Dismissed¶¶72

State of Chhattisgarh v. Manishankar Kaiwart

Chhattisgarh HC22 Mar 2026CRMP/804/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

condonation of delay; 206 days delay; leave to appeal against acquittal; State of Chhattisgarh; delay and laches; Section 5 Limitation Act 1908; government departmental delay rejected; sufficient cause; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited (2012) 3 SCC 563; State of M.P. v. Ramkumar Choudhary 2024 INSC 932; acquittal under IPC Sections 302/149, 120-B; CRMP Chhattisgarh Bilaspur; Sessions Case No.333/2021; Crime No. 435/2021 PS Masturi; petition for leave to appeal rejected at threshold.

What did the court decide?

None. The instant petition seeking leave to appeal was rejected on the ground of delay and laches (condonation of the 206-day delay refused); accordingly, no leave to appeal against the acquittal was granted. ¶¶72

State of Chhattisgarh Vs Manishankar Kaiwart — Chhattisgarh HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether sufficient cause exists to condone the inordinate delay of 206 days in the State's petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal. +1 more

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Court's answer

The State failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay; the bare sequence of events (proposal forwarded by the Law & Legislative Affairs Department to the Office of the Advocate General, subsequent processing, and eventual filing) lacks specificity or justifiable cause and does not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation, so the State miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting condonation of the inordinate 206-day delay.

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Ratio / Principle

The Court declined to exercise its discretionary power to condone the extraordinary delay, finding no convincing or bona fide reason established by the State's counsel and no justification for condoning the 206-day delay in filing the petition against acquittal.

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Key takeaways

In the light of Postmaster General (2012) 3 SCC 563 and Ramkumar Choudhary (2024 INSC 932): government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment; condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by government entities; the law casts its protection equally upon all litigants.ratio¶¶70

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

CRMP No. 804 of 2026, High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (decided 23.03.2026, per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice, with Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge): The State of Chhattisgarh sought condonation (I.A. No.01 of 2026) of a 206-day delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 08.05.2025 (Sessions Case No.333/2021, 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur) of respondents Manishankar Kaiwart and Ajay Kumar Bhaina under Sections 147/149, 148/149, 302/149, 201 & 120-B IPC (Crime No. 435/2021, P.S. Masturi). Relying on Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited (2012) 3 SCC 563 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, the Court held that government departments are under a special obligation to act with diligence, that condonation of delay is an exception and not the rule, and that it cannot be claimed by government entities as a matter of right or anticipated privilege; departmental formalities and bureaucratic machinery were not accepted as cogent explanation. Finding that the State had miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause, the Court declined to exercise its discretion and rejected the petition on the ground of delay and laches.

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MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREETKAUR Date: 2026.03.24 11:09:06 +0530

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2026:CGHC:13609-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 804 of 2026

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - Manishankar Kaiwart S/o Late Shri Udayram Kewat, Aged About 51 Years R/o Ward No. 04, Malhaar, Chowki Malhar, Police Station Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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2 - Ajay Kumar Bhaina S/o Umend Ram Bhaina R/o Ward No. 10, Malhar Baramdev Chowk, Chowki Malhar, Police Station Masturi District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Soumya Rai, G.A.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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23.03.2026

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1. Heard Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Government Advocate for the

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appellant/State on I.A. No.01 of 2026, which is an application for

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condonation of delay of 206 days.

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2. The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant of leave to appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment of acquittal dated 08.05.2025, passed in Sessions Case No.333/2021, by the Court of learned 4^th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) whereby acquitting the respondent from the offence punishable under under Sections 147/149, 148/149, 302/149, 201 & 120-B of the IPC in connection with Crime No. 435/2021 at Police Station- Masturi, DistrictBilaspur (C.G.).

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3. Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is patently erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on record establishing the guilt of the accused/respondents, the learned Trial Court has erroneously acquitted them on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable grounds. Learned State counsel submits that in the peculiar facts and

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circumstances of the present case, the conduct of the accused/respondents clearly reflects their ill-intention and culpability, and therefore they ought to have been convicted appropriately by the learned trial Court. It is contended that a clear motive has been duly established through the testimony of the wife of the deceased, and the prosecution, having registered offences under Sections 147/149, 148/149, 302/149, 201 and 120-B of the IPC, has successfully led cogent and reliable evidence by examining as many as 18 witnesses to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material available on record, including the consistent testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the circumstances indicating intention to commit murder, and the fact that the injuries inflicted were grievous in nature with clear intent to cause death. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court erred in disregarding crucial circumstances such as the “last seen together” theory, wherein the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused persons, had consumed alcohol with them, and thereafter went missing, with his dead body being recovered after six days. The Court below has also committed an illegality in disbelieving the seizure of the weapon merely on the ground that it was recovered pursuant to memorandum statements, without appreciating the settled legal position, including the applicability of Section 30 of the Evidence Act regarding consideration of confessional statements of co-

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accused. It is thus submitted that the learned trial Court has failed to evaluate the evidence in its proper perspective, has ignored material circumstances and legal principles, and has erroneously extended benefit of doubt to the accused persons, rendering the impugned judgment of acquittal unjust, improper, and unsustainable in law, and therefore liable to be set aside.

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4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case preferred the present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 108 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 , to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 206 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.

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5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of

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1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.

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6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3

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SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

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“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

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29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

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30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

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7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 , while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-

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“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within

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limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

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"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

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“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to

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passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

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14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."

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Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

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5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

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“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

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25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private

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party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

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26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of

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the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

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27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

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xxx xxx xxx

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34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

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36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order

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as to costs.”

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Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

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6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the

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States scrupulously.

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7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”

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8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few.

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9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal against the impugned acquittal order dated 08.05.2025. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present petition was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate delay of 206 days.

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10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The

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learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of 206 days in filing the petition against acquittal.

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11. In view of the above, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal is hereby rejected on the ground of delay and laches .

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Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Manpreet

State of Chhattisgarh v. Manishankar Kaiwart

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

State of Chhattisgarh v. Manishankar Kaiwart

Case brief

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