Akil Arsad Vs the State of Chhattisgarh

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Digitally signed by ANURADHA ANURADHA TIWARI TIWARI Date: 2026.03.13 10:25:30 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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NAFR

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CRMP No. 52 of 2026

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1 - Akil Arsad S/o Jamir Ahmad, Aged About 38 Years R/o Ward No. 12, Behind Karan Nursing Home, Manendragarh, Police StationManendragarh, District Manendgarh Bharatpur C.G.

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2 - Shahjaha Begum, W/o Jamiir Ahmad Aged About 60 Years R/o Ward No. 12, Behind Karan Nursing Home, Manendragarh, Police StationManendragarh, District Manendragarh Bharatpur Chirmiri (C.G.)

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... Petitioners

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versus

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1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through Officer- In- Charge, Police Station- Manendragarh, District Manendragarh Bharatpur Chirmiri (C.G.)

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2 - Neha Parvin, W/o Akil Arsad Aged About 28 Years R/o Ward No. 12, Masjidpara, Police Station City Kotwali, Manendragarh, District Manendragarh Bharatpur Chirmiri (C.G.)

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... Respondents

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner	: Mr. Shivam Agrawal Advocate
For Respondent	: Mr. Saurabh Sahu, Panel Lawyer
No.1/State
For Respondent No.2	: Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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12.03.2026

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1. Heard Mr. Shivam Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners as

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well as Mr. Saurabh Sahu, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for

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the State/respondent No.1 and Mr. Akhtar Hussain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.

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2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present criminal proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of law and have been initiated with an oblique motive to harass the petitioners. It is contended that the allegations made in the FIR are vague, omnibus and general in nature, without attributing any specific overt act to the petitioners, particularly petitioner No.2 who is the mother-in-law. It is further submitted that even if the entire allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value, the basic ingredients of the offences alleged under Sections 294, 323 and 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC are not made out against the petitioners.

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3. It is further argued that the dispute between the parties is purely matrimonial in nature and has been exaggerated by the complainant by making false and concocted allegations with the intention to pressurize the petitioners. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners have never demanded any dowry from the complainant or her family members and the allegations regarding demand of money and a car are completely false and fabricated. It is also submitted that the complainant herself was not willing to reside with petitioner No.1 at Chennai and preferred to stay at her parental home, which ultimately resulted in matrimonial discord between the parties.

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4. Learned counsel further submits that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would amount to misuse of the criminal justice system and would cause grave injustice to them. It is therefore prayed that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the FIR, charge-sheet as well as the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manendragarh be quashed by this Court in exercise of its inherent powers, as the same are manifestly attended with mala fide intention and have been instituted only to wreak vengeance against the petitioners.

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5. Learned State counsel, on the other hand, opposes the petition and submits that the FIR as well as the material collected during the course of investigation clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences against the petitioners. It is contended that after due investigation the police have filed the charge-sheet and the trial Court has already taken cognizance of the offences. It is further submitted that the allegations made by the complainant regarding demand of dowry and cruelty are matters of evidence which can only be adjudicated during the course of trial.

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6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that the petitioner No.1 has failed to comply with the order passed by this Court dated 05.02.2026, whereby while referring the matter to the Mediation Centre, this Court had directed petitioner No.1 to deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- before the Mediation Centre. It is

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submitted that despite the said direction, the petitioner No.1 has not deposited the aforesaid amount, which shows lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioners. Therefore, it is prayed that the present petition deserves to be dismissed.

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7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with petition.

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8. In the matter of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another¹ , the Supreme Court has held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as coaccused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.

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9. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others² the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out.

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1 (2012) 10 SCC 741

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2 (2018) 14 SCC 452

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10. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another³ , it has been held by the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others⁴ that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra) by holding as under:-

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“24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been

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3 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620

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1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

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25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants..…”

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11. The Apex Court, in Payal Sharma v. State of Punjab & Another {Cr.A. No. 4773/2024, decided on 26.11.2024} had, relying on the decision in Geeta Mehrotra (supra), Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Others v. State of Bihar & Others {(2022) 6 SCC 599}, Bhajan Lal (supra), and Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra

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Pradesh & Another {(2013) 10 SCC 591}, had quashed the FIR and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

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12. Very recently, the Apex Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayan & Others v. State of Telangana & Another {Cr.A. No. 5199 of 2024, decided on 10.12.2024}, has observed as under:

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“ 25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

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26. In fact, in the instant case, the first appellant and his wife i.e. the second respondent herein resided at Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where he was working in Southern Railways. They were married in the year 2015 and soon thereafter in the years 2016 and 2017, the second respondent gave birth to two children. Therefore, it cannot be believed that there was any harassment for dowry during the said period or that there was any matrimonial discord. Further, the second respondent in response to the missing complaint filed by the first appellant herein on 05.10.2021 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting for closure of the said complaint as she had stated that she had left the matrimonial home on her own accord owing to a quarrel with the appellant No.1 because of one Govindan with whom the second respondent was in contact over telephone for a period of ten days. She had also admitted that she would not repeat such acts in future. In the above conspectus of facts, we find that the allegations of the second respondent against the appellants herein are too far-fetched and are not believable.

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27. xxx xxx xxx

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28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the

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country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

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29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty

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in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

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30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows:

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“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.”

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31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while

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dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection .

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32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants. ”

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Observing the aforesaid, the Apex Court quashed the FIR, the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the learned trial Court.

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13. From a perusal of the FIR as well as the material collected during the course of investigation, it appears that specific allegations have been levelled against petitioner No.1/husband with regard to demand of dowry, harassment and assault upon respondent No.2. The allegations against petitioner No.1 cannot be said to be

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vague or omnibus in nature and the same disclose a prima facie case for the offences alleged. At this stage, this Court cannot undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence or adjudicate upon the veracity of the allegations made in the complaint.

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14. The contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations levelled against them are false, motivated and have been made only on account of matrimonial discord are essentially questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. Such disputed questions require appreciation of evidence and examination of the materials that may be brought on record by the parties during the course of trial. It is well settled that the powers of this Court under Section 482 CrPC/ 528 BNSS are to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in those cases where the allegations made in the FIR and the material collected during investigation, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide or instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance. In the present case, on a prima facie consideration of the FIR and the chargesheet, the allegations against petitioner No.1 disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged and, therefore, this Court does not find any justification to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the proceedings at this stage.

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15. In view of the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent powers, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for quashing the FIR, the charge-sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings insofar as they relate to petitioner No.1. The grounds urged by the petitioners pertain to matters which can more appropriately be examined by the trial Court after the parties lead their respective evidence.

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16. Accordingly, the present petition, insofar as it relates to petitioner No.1, stands dismissed. Consequently, the interim relief earlier granted in favour of petitioner No.1 shall stand vacated and the trial Court shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law.

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17. However, it is made clear that any observation made hereinabove is only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not prejudice the case of either of the parties during trial.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha ) Judge Chief Justice

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Anu

Akil Arsad v. the State of Chhattisgarh

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Akil Arsad v. the State of Chhattisgarh

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