Smt. Ranjana Nag Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:26184-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1649 of 2026

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1 - Smt. Ranjana Nag W/o Shri Bhom Singh Nag Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Kanharpuri, P.S. And Tahsil Kanker, District Uttar Bastar, Kanker, Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Bhom Singh Nag S/o Late Chamru Ram Nag Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Telkhabor Kanker, P.S. Kanker, District Uttar Bastar, Kanker, Chhattisgarh. (Address Of Both Petitioners As Per Annexure A/2)

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary Home, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Station House Officer Police Station Kanker, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh.

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3 - Hemraj Vatti S/o Late Bhanwar Singh Vatti Aged About 40 Years Posted As Police Constable, Police Line, Kanker, District Uttar Bastar, Kanker, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. T.K. Jha, Sr. Adv. along with Mr. Parth Kumar Jha, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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29.06.2026

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Heard Mr. T.K. Jha, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. Parth Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate for respondents No.1 & 2 / State.

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The petitioners have filed this petition praying for following relief:-

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“It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that this Honble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and quash the registration of FIR No. 161/26 dated 15.05.2026 for offence u/s 420 r/w 34 of IPC 1860 lodged in P.S. Kanker, in the interest of justice.”

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The present petition arises out of FIR No. 0161/2026 dated 15.05.2026 registered at Police Station Kanker, District Uttar Bastar Kanker (C.G.) for the offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC, alleging that the petitioners dishonestly induced the complainant, Hemraj Vatti, to enter into an agreement for sale of 50 dismals of land out of Khasra No. 1370/2 situated at Village Kanharpuri for establishment of a petrol pump. It is alleged that pursuant to a notarized agreement dated 03.08.2021, a total sum of Rs. 32,50,000/- was paid to Petitioner No. 1 towards the proposed sale consideration, however, despite receipt of the amount, the petitioners did not execute the sale deed and subsequently leased the subject land to a third party on 21.09.2023 and sold portions thereof to other purchasers during the year 2025. It is further alleged that although the petitioners

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had agreed to refund an amount of Rs. 35,80,000/- by 15.10.2024, they failed to do so, resulting in registration of the impugned FIR for the alleged offence of cheating. The petitioners, however, categorically deny the allegations and submit that the dispute, even if accepted at its face value, arises purely out of a contractual transaction relating to an agreement for sale of immovable property, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC, and has been given a criminal colour solely to exert pressure for recovery of money, rendering the continuation of the criminal proceedings an abuse of the process of law.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned FIR is wholly illegal, arbitrary and amounts to a gross abuse of the process of law, as the allegations contained therein, even if accepted in their entirety, disclose nothing more than a civil dispute arising out of an agreement for sale of immovable property. It is submitted that the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating are conspicuously absent, inasmuch as there is no allegation to establish any dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioners at the inception of the transaction. It is further contended that mere non-execution of a sale deed or alleged breach of contractual obligations cannot, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. Learned counsel further submits that although the complainant had issued a legal notice to the petitioners, the same was duly replied to by them.

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However, when queried by this Court to produce a copy of the said reply, learned counsel submitted that the receipt and copy of the reply could not be produced as they had been misplaced. It is also submitted that the original agreement to sell relied upon by the petitioners is likewise not available with them. Learned counsel nevertheless contends that these circumstances would not alter the purely civil nature of the dispute and that the complainant has deliberately given a criminal colour to a contractual transaction with the sole object of exerting undue pressure upon the petitioners for recovery of the alleged amount. It is, therefore, argued that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to misuse of the criminal justice system and an abuse of the process of the Court, warranting exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings.

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Per contra, learned State counsel, opposing the petition, submits that the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during the course of investigation prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 of the IPC. It is contended that the petitioners induced the complainant and his adoptive father, retired T.I. R.P. Singh, to enter into an agreement for purchase of 50 decimals of land by representing that the land would be sold in favour of the complainant, pursuant to which a substantial amount of Rs.35,80,000/- was paid to the petitioners. However, despite

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receiving the entire consideration, the petitioners neither executed the sale deed nor refunded the amount and, instead, leased the subject land to a third party and subsequently alienated portions thereof in favour of different purchasers, thereby causing wrongful loss to the complainant and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. It is further submitted that the conduct of the petitioners, viewed in its entirety, prima facie reflects dishonest intention and deception attracting the offence of cheating, and since the investigation is at a nascent stage, the disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.

