State of Chhattisgarh Vs Yogesh Kumar Sahu

Yogesh Kumar Sahu S/o. Dujram Sahu, Aged About 27 Years R/o. Madheli, Police Station Kurud, Chowki Birejhar, District Dhamtari (Chhattisgarh) Present Address Chipridih Police Station Gobranawapara, District Raipur Chhattisgarh

¶11

... Respondent(s)

¶12

For Petitioner(s)

¶13

: Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate

¶14

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

¶15

Order on Board

¶16

Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.

¶17

16/06/2026

¶18

Heard Mr.Priyank Rathi, learned Govt. Advocate, for the petitioner in present petition.

¶19

This is an application under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the petitioner/State for grant of leave to

¶20

2

¶21

appeal. The present application has been filed against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 27.06.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second (POCSO) FTSC, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 188/2020, whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the offence under Section 450, 376 (AB), 506-II of Indian Penal Code.

¶22

The brief facts of the case are that, on 25.10.2020, the mother of the minor victim lodged a written report at Police Station Gobranawapara, District- Raipur, stating that her daughter, who was under 12 years of age, had complained of severe pain in her arms, legs, and stomach, following which she revealed that she had been subjected to a sexual assault. On the basis of the said information, a First Information Report was registered vide Crime No.453/2020 at Police Station Gobranawapara for the offences under Sections 376(AB), 454, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code along with Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short “POCSO Act”) against the accused Yogesh Kumar Sahu, and investigation proceedings were initiated. During the course of inquiry, the police conducted spot inspections, prepared the spot maps, and conducted medical examinations of both the victim and the accused, while also sending the seized undergarments and vaginal slides for chemical examination to the State FSL. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offences under Sections 450, 376(AB) and 506-II of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act before the competent Court, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, however, upon finding vital omissions, material contradictions among the testimonies of the

¶23

3

¶24

family members, and negative forensic findings, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second (POCSO) FTSC, Raipur, acquitted the accused of all charges vide judgment dated 27.06.2022, against which the State of Chhattisgarh has preferred an application for grant of leave to appeal before the this Court.

¶25

Learned counsel for the petitioner/State would submit that there is sufficient evidence available on record which clearly establishes the involvement of the respondent/accused in the offence in question. It is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material evidence, particularly the circumstances surrounding the minor victim being subjected to a grave sexual assault within her residence. The medical evidence, especially the testimony of the doctor, clearly indicates that the victim sustained physical trauma and severe distress which corroborates the initial prosecution case. It is further submitted that the prompt lodging of the written report by the mother and the consistency in the initial investigative procedures led to the seizure of relevant articles, but the same has not been properly considered by the trial Court. The learned trial court also failed to properly invoke the statutory burden of proof as mandated under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, given that the victim is a minor under 12 years of age whose testimony explicitly supported the core components of the prosecution's case. Despite the gravity of the offence and a complete prima-facie case pointing towards the guilt of the accused, the learned trial Court has granted undue benefit of doubt on minor discrepancies and acquitted the accused. The impugned judgment of acquittal is thus perverse, illegal and liable to be set aside.

¶26

4

¶27

Therefore, the present application for grant of leave to appeal has been filed.

¶28

We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the application for grant of leave to file the acquittal appeal.

¶29

From perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, it transpires that the learned trial Court has taken into consideration that the case of the prosecution rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and that the chain of circumstances is not complete. The learned trial Court has observed that there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and that the circumstance of the accused being seen at the place of occurrence has not been conclusively proved. It has further been considered that though the medical evidence suggests a grave sexual assault and traumatic physical condition, there is no direct or conclusive evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the offence. The learned trial Court has also doubted the reliability of the initial written application and the seizure of the undergarments and slides, as the same are not sufficiently corroborated by independent or definitive scientific evidence, including the negative findings in the forensic report. It has also been taken into account that some of the critical assertions regarding the presence of eyewitnesses have not supported the prosecution case and have created significant doubt. Further, the learned trial Court has held that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the accused and excluding every hypothesis of innocence, and therefore, the accused has been given the benefit of doubt.

