 23]

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In the instant case, the respondent-wife Rashmi Soni has been examined as DW-1. In her examination-in-chief, she alleged that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant and his family members. However, during the cross-examination of Rashmi Soni DW-1, material admissions came on record. She

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7 AIR 1975 SC 1534

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further admitted that after the alleged incidents of cruelty, efforts for reconciliation were made between the parties. DW-1 further admitted that on 13.03.2019, a written compromise was arrived at between the parties in the presence of elders and that the said compromise bears the signatures of her parents. This admission clearly shows that DW-1 was willing to continue the matrimonial relationship even after the alleged acts. Rashmi Soni (DW-1) further admitted that she lodged a criminal case under Section 498-A IPC not only against the appellant but also against his aged parents, his brother Sandeep, and his sister Nisha Soni. It has come on record, and is not disputed, that after full trial, the parents of the appellant, brother Sandeep and sister Nisha Soni were acquitted by the competent criminal court. Apart from her oral allegations, she did not produce any independent or corroborative evidence to substantiate cruelty of such a grave nature as would make cohabitation unsafe.

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The appellant-husband Sanju Soni has been examined as PW-1 he denied all allegations of cruelty. Sanju Soni PW-1 deposed that he made sincere efforts to save the marriage and participated in reconciliation proceedings even after disputes arose. His testimony remained consistent and was not shaken in cross-examination on material aspects.

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Cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act must be of a grave and weighty nature. In the present case, the

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proceedings of the Family Counselling Centre, exhibited as Exhibit P-05, show that after counselling, both parties agreed to reside together as husband and wife. The documents forming part of Exhibit P-05, including the counselling proceedings dated 23.09.2018, 07.10.2018 and 29.10.2018, specifically record that pursuant to counselling, the parties resumed cohabitation and started living peacefully. The said documents further demonstrate that after 09.09.2018, the parties actually lived together and continued to cohabit even thereafter, including up to 29.10.2018, thereby restoring normal matrimonial life. Such conscious resumption of cohabitation after the alleged incidents clearly establishes that the earlier conduct, if any, stood forgiven and condoned. Once cruelty is condoned, it cannot be revived in the absence of any subsequent act of cruelty.

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Therefore, over all scrutiny of statement of both the parties does not constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Thus, there is no evidence available on record to prove cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) on the part of respondent/defendant.

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The Second question that arises for consideration in this appeal is, “whether the Family Court is justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955 for grant of decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion.

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Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955, which provides as under :-

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“ 13. Divorce

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x x x

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(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;

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Explanation. - In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

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A careful perusal of Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955 would show that husband or wife would be entitled for decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion if the other party to the marriage is residing separately for a period of two or more years without reasonable cause or consent or against the wishes of such party.

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In the matter of Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena alias Mota 8, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that for offence of desertion so far as deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there : (1) factum of separation and (2) intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly, two elements are essential so far as deserted spouse is concerned : (1) absence of consent and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to spouse leaving matrimonial home to form necessary intention aforesaid.

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8 AIR 1964 SC 40

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Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955 along with its explanation has to be read with Section 23(1)(a) of the Act of 1955, which provides as under :-

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“ 23. Decree in proceedings. - (1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that -

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(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner [except in cases where the relief is sought by him on the ground specified in sub-clause (a), subclause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of section 5] is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and”

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A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that under sub-section (a) of clause (1) of Section 23 of the Act of 1955, in any proceeding under the Act, if the Court is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, the Court shall grant the relief under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act of 1955. Therefore, even if a proceeding is undefended, it is obligatory on court to be satisfied under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act of 1955 that petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for purpose of such relief. The Court is bound to take into consideration conduct of petitioner. If the petitioner has by his own misdeeds forced his spouse to leave him, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and ask for assistance of Court to perpetuate his own wrong doing.

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The Supreme Court, in the matter of Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar 9, has held that in order to be a ‘wrong’ within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act of 1955, the conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled.

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In the matter of Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi 10, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the husband, who committed wrong (adulterous life) cannot be given advantage of his own wrong and cannot be granted divorce on the ground of desertion on part of his wife who is still prepared to live with him and further

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observed as under :-

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“18. … In the present case, the allegations of adulterous conduct of the appellant have been found to be correct and the Courts below have recorded a finding to the same effect. In such circumstances, in our view, the provisions contained under Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act would be attracted and the appellant would not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. Let the things be not misunderstood nor any permissiveness under the law be inferred, allowing an erring party who has been found to be so by recording of a finding of fact in judicial proceedings, that it would be quite easy to push and drive the spouse to corner and then brazenly take a plea of desertion on the part of the party suffering so long at the hands of the wrong-doer and walk away out of the matrimonial alliance on the ground that marriage has broken down.”

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Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, the evidence on record

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is required to be examined.

9 AIR 1977 SC 2218

10 AIR 2001 SC 1709

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The respondent-wife Rashmi Soni DW-1 admitted that she left the matrimonial home on 20.02.2019 and went to her parental house. Though she attempted to state that thereafter reconciliation talks took place, she categorically admitted that she never permanently resumed cohabitation with the appellant. The Wife further admitted that subsequently she again left the matrimonial home and that on 18.09.2019, she removed all her belongings from the matrimonial house with police assistance and since then has been residing continuously at her parental home. Thus, the factum of separation from 20.02.2019 stands clearly established from the testimony of Rashmi Soni DW-1 herself. It is further borne out from the record that Rashmi Soni DW-1 never filed any petition for restitution of conjugal rights, which is a relevant and telling circumstance indicating absence of intention to resume marital life.

