Yogesh Kumar Dewangan Vs State of Chhattisgarh

validity of the FIR dated 04.04.2026 registered in Crime No.139/2026 at Police Station Simga, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara for the offence punishable under Section 21(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the charge-sheet dated 28.04.2026, the cognizance order dated 29.04.2026, the order framing charge dated 08.05.2026 and all consequential criminal proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge (NDPS), Balodabazar in Special Case (NDPS) No.6/2026. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer:-

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“In view of the facts stated hereinabove and the grounds urged, the Petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:

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a ) Quash the FIR dated 04-04-2026, bearing Crime No. 139/2026 (Annexure – P/1), registered at Police Station – Simga, District-Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), for the offence punishable under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act, 1985 against the Petitioner;

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b ) Quash the Chargesheet dated 28-042026, bearing Chargesheet No. 107/2026 (Annexure – P/2), filed before the learned Special Judge (N.D.P.S.), Balodabazar, District-Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), for the alleged offence under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act, 1985 against the Petitioner;

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c ) Quash the Cognizance Order dated 2904-2026 (Annexure – P/3) passed by the learned Special Judge (N.D.P.S.), Balodabazar, DistrictBalodabazar-

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Bhatapara (C.G.), in Special Case (N.D.P.S.) No. 6/2026 against the Petitioner in connection with the said FIR and chargesheet;

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d ) Quash the Memo of Charge dated 0805-2026 (Annexure-P/4) framed by the Ld. Special Judge (N.D.P.S.), Balodabazar, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act in Special Case (N.D.P.S.) No. 6/2026 against the Petitioner in connection with the said FIR and chargesheet;

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e ) Quash all subsequent/consequential proceedings in Special Case (N.D.P.S.) No. 6/2026 pending before the Ld. Special Judge (N.D.P.S.), Balodabazar, DistrictBalodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) against the Petitioner in connection with the said FIR and chargesheet; and

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f ) Pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just, fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.”

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Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner is the proprietor of a medical store namely Jai Maa Sharda Medical Hall , situated at Simga, and is stated to be holding a valid drug licence issued under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, authorising him to stock and sell Schedule H and Schedule H1 medicines. The prosecution case is that on the basis of secret information received on 03.04.2026, the police were informed that the

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petitioner was illegally stocking and selling narcotic and psychotropic medicines from his medical store. After recording the information in the daily diary and completing the requisite preliminary formalities, including associating independent witnesses, a decoy customer was deputed to the petitioner's medical store with a marked currency note of Rs.500/- for purchasing the suspected narcotic medicines. It is alleged that the decoy customer purchased one strip of ULTRANICE tablets for Rs.400/- and received Rs.100/- as balance. Immediately thereafter, the police party conducted a search of the medical store as well as the petitioner's first-floor residential premises situated above the shop. During the search of the first-floor residential premises, the police allegedly recovered four strips of ULTRANICE tablets containing 15 tablets each (total 60 tablets), Contramal-100 (Tramadol Injection BP) comprising 40 injections of 2 ml each (total 80 ml), and six bottles of PLANOKUF NEW syrup containing Codeine Phosphate and Triprolidine Hydrochloride, each bottle containing 100 ml (total 600 ml). During the search of the medical shop situated on the ground floor, the police also recovered the marked currency note of Rs.500/- bearing Serial No. 6CL374438, allegedly used by the decoy customer for purchasing the tablets, from the cash drawer of the shop. The aforesaid articles were seized under separate seizure memoranda, whereafter the opinion of the Drug Inspector was obtained and, on the basis thereof, FIR bearing Crime No.139/2026 came to be registered at Police Station Simga for the offence punishable under Section 21(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed, cognizance was taken by the learned Special

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Judge (NDPS), Balodabazar, and charges were subsequently framed against the petitioner.