¶30

5

¶31

We have again gone through the record produced by the petitioner/State in the present case. It reveals that the prosecution case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence and none of the witnesses have seen the occurrence. It further appears from the record that even the version put forth by the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not wholly inconsistent with the overall prosecution evidence, rather the same finds substantial corroboration from the testimony of prosecution witnesses. The accused has explained that on the date of incident he was not present at the place of occurrence, that there was a complete absence of any incriminating medical or forensic link connecting him to the alleged assault, and that the allegations were leveled due to pre-existing animosity or suspicion. It is further stated that the minor victim's initial disclosures and subsequent depositions contained material variations regarding the identity of the perpetrator and the sequence of events. The statements of prosecution witnesses including the grandmother of the victim (PW-04), Laxman Sahu (PW05), and Toran Lal Sahu (PW-06) also broadly indicate that no one had seen the accused entering or leaving the spot, and that the physical and scientific evidence, particularly the FSL and chemical examination reports, completely failed to establish any biological connection between the accused and the victim. Even the conduct attributed to the accused, including his continuous presence in the village and cooperation with the initial inquiry, appears to be natural and consistent with the circumstances of an innocent person rather than indicative of guilt. In such a factual backdrop, the chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution cannot be said to be complete or pointing unerringly towards the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, and the

¶32

6

¶33

possibility of an alternative version consistent with innocence cannot be ruled out, thereby reinforcing the view taken by the learned trial Court.

¶34

From perusal of the medical examination report of the minor victim (Exhibit P-04) and the corresponding forensic findings, it appears that the injuries and physical trauma have been opined to be suggestive of a grave sexual assault; however, the said medical evidence only establishes the nature of the physical condition and does not connect the respondent/accused with the commission of the offence. The document (Exhibit P-04) is proved by PW-07/Dr. Smita Sahu, who has stated that the local injuries could be caused by external force. However, there is no specific or conclusive biological link, such as positive DNA profile matching, linking the respondent/accused with the samples or undergarments collected from the victim. In absence of such definite scientific corroboration, the case of the prosecution regarding the presence and active involvement of the accused becomes doubtful. Thus, though the medical evidence indicates a traumatic incident, it does not conclusively establish the involvement of the accused, and the same creates a doubt in the prosecution case regarding the manner and authorship of the crime.

¶35

The learned trial Court has also considered the evidence of Smt. Laxmi Bai (PW-02), Shiv Kumar (PW-03) and other prosecution witnesses and has taken note of the discrepancies and inconsistencies in their statements. The learned trial Court has observed that these witnesses have only deposed regarding the disclosures made subsequently by the minor victim and their suspicion against the accused, but their testimonies do not conclusively establish the exact circumstances

¶36

7

¶37

leading to the alleged incident or the identity of the perpetrator at the place of occurrence. It has further been considered that material omissions and contradictions have been brought on record in their cross-examination, which affect the credibility of their evidence, particularly when contrasted with the negative chemical examination report from the State Forensic Science Laboratory. Accordingly, the learned trial Court has held that their evidence is not wholly reliable to base a conviction against the accused.

¶38

By giving benefit of doubt, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused. It is a settled principle of law that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence available on record, the view favourable to the accused is to be adopted. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Digambar Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh , relying upon Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh , 1973) 2 SCC 808 that where two views are possible, the one favouring the accused must be preferred, particularly in cases based on circumstantial evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Digambar Vaishnav and another v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2019 (4) SCC 522 has held that:

¶39

“19. It is also well-settled principle that in criminal cases, if two views are possible on evidence adduced in the case, one binding to the guilt of the accused and the other is to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused, should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial

¶40

8

¶41

evidence [See Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808].”

¶42

From the overall evidence produced by the prosecution and upon due consideration of the well-reasoned findings recorded by the learned trial Court in acquitting the respondent/accused, we do not find any perversity, illegality or material infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court. The view taken by the learned trial Court is a plausible and reasonable view based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. Accordingly, no case is made out for grant of leave to appeal and the impugned judgment is not liable to be set aside.

¶43

Recently, applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:

¶44

"8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all."

¶45

Further, in case of Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala , 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at para

¶46

9

¶47

25, which reads as under :-

¶48

“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."

¶49

Considering the evidence available on record as well as the law laid

¶50

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, particularly with regard to the limited scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal and the settled principle that when two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused is to be adopted, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish any perversity, illegality or manifest error in the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court. The findings recorded by the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and cannot be said to be unreasonable or improbable so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

¶51

Consequently, no case for grant of leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 27.06.2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second (POCSO) FTSC, Raipur, District

¶52

10

¶53

Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 188/2020 is made out. The application for grant of leave to appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.

¶54

Accordingly, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed .

¶55

As a consequence thereof, the accompanying acquittal appeal also stands dismissed .

¶56

Sd/-

¶57

Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶58

sagrika

State of Chhattisgarh v. Yogesh Kumar Sahu

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

State of Chhattisgarh v. Yogesh Kumar Sahu

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Sanjay Mishra Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Amar Prajapati Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Ravi Tondey Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Sheikh Samshuddin @ Guddu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Lakshya Kumar Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Jitendra Nande Vs State of Chhattisgarh