Jagdish Prasad Bansal Vs Shivkumar Dansena

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CGHC010352872024

2026:CGHC:27879-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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FA No. 198 of 2024

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Jagdish Prasad Bansal S/o Late Ramphal Bansal, Aged About 67 Years R/o Ward No. 11, Sakti, Tehsil Sakti, District-Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) -----(Plaintiff)

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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Shivkumar Dansena The Then Nayab Tehsildar/tehsildar/executive Magistratet, Sakti, Tehsil-Sakti, District-Sakti (C.G.) At The Time Of Filing Of The Civil Suit He Was Posted At Kharsiya As Tehsildar Kharsiya, DistrictRaigarh Now At Present He Is Posted As Tehsildar Raigarh, District-Raigarh (C.G.) -----(Defendant)

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Amrito Das, Senior Advocate with Ms. Juhi Jaiswal, Advocate

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D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu & Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput

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Judgment on Board

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02/07/2026

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Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J.

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By this appeal, appellant has challenged the legality and sustainability of the impugned order dated 28.09.2024 passed in Civil Suit No.18-B/2023 by learned First District Judge, Sakti, District – Janjgir

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Digitally signed by PRAVEEN KUMAR SINHA Date: 2026.07.09 18:49:55 +0530

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Champa, whereby learned trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC.

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Facts relevant for disposal of the present appeal are that the appellant/plaintiff instituted a civil suit against the respondent/defendant seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 33,95,000/- as compensation for the alleged illegal demolition of his office, mental agony, and defamation. The plaintiff pleaded, inter alia, that while the respondent-defendant was posted as Nayab Tehsildar/Tehsildar /Executive Magistrate at Sakti, District Sakti, he misused his official powers and illegally demolished the plaintiff's office on 26.03.2018, thereby causing substantial loss. It was specifically averred in the plaint that the entire demolition action was mala fide, arbitrary, and contrary to law. It was further pleaded that despite the grant of a stay order by the Board of Revenue, the respondent proceeded to demolish the entire building, resulting in considerable financial loss and mental suffering to the plaintiff.

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At the stage of filing the written statement, the respondent/defendant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint. It was specifically contended that the action challenged in the suit had been undertaken by the defendant in his official capacity as Nayab Tehsildar . It was submitted that a Tehsildar or Nayab Tehsildar apart from being a Revenue Officer under Section 11 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short, "the Code of 1959"), is also a Revenue Court within the meaning of Section 31 of the said Code. In that capacity, such officer is empowered to initiate proceedings against unauthorized occupants of Government land under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 and to pass orders of eviction

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thereunder. It was further contended that, by virtue of Sections 2 and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, a Tehsildar or Nayab Tehsildar is deemed to be a "Judge" in respect of acts performed and orders passed while exercising powers under the Code of 1959 and is, therefore, entitled to the protection afforded under Section 3(1) of the Act. Consequently, no civil suit or criminal proceeding can be instituted against such officer in respect of any act done or order passed in the discharge of his quasi-judicial functions. The suit seeking compensation for actions taken by the defendant in exercise of his statutory powers as Revenue Court was expressly barred under Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, rendering the suit not maintainable.

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Learned trial Court, after considering the pleadings of the parties, material available on record, and the relevant statutory provisions, allowed the application filed by the respondent/defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Consequently, by the impugned order dated 28.09.2024, learned trial Court rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC, holding that the suit was barred in view of the provisions of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant/plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that learned trial Court committed error in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC considering the facts and material placed before it by defendant overlooking the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC . He contended that trial Court failed to appreciate the order passed by Board of Revenue dated 20.05.2020 and the order of High Court of

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Chhattisgarh in Writ Appeal No.370/2023. It is contention of learned counsel for appellant that the action of demolition of the building of appellant on 26.03.2018 after passing of interim order in favour of appellant and bringing the knowledge of defendant/respondent, cannot be said to be an act of respondent to be in good faith, but the act of respondent- defendant is with malafide. The act of defendant to be malafide is a mixed question of fact and law which can be decided only after full-fledged trial. Act of respondent to be in good faith or with malafide can be proved only after recording of evidence of parties. The finding recorded by trial Court is without there being any evidence on record and therefore suit filed by appellant- plaintiff ought not to have been dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC. The act of respondent/defendant which is pleaded in plaint will not fall within the ambit of “discharge of his judicial duty” and, therefore, the said act is not covered under sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 1985”). He also contended that the order passed by the trial Court dismissing the entire suit under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC is per se illegal and therefore it be set aside. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant places reliance upon the decision in case of Shaifali Gupta Vs. Vidya Devi Gupta & Ors. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1181), Producin Pvt. Ltd Vs. Chhattisgarh State Minor Forest Produce (T & D) & Ors (First Appeal No.65 of 2013, decided on 07.03.2022), Sought Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. M/s Rajendra Kumar Poddar (WP227 No. 488 of 2021 decided on 11.11.2022 ), E.S. Sanjeeva Rao Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Mumbai and Ors . (2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1908), Rachapudi Subba Rao Vs. Advocate General (1981) 2 SCC

