Onkar Singh Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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Digitally signed by RAVVA UTTEJ KUMAR RAJU

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2026:CGHC:1929

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AFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 396 of 2007

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The date when	The date when	The date when the
the judgment is	the judgment is	judgment is uploaded on
reserved	pronounced	the website
		Operative Full
27.10.2025	13.01.2026.	-- 13.01.2026

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Onkar Singh S/o Ramlakhan Singh, aged about 40 years, villageJamuadand, P.S. -Balrampur, Distt. - Surguja (C.G.)

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... Appellant

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh, through D.M. - Surguja (C.G.)

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... Respondent

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(Cause title is taken from Case Information System Software)

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For Appellant : Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate. For State : Ms. Nandkumari Kashyap, P.L.

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

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C.A.V. Judgment

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This appeal is preferred under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.05.2007 passed by learned Special

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Sessions Judge, SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Ambikapur District- Surguja (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 49/2006, Sessions Division- Surguja Place- Ambikapur (C.G.), wherein the said Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as under :-

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Conviction	Sentence
Under Section 376 (1) of	R.I. for 07 years and fine of Rs. 100/-,
IPC	in default of payment of fine, to
	undergo additional R.I. for one month.

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The case of the prosecution, as unfolded from the impugned judgment and the records of the case is that on 26.02.2006 at around 7 pm, the prosecutrix/ victim after filling up the water from a well in the village Jamuadand, went to the sugarcane field of Ramgahan for open defecation. At that time, the accused caught hold of her, made her fall on the ground and without her consent satiated his lust by committing forcible sexual intercourse upon her and as the victim was screaming, he stuffed her mouth with a cloth. The prosecutrix/victim immediately informed her mother-in-law about the incident. As the victim’s husband was absent at the time of the incident, the F.I.R of sexual assault was filed by the prosecutrix at the Balrampur Police Station upon his arrival. On the basis of the said information the crime number was registered and the investigation was started. After completion of due and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was led before the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate, who, in turn, committed the case for trial. On the basis of the material

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contained in the charge-sheet, learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for alleged commission of offence under Sections 376 (1), 506 (II) of IPC and Section 3 (2) (v) of SC & ST Act (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The appellant having abjured his guilt was subjected to trial.

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In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. The statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. of the appellant has been recorded, in which he denied the incriminating charges leveled against him, pleaded his innocence that he has been falsely implicated in this case. However, the accused/appellant has not adduced any witness in his defence.

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The learned trial Court after hearing the counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record has convicted and sentenced the present accused/appellant as mentioned in inaugural para of this judgment. Hence, this present appeal.

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Assailing correctness and validity of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, l earned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to the law, facts and circumstances of the case. The prosecution witnesses PW-02, PW03, PW-04, PW-05, PW-07 and PW-08 have admitted this fact that the prosecutrix and the accused are neighbours and they have cordial relations with each other and both of them often used to visit each other’s house, but the prosecutrix had denied this established facts and deposited in her evidence that she saw the accused for the first time at the place of the incident and second time in the court and

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she never saw the accused/appellant ever. Both of the prosecutrix and the appellant were called before the Panchayat and after advice of the Panchayat, the matter was reported to the police, but this established facts is totally denied by the prosecution witnesses PW01, PW-02, PW-03 and PW-04, however, PW-10 the Investigating Officer did not establish this very facts in his evidence. It is clear from record that there is delay of 3 days in lodging the F.I.R., but in para 2 of the statement of the prosecutrix/victim she has stated that she called her husband in the morning and after his arrival, the F.I.R. vide Ex. P/01 was lodged around 4-5 pm the next day which is clearly false statement. The finding regarding delay of lodging the F.I.R. given by the learned trial Court in para 13 of its judgment is not sustainable because the date of the incident is 26.02.2006 and the report of the said incident was lodged on 01.03.2006. The prosecutrix was having love affair with the accused/appellant and was not ready to report the matter, but this established facts were not considered properly by the learned trial Court. He further submits that in paragraph 7 of the statement of the prosecutrix, the appellant dragged her for 150 meters in a sugarcane field whose surface was very rough; therefore , she sustained injuries, but according to the testimony of PW-06, Dr. Shipra, no injuries were detected on the prosecutrix's body, which undermines the allegation of dragging, as this would typically result in visible injuries. He further submits that PW-05 father of prosecutrix has admitted in para 4 of his evidence that at the time of engagement of his another daughter, the accused came with his daughter and son-in-law. He further contends that PW07 has admitted in para 02 of his deposition that the prosecutrix and

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the accused were in a relationship for the preceding year, a fact known to the entire village, PW-08 A.S.I Sharma has also admitted this fact in para 05 of his statement. Consequently, the allegation that an unknown accused committed forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix after threatening her was not established; thus, the accused was acquitted of the charge under Section 506 (II) of the IPC. Learned trial Court has failed to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt. The independent witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. The complainant has not supported even the evidence of victim whereas, the learned trial Court had not properly appreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Learned trial Court has failed to appreciate this fact that there are material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of other witnesses. Learned trial Court has failed to consider the settled law that if there is any doubt in the prosecution case, then benefit of doubt always go in favour of the accused person. Thus, looking to the conduct of the prosecutrix and the nature and quality of evidence adduced by the prosecution, conviction of the appellant is not legally sustainable in the eyes of law and he deserves to be acquitted of all the charges.