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Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashment of the aforesaid FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order, order framing charge and all consequential criminal proceedings. The case of the petitioner is that he is a duly licensed pharmacist and the medicines seized during the raid were lawfully possessed and procured from authorised wholesale distributors through valid GST invoices in the ordinary course of his licensed business. It is further pleaded that the alleged sale transaction was never completed as the police intervened before the petitioner could verify the prescription and generate the invoice, and therefore, even if the allegations contained in the FIR and charge-sheet are accepted at their face value, no offence under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act is made out against him.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a licensed pharmacist and proprietor of Jai Maa Sharda Medical Hall, Simga. It is argued that the petitioner possesses a valid licence issued under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and is legally authorised to stock and sell Schedule H and Schedule H1 medicines. The medicines allegedly seized, namely Tramadol injections, Codeine-based cough syrup and Ultranice tablets, were lawfully procured from authorised wholesale distributors under valid GST invoices and formed part of the regular licensed stock maintained in the medical store. It is further submitted that according to the prosecution itself, a decoy customer

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was sent to purchase medicines. However, before the petitioner could verify the prescription, prepare the invoice and complete the transaction, the police allegedly entered the shop and apprehended him. Thus, no completed sale ever took place.

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Learned counsel would further submit that the entire prosecution is based upon an incomplete transaction. The petitioner had no opportunity to generate a bill as the transaction itself was interrupted by the police officials. It is argued that the prosecution has deliberately ignored the valid drug licence, purchase invoices and the statutory protection available under Section 8 of the NDPS Act read with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. It is also submitted that the alleged trap proceedings suffer from serious procedural defects. No pre-trap memorandum recording the serial number of the currency note was prepared. The alleged currency note was neither chemically treated nor subjected to any scientific examination. No phenolphthalein test or hand wash test was conducted. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish any completed sale or acceptance of consideration by the petitioner.

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Placing reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , AIR 1960 SC 866, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy , (1977) 2 SCC 699 and Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre , (1988) 1 SCC 692 learned counsel submits that even if the allegations contained in the FIR and chargesheet are accepted in their entirety, the essential ingredients of the

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offence under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act are not made out and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court.

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Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that during investigation, contraband substances were recovered from the medical store and residential premises of the petitioner. According to the prosecution, the petitioner sold the medicines to the decoy customer without following the statutory procedure and, therefore, a prima facie case under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act is prima facie made out. It is further submitted that at the stage of exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, this Court is not required to appreciate evidence or examine the correctness of the defence raised by the accused. The issues raised by the petitioner constitute disputed questions of fact which can only be adjudicated during trial. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection.

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The scope of interference by this Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is well settled. Such jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised sparingly, with great caution and circumspection, and only in exceptional cases where the allegations made in the First Information Report and the material collected during investigation, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, or where the continuation of the

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criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.

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In the present case, the prosecution alleges that acting upon secret information, a decoy customer was deputed to the petitioner's medical store to purchase pharmaceutical preparations containing narcotic substances by using a marked currency note of Rs.500/-. It is alleged that after one strip of ULTRANICE tablets was sold to the decoy customer for Rs.400/- without compliance with the statutory requirements, the police immediately conducted a raid at the petitioner's medical store and the first-floor residential premises situated above the shop. During the search of the residential premises, the police allegedly recovered four strips of ULTRANICE tablets containing 60 tablets in all, 40 injections of Contramal-100 (Tramadol Injection BP) having a total quantity of 80 ml, and six bottles of PLANOKUF NEW syrup containing Codeine Phosphate and Triprolidine Hydrochloride having an aggregate quantity of 600 ml. The prosecution further alleges that the marked currency note of Rs.500/-, bearing Serial No. 6CL374438, which had allegedly been handed over to the decoy customer before the trap proceedings, was recovered from the cash counter of the medical store. The seized tablets, injections and syrup were thereafter subjected to identification and weighment proceedings in the presence of witnesses, and the opinion of the Drug Inspector was subsequently obtained, who opined that the case attracted the provisions of Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act. It is on the basis of the aforesaid search, seizure and subsequent investigation that the impugned FIR came to be registered against the petitioner.

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The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that he is a licensed pharmacist holding a valid drug licence under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and that the medicines recovered from his medical store were lawfully procured from authorised wholesale distributors under valid GST invoices.