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577 and Deepali Jadhav Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Revision No.1592 of 2021 , decided on 8 th March 2022),

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Learned counsel for the respondent/defendant would vehemently oppose submission of learned counsel for the appellant and would submit that respondent-defendant was serving as a Nayab Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate on 26.03.2018 and in compliance of/execution of order passed by his predecessor in the year 2015 under Section 248 of the Code of 1959, he had removed the encroachment by demolishing the superstructure. It is his contention that demolition of illegal construction on Govt. land has been done following due procedure of law. Order of removing encroachment under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 passed by Tehsildar was put to challenge before higher authorities i.e. Sub Divisional Officer/Collector/Commissioner. He contended that in the revision application, there is no pleading made by the appellant that respondent defendant has acted malafide. Board of Revenue also has not recorded any finding about the conduct of respondent defendant to be not of in good faith on 26.03.2018. Respondent being a Revenue Officer acting as a quasi- judicial authority has acted to execute the order passed by the authority in revenue case, under the provision of Section 248 of the Code of 1959 and therefore the act of respondent -defendant is in good faith under the authority of law. He therefore is protected under Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 in order to safeguard the Judges and the Presiding Officer of Revenue Courts from false and frivolous prosecution. He submits that there is no dispute that suit can be dismissed under the provision of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC considering

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the complaint averment. Tehsildar is a Revenue Officer within the meaning of Section 11 of the Code of 1959 and functions as quasijudicial Officer in Revenue Court. He contended that act of respondent defendant is covered under Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1985. No cause of action would legally arise against the respondent personally for the act performed by him in discharge of his official duties. Learned trial Court upon considering the averments contained in the plaint and the applicable statutory provision held that suit was expressly barred under the law and rejected the suit filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. In support of his submissions, he places reliance upon the decision in case of Rajkumar Tamboli Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (CRMP No.1461 of 2023 and other connected matters decided on 29.04.2024), P.K. Gupta Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (CRMP No.366 of 2015, decided on 17.01.2020), Sree Surya Developers and Promoters Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad and Ors. (2022) 5 SCC 736 and K. Akbar Ali Vs. K. Umar Khan & Ors (2021) 14 SCC 51.

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We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and also perused the records of the case.

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Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by learned trial Court whereby the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the defendant/respondent was allowed and the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC recording a finding that respondent/defendant while holding post of Nayab Tehsildar/In-Charge Tehsildar, Sakti, has initiated proceeding of ejectment and removal of superstructure and therefore he is protected under the Judges (Protection) Act 1985.

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From the pleadings made in the plaint itself it is clear that the plaintiff/appellant has pleaded that Tehsildar while considering the case registered against the plaintiff/appellant has passed an order of ejectment. Order passed by the Tehsildar was upheld by Commissioner and after passing of order by the Commissioner on 21.03.2018, notice was issued for removing superstructure and vacating land subject matter of revenue proceedings and upon date fixed for removing encroachment in the notice, superstructure was demolished and get the land vacated. Nayab Tasildar is a Revenue Officer under Section 11 of the Code of 1959. Section 11 of the Code of 1959 is relevant in the facts of case and it is extracted below for ready reference:

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“ 11. Revenue Officers. - There shall be the following classes of the Revenue Officers, namely :-

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(1) Commissioner, Land Records;

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(2) Additional Commissioner, Land Records;

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1. Commissioner,

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(4) Additional Commissioner;

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(5) Collector and District Survey Officer,

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(6) Additional Collector,

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(7) Sub-Divisional Officer (Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) and Deputy Survey Officer,

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(8) Assistant Collector,

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(9) Joint Collector,

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(10) Deputy Collector,

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(11) Tahsildar and Assistant Survey Officer;

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(12) Additional Tahsildar (Additional Tahsildar);

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(13) Superintendent of Land Records;

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(14) Naib Tahsildar, and

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(15) Assistant Superintendent of Land Records.]

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Section 31 of the Code of 1959 provides for conferral of status of

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Courts on Board and Revenue Officers which reads as under :

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“31. Conferral of Status of Courts on Board and Revenue Officers - The Board or a Revenue Officer, while exercising power under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force to enquire into or to decide any question arising for determination between the State Government and any person or between parties to any proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court.

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Section 32 provides inherent power to Revenue Courts, which is also re-produced herein-under:

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“32. I nherent power of Revenue Courts. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.”