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Learned State counsel further submits that a bare perusal of the contents of the impugned FIR would reveal that the gravamen of the allegations against the petitioners is that they entered into an agreement to sell a parcel of land, received the sale consideration from the complainant, failed to execute the sale deed within the stipulated period, and thereafter leased and sold the subject land, in part, to third parties while also allegedly failing to refund the amount received. The FIR further alleges that the complainant was induced to part with the consideration on the assurance that the land would be registered in his favour. Thus, the allegations, as set out in the FIR, form the basis of the prosecution case that the petitioners dishonestly induced the complainant to deliver money and subsequently acted in a manner inconsistent with the

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terms of the agreement, thereby attracting the offence under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the documents and material placed on record along with the petition.

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The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.).

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In Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra

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and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 , the Apex Court has observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability, genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.) is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to

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be cautious. The Apex Court has emphasized that though the Court has the power to quash the FIR in suitable cases, the Court, when it exercises power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), only has to consider whether or not the allegations of FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider the case on merit. Further, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.) , final conclusions are as under:-

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“ i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

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ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

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iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

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iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

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v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or

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otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

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vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

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vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

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viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

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ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

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x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

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xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

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xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer

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finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

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xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

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xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

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xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

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xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of

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powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/ disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

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xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

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Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025) , while reiterating the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, has once again emphasized that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised with great caution, circumspection and only in exceptional circumstances. The Apex Court has held that while considering a prayer for quashing of an FIR, charge-sheet or criminal proceedings, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected during investigation. The scope of judicial scrutiny at such stage is confined to examining whether the allegations made in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet, if accepted at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and make out a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Court,

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while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the BNSS), cannot enter into disputed questions of fact, evaluate the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations, assess the evidentiary value of witness statements, or adjudicate upon the probable defence available to the accused. Such an exercise falls squarely within the province of the trial Court, which alone is competent to appreciate evidence after the parties have led their respective cases. The Apex Court cautioned that where the allegations disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences and the investigating agency has collected material in support thereof, criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold merely because the accused has raised a plausible defence or disputes the correctness of the prosecution case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:

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“20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

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(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

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(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the

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accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

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(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted prosecution/complainant; and/or the material that justifiably refuted it cannot be by is by the such, the prosecution/complainant?

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(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

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If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.

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[(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)] ”

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1. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the allegations made in the FIR and the material collected during investigation cannot be said to be so absurd,

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inherently improbable or wholly devoid of substance as to warrant exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. The FIR specifically alleges that the petitioners induced the complainant to part with a substantial amount towards the proposed sale of land, failed to execute the sale deed despite receipt of the consideration, and thereafter leased and alienated the very same property in favour of third parties without honouring their commitment or refunding the amount received. Though learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that a reply had been sent to the legal notice issued by the complainant, the same could not be produced before this Court on the ground that the copy of the reply as well as the postal receipt had been misplaced. Likewise, the petitioners also expressed their inability to produce the agreement to sell, stating that the same was not available with them. Consequently, the petitioners have failed to place before this Court any unimpeachable or sterling material of the nature contemplated in Rajiv Thapar (supra), which would conclusively demolish the allegations contained in the FIR at this stage. These aspects involve disputed questions of fact which can only be examined during the course of investigation or at trial. At this stage, this Court is not expected to test the veracity of the rival claims or undertake a meticulous appreciation of the defence sought to be raised by the petitioners while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

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The contention of the petitioners that the dispute is purely civil in nature cannot be accepted at this preliminary stage, as the allegations in the FIR are not confined to a mere breach of contract but also disclose allegations of dishonest inducement and subsequent conduct allegedly causing wrongful loss to the complainant. Whether the petitioners had the requisite fraudulent or dishonest intention from the inception of the transaction is a matter to be established during investigation on the basis of evidence collected.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, the present petition stands

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dismissed .

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Sd/- Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha ) Judge Chief Justice

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Manpreet

Smt. Ranjana Nag v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Smt. Ranjana Nag v. State of Chhattisgarh

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