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The aforesaid submissions, in the considered opinion of this Court, involve disputed questions of fact. Whether the petitioner had lawfully possessed the medicines in accordance with the conditions of his licence, whether the alleged sale had in fact been completed, whether the statutory requirements governing sale of such pharmaceutical formulations were complied with, whether the petitioner is entitled to claim the protection available under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, and whether the alleged procedural irregularities in the trap proceedings have any bearing on the prosecution case are all issues which necessarily require appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. Such questions cannot be conclusively determined while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

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Equally, the validity of the search and seizure, the evidentiary value of the alleged recovery, the effect of the absence of any pre-trap memorandum or other procedural safeguards, and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are matters which fall within the domain of the trial Court. At this stage, this Court cannot embark upon a meticulous examination of the defence projected by the petitioner or undertake a comparative evaluation of the prosecution material vis-àvis the defence documents. The Court is only required to ascertain

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whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation disclose a prima facie case warranting a fullfledged trial.

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In Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that the extraordinary jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides or amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The Apex Court, while laying down the illustrative categories in paragraph 102 of the judgment, simultaneously cautioned that such jurisdiction should be exercised very sparingly and that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of B.N.S.S should be exercised, which are as under: -

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"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

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secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding is a instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

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Similarly, in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the power of quashing is an exception and not the rule. It was held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court is only required to examine whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and cannot conduct a mini trial by appreciating the evidence or evaluating the probable

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defence of the accused. The Court further observed that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold unless the case falls within the well-recognised parameters governing exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction. Further, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), final conclusions are as under:-

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“i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

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ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

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iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

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iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

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v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

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vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

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vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an

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exception rather than an ordinary rule;

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viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

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ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

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x) Save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

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xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

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xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

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xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

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xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

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xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

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xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts

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are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/ disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

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xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague

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and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

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Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025) , while reiterating the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, has once again emphasized that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised with great caution, circumspection and only in exceptional circumstances.

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The Apex Court has held that while considering a prayer for quashing of an FIR, charge-sheet or criminal proceedings, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected during investigation. The scope of judicial scrutiny at such stage is confined to examining whether the allegations made in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the chargesheet, if accepted at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and make out a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the BNSS), cannot enter into disputed questions of fact, evaluate the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations, assess the evidentiary value of witness statements, or adjudicate upon the probable defence available to the accused. Such an exercise falls squarely within the province of the trial Court, which

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alone is competent to appreciate evidence after the parties have led their respective cases. The Apex Court cautioned that where the allegations disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences and the investigating agency has collected material in support thereof, criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold merely because the accused has raised a plausible defence or disputes the correctness of the prosecution case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

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“ Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani ” (supra) has observed that:

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“20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

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(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

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(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

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(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted prosecution/complainant; and/or the material that justifiably refuted it cannot be by is by the such, the prosecution/complainant?

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(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

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If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.

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[(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]”

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Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the investigation has already culminated in filing of the charge-sheet and the learned Special Judge, upon consideration of the material collected during investigation, has taken cognizance and framed charges against the petitioner. The defence sought to be projected by the petitioner, founded upon his drug licence, GST invoices, alleged incompleteness of the transaction, procedural irregularities in the trap proceedings and the applicability of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, raises disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. Whether such defence ultimately merits acceptance is a matter to be determined by the trial Court upon appreciation of the evidence that may be adduced by the parties.

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This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the present case does not fall within any of the exceptional categories illustratively enumerated in Bhajan Lal, Neeharika and Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra) so as to warrant exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The allegations contained in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet, taken at their face value, disclose a prima facie case requiring adjudication by the competent trial Court. Consequently, no ground is made out for quashing the FIR, the charge-sheet, the order taking cognizance, the order framing charge or the consequential criminal proceedings.

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Accordingly, the petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed . It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are confined to adjudication of the present petition under Section 528 of the BNSS and shall not prejudice either party during the course of trial, which shall proceed independently in accordance with law.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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ved

Yogesh Kumar Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Yogesh Kumar Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh

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