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Section 2 of the Act of 1985 defines “Judge”. Definition of Judge is also extracted below for ready reference:

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“2. Definition. —In this Act, “Judge” means not only every person who is officially designated as Judge, but also every person—

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(a)who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or

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(b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in clause (a).”

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While exercising the power under Section 248 of the Code of 1959, Nayab Tahsildar decided the revenue case and according to Section 31 of the Code of 1959, he is conferred with the status of Revenue Court, while discharging the proceeding under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 and executing its order.

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rachapudi Subba Rao (supra) has considered the issue of protection to the Judicial Officer and observed thus :

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“9 . As pointed out by this Court in Anwar Hussain V. Ajoy Kumar Mukerjee & Ors. the Section affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a judicial Officer in his judicial capacity. In the first category fall those acts which are within the limits of his jurisdiction. The second category encompasses those acts which may not be within the jurisdiction of the judicial Officer, but are, nevertheless, done or ordered to be done by him, believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be done.

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10 . In the case of acts of the first category committed in the discharge of his judicial duties, the protection afforded by the statute is absolute, and no enquiry will be entertained as to whether the act done or ordered to be done was erroneous, or even illegal, or was done or ordered without believing in good faith.

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11. In the case of acts of the second category, the protection of the statute will be available if at the time of doing, ordering the act, the judicial officer acting judicially, in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the same. The expression "jurisdiction" in this Section has not been used in the

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limited sense of the term, as connoting the "power" to do or order to do the particular act complained of, but is used in a wide sense as meaning "generally the authority of the Judicial Officer to act in the matters". Therefore, if the judicial officer had the general authority to enter upon the enquiry into the cause, action, petition or other proceeding in the course of which the impugned act was done or ordered by him in his judicial capacity, the act, even if erroneous, will still be within his `jurisdiction', and the mere fact that it was erroneous will not put it beyond his "jurisdiction". Error in the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with lack of jurisdiction in entertaining the cause or proceeding. It follows that if the judicial officer is found to have been acting in the discharge of his judicial duties, then, in order to exclude him from the protection of this statute, the complainant has to establish that (1) the judicial officer complained against was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever, and (2) he was acting without good faith in believing himself to have jurisdiction.”

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High Court of Bombay in case of N.V. Shamsunder Civil Judge (Senior Division) V. Savitabai reported in 2006 Lawsuit (Bom.) 1230 has considered the suit filed against Civil Judge for not investing the amount of compensation as directed by the Appellate Authority awarded in the land acquisition matter, and it observed thus :

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“6 . I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel and perused the record. Since the immunity is claimed by the defendant No. 1 under the above two Acts, it would be appropriate to quote Section 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act of 1850 and Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act,

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Section 1 of the Judicial Officers Protection Act of 1850 reads as under:

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Non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially, for official acts done in good faith and of officers executing warrants and order:- No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction: Provided that he at the time in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same.

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Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads as under:

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Additional protection to Judges :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or

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any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge.

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7. From the bare perusal of the Section 1 of The 1850 Act, it is clear that the Judicial Officer acting judicially is protected in respect of any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty provided he in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. Insofar as Section 3 of The 1985 Act, which provides additional protection to Judges clearly stipulates that no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceedings against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Thus, Section 3 gives complete immunity to a Judge or Ex-Judge in respect of any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Section 4 of the said Act also provides that provision of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force providing for protection of Judges. The conjoint reading of sections 3 and 4 makes it clear that the protection given to a Judge or Ex-Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him while discharging official or judicial function is absolute. Under Section 1 of The 1850 Act the protection from being sued in civil suit is available to a Judge or Magistrate for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty provided he in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or

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order the act complained of. As such the protection available to a Judge under The 1850 Act is in respect of any action taken in good faith whereas the protection available under The 1985 Act is absolute and is even available not only to a sitting Judge but also to an Ex-Judge in respect of the actions taken or words spoken by him while discharging his official or judicial function. The reason behind giving absolute protection by The 1985 Act is quite obvious. If such an absolute protection is not given, the Judge or Ex Judge runs the risk of facing civil action at the instance of the disgruntled litigants who may have been aggrieved by adverse orders passed against them. If such an absolute protection is not given, a Judge or an Exjudge is likely to face frivolous suits at the instance of the litigants who are aggrieved by adverse orders passed by the Judge or Ex-Judge. Therefore, in order to give absolute protection to the Judge not only during his tenure but even thereafter, the Legislature thought it fit to enact The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. A bare reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act makes the intention of the legislature to give complete protection to a Judge sitting or retired clear. That being the position, in my view, there is considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Bhangde that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction illegally in rejecting the application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the case of the defendant No. 1 that the suit filed against the defendant No. 1 was clearly barred and, therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected as against the defendant No. 1 under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of Civil Procedure Code on the ground that there was a bar to file the suit. Since the suit was clearly barred under Section 3 of the 1985 Act, the application filed by the defendant No. 1 ought to have been allowed by the trial Court. I am, therefore, of the