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On the other hand, the appellant-husband Sanju Soni PW-1, deposed that he made repeated efforts to bring the wife back to the matrimonial home through family members and counselling proceedings. His testimony remained unshaken on material particulars.

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The conduct of Rashmi DW-1 subsequent to separation is of decisive significance. The evidence shows that Rashmi DW-1 lodged criminal proceedings under Section 498-A IPC not only against the appellant but also against his aged parents, brother

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Sandeep and sister Nisha Soni, all of whom were subsequently discharged by the competent criminal court. The implication of the entire family followed by acquittal clearly demonstrates that wife’s intention was not to resume cohabitation but to prosecute the appellant and send him to jail. Mere participation in counselling or brief interaction does not amount to resumption of cohabitation. As held by the Supreme Court, a temporary stay or isolated attempt at settlement, unaccompanied by a genuine intention to live together, does not interrupt desertion. In the present case, DW-1 has nowhere stated that she returned to the matrimonial home with an intention to resume cohabitation permanently.

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The respondent-wife has also failed to establish any reasonable cause for remaining away from the matrimonial home after 20.02.2019, particularly when cruelty has already been found not proved and condoned. Section 13(1)(i-b) has also to be read with Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence, it is evident that the appellant-husband is not taking advantage of his own wrong. There is no material to show that the appellant, by his misconduct, forced the wife to leave the matrimonial home. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that wife voluntarily withdrew from cohabitation and thereafter persisted in separation with a settled intention.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Debananda Tamuli (Supra)

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has held thus in paragraphs No.8 to 11 which are reproduced hereinbelow:-

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8. The reasons for a dispute between husband and wife are always very complex. Every matrimonial dispute is different from another. Whether a case of desertion is established or not will depend on the peculiar facts of each case. It is a matter of drawing an inference based on the facts brought on record by way of evidence.

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9. Now, coming to the facts of the case, there is no dispute that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 17-6-2009 and that they stayed together only till 30-6-2009. The petition for divorce was filed on 9-9-2011. As per clause (i-b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the HM Act, the desertion must be for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the institution of the petition. In her affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief filed on 24-6-2015, the respondent stated that after she became aware of the serious illness of the appellant's mother, she came to Tezpur on 1912-2009. She stayed with her sister-in-law. According to the respondent, on 20-12-2009, the appellant told her to leave Tezpur. Therefore, she left Tezpur. After she was informed about the death of the appellant's mother, she came back to Tezpur and visited the appellant's house on 21-12-2019, and left on the next day. In the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, it is not even the case made out by the respondent that she came to Tezpur intending to resume the matrimonial relationship.

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10. The perusal of the respondent's evidence does not disclose any effort made by her to resume the matrimonial relationship. She has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. As can be seen from the evidence on record, the appellant is carrying on business at Tezpur. The respondent is working as a Lecturer in University Law College at Gauhati. There is

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no dispute that from 1-7-2009 till date, they are staying separately.

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11. Merely because on account of the death of the appellant's mother, the respondent visited her matrimonial home in December 2009 and stayed there only for one day, it cannot be said that there was a resumption of cohabitation. She has not stated that she came to her matrimonial home on 21-12-2009 with the intention to resume cohabitation. The intention on the part of the respondent to resume cohabitation is not established. Thus, in the facts of the case, the factum of separation has been proved. From the evidence on record, an inference can be drawn that there was animus deserendi on the part of the respondent. She has not pleaded and established any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home.

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In the instant case from the statement of the respondent-wife herself recorded in paragraph 27, it clearly emerges that her intention was not to resume or continue cohabitation. The respondent categorically admitted that after 20.02.2019 she did not permanently return to the matrimonial home and further stated that she was not residing with the appellant thereafter. She further admitted that even during the intervening period she stayed away from the appellant and ultimately left the matrimonial home. It is further evident from her own statement that on 18.09.2019, the respondent went to Police Station Chakradhar Nagar, got a panchnama prepared and took back the entire streedhan and household articles, except clothes, thereby completely severing matrimonial ties. The act of taking away the entire streedhan and articles conclusively establishes a clear intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus

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deserendi). In view of the evidence on record and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, this Court holds that the wife left the matrimonial house on 20.02.2019.

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Additionally, the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent resulted in the discharge/acquittal of the brother and sister of the appellant, namely Sandip Soni and Nisha Soni, as borne out from the certified orders placed on record. The discharge of close family members reinforces that the allegations were not substantiated and further supports the inference that the respondent left the matrimonial home without reasonable cause and against the wishes of the appellant.

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Thus, from the respondent’s own admissions, the documentary evidence regarding removal of streedhan, and the outcome of the criminal proceedings, it stands proved that the respondent voluntarily left the matrimonial house, without reasonable cause, and with the intention of permanently ending matrimonial cohabitation. The factum of separation and the intention to desert are both established, thereby satisfying the essential ingredients of desertion as contemplated under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

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Accordingly, this Court holds that the respondent-wife deserted the appellant-husband, and the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 stands proved.

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The issue of desertion is answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent.

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In the result, in view of the findings recorded above, the appeal partly succeeds. The finding of the Family Court insofar as it relates to the ground of cruelty is affirmed, as the same has not been proved. However, the finding of the Family Court on the ground of desertion is set aside, and it is held that the respondent-wife deserted the appellant-husband on 20.02.2019 for a continuous period of two years. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, and the marriage between the parties stands dissolved by a decree of divorce. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent.

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A decree be drawn accordingly.

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SD/SD/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Judge

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ashu

Sanju Soni v. Smt. Rashmi Soni

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Sanju Soni v. Smt. Rashmi Soni

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