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opinion that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction illegally in rejecting the application filed by the defendant No. 1. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Darda appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 6 that the respondents 1 to 6 have filed the suit against the defendants in good faith believing that the suit is the only remedy available in view of the communication of the Registrar and the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure issued to the defendants. The suit must have been filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants after obtaining legal advise and if the plaintiffs have been wrongly advised in filing the suit which is patently not maintainable, they cannot come with the plea that the suit was filed in good faith. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the defendant No. 1 in the trial Court was vehemently contested in the trial Court by respondents 1 to 6. They have also contested the present Revision Application. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Darda, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside .”

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In case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1999) 7 SCC 409, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the revenue officer in quasi-judicial adjudication has wrongly exercised his jurisdiction, that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That can not always form basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the officer while he is acting as quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a quasi- judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervision in appeal.

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In case of Balram & Ors. Vs. Aswani Kumar Yadav & Ors. reported in MANU/MP/0175/2001, High Court of Madhya Pradesh has observed thus:

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“ The non-applicant No. 1 was empowered to give a definite judgment in a legal proceeding. It does not matter that for the purpose of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, the judgment is mentioned as an order. The definition given in Section 2 of the Act is much wider and it includes an order which determines the right of the parties, for the reasons given in it. If the non-applicant No. 1, exercising his power under the M.P. Land Revenue Code, is a Judge, then he is entitled to protection under Section 3(1) of the Act and no Court could entertain any civil or criminal proceedings against him for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him, or in the course of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. It cannot be said that if the non-applicant No. 1 is charged of the offences which the applicant-complainant wants him to be charged with, the action taken by him during the course of passing of the judicial order of mutation, will not form part of the offences.”

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In the pleadings made in the plaint, there is no specific pleading that respondent /defendant has acted without jurisdiction, but the pleading is that Tehsildar (defendant) even after bringing to his knowledge of the interim order of stay of order of ejectment has demolished the superstructure and got the appellant/plaintiff evicted.

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Definition of Judge as provided under the Act of 1985 is very wide. It also includes a person empowered under law to give in legal proceeding a definite judgment. The respondent while acting in the

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officiating capacity of Tehsildar was executing the order passed under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 in Revenue Case.

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Section 3 of the Act of 1985 provides for additional protection to Judges which reads as under :

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“3. Additional protection to Judges.—

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(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.

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(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge.”

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Perusal of the afore extracted provision under the Act of 1985 would show that there is bar for entertaining or continuing of any civil or criminal proceedings against any person who is or was Judge for any act, thing or word committed.

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The act of the person being a Judge is protected. It is not in dispute that respondent while acting as Tehsildar was discharging his duties and functions under Section 248 of the Code fo 1959 and in compliance of order passed under Section 248 further action of removal of encroachment was initiated by him.

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The argument which is advanced by learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff is that whether the act committed by respondent/defendant is in discharge of his duty or not can only be proved by evidence, which in the opinion of this Court is not sustainable. It is not disputed by the appellant that respondent /defendant was not posted as officiating Tehsildar, the demolition is in execution of the order passed under Section 248 of the Code of 1959. In above facts of the case and the provision under the Act of 1985 as also provision of Section 31 of the Code of 1959 we are of the considered view that respondent/ defendant is protected under the Act of 1985 as the respondent-defendant acted in capacity of Nayab Tahsildar a Revenue Officer under Section 11 of the Code of 1959 and has exercised jurisdiction under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 being a revenue Court. The act of respondent defendant is protected . In the plaint there is no specific pleading that action taken by respondent is without jurisdiction.

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Reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in case of Rachapudi Subba Rao (supra) is considered by this Court in preceding paragraph.

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In case of Deepali Jadhav (supra) criminal case was registered against the applicant therein under Section 13 (1) (d), 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 along with other offences of IPC and in that facts of case High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that in view of conduct of judicial officer, applicant was not entitled for protection under the Act of 1985.

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As civil proceeding initiated against respondent/defendant is barred under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 and therefore in the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court has not committed any illegally or infirmity in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and dismissing the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Act of 1985.

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For the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The first appeal deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment and decree dismissing the suit under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC are affirmed.

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Let a decree be drawn accordingly.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Judge

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S

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Praveen

Jagdish Prasad Bansal v. Shivkumar Dansena

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Jagdish Prasad Bansal v. Shivkumar Dansena

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