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Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Mahesh Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh , passed by this Court in CRA No. 116 of 2005 & Shankar Yadav vs. State of Chhattisgarh , passed by Division Bench of this Court in CRA No. 1121 of 2014 .

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Ex adverso, learned counsel for the respondent/State supporting the impugned judgment submits that learned Trial Court after minutely appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has rightly convicted

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and sentenced the appellant. So, there is no scope for interference by this Court. This appeal being without any merit is liable to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned judgment.

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It is evident from record of learned learned trial Court that it framed charges for offence punishable under Sections 506 (II) of IPC and Section 376(1) of IPC and Section 3 (2) (v) of SC & ST Act (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court acquitted the appellant of offence under Sections 506-II of the IPC and Section 3 (2) (v) of SC & ST Act (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, but convicted him under Section 376(1) of the IPC.

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Prosecutrix/victim (PW-1) has stated that on the date of incident she went to fetch water from the well in her house, thereby she went towards the field for defecating. At that time, the accused caught hold of her, made her fall on the ground and without her consent satiated his lust by committing forcible sexual intercourse upon her and as the victim was screaming, he stuffed her mouth with a cloth and threatened to strangle her if she continued, further warning her never to disclose the incident. After reaching home, she immediately informed her mother-in-law about the incident, as her husband was not at home. Upon his arrival, the F.I.R of sexual assault (Ex. P/01) was filed by the prosecutrix at the Balrampur Police Station. In para 07 of her cross-examination she stated that " घटनाद ि �ना ं कएव ं आजक े पहल े म ैं न े उस े कभीनही ं �खी।अभ े ि भय कहा ँ स े आयाथाऔरकहा ं चलागयाम ैं नही ं जानती।अभ ि भय घटनाक े समयकयापहनाथाम ् ैं नही ं �खीथी े , कयो ् ं द ि कम ैं न े अभ ि भय

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कोनही ं �खी े " She denied this suggestion that she was in love affair with the accused and she also denied the suggestion that the accused used to accompany the victim’s husband when she visited her maternal home. She further denied the suggestion that she used to travel with the accused on his bicycle, and also denied that the accused gave her a saree and anklets. She denied the suggestion that she had made a false report against the accused at the behest o f Jagmohan.

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PW-02, mother-in-law of the prosecutrix has stated that her daughterin-law went to fetch water from the well and she came back home after an hour and apprised her of the fact that when she went to the field for defecating, all of a sudden the accused caught hold of her and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. At that time, the husband of the victim was not at home. Upon his arrival, the F.I.R. regarding sexual assault (Ex. P/01) was filed by the prosecutrix at the Balrampur Police Station. In para 04 of her cross-examination she admitted that " यहसहीह ै द ि कआरोपीहमार े घरक े सामन े रहताह ै ।यहसहीह ै द ि क मझ ु े म े रीबह ू न े आरोपीकानामबताईथी।यहकहनागलतह ै द ि कम े रीबह ु आरोपीको नही पहचानती ह ै ।यहकहनागलतह ै द ि कम े रीबह ु घटनाद ि �ना ं ककोपहलीबारआरोपी �खीथी े ।यहकहनागलत �खीथी।एव े ं � ू सरीबारनयायालयम ् ें गवाही�न े े आईथीतब ह ै द ि कआरोपीकोमरीबह े ु पहल े स े नही ं जानती।” She admitted this suggestion in para 07 of her cross-examination that "यहकहनासहीह ै द ि कअभ ि भय ु कतमर े े बट े े क े साथम े र बह ु र ि रयाकोम े र े मायक े लन े े जाताथा।�ोनो ं प ु रान े द ि म थ , लद े ि कनआरोपी न े द ि म ्ቔ तानही ं द ि नभाई।यहसहीह ै द ि कआरोपीहमार े घरम ें खानाखाताथाज ि जसकोम े री - बह ु खानापरोसतीथी।आरोपीकाम े र े घरआना जानारहताथा।ल े द ि कनम े र े बह ु को - अरोपीन े पायतद ि �याथाद ि कयहम ें नही ं जानतीथी।आरोपी 2-3 सालहमार े घरआता - जाताथा।यह जाताथा।यहकहनागलतह ै द ि कहमलोगो ं कीग ै रहाज ि जरीम ैं जारोपीआता

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2-3 प ू छ े परजीन े परद ि कआरोपीसा ्ቌ ीकीबह ु स सालस े पयारकरताथा।सा ् ्ቌ ीका कथनह ै द ि कउस े इसकीजानकारीनही ं ह ै । " In para 08 of her cross-examination she admitted that " यहसहीह ै द ि कम ैं न े अपनीबह ु कोर ि रपोट 8 करन े क े ल ि लएकहीथी। यहकहनासहीह ै द ि कम ें नही ं कहतीतोबह ु र ि रपोट 8 नही ं करती। मन ैं े अपन लडकाको ़ बलाया ु औरबह ु कोजबर�सतीर ् ि रपोट 8 करन े क े ल ि लएल े गई।यहकहनासहीह ै द ि कम ैं बह ु कोबह ु तखचा 8 करक लाई थीकज < काखच 8 आजतकम ैं नही ं उतारपाईह , बह ु आरोपी क े पासचलीगईथी , इसल ि लएम ैं र ि रपोट 8 करवाई। "

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PW-03, brother-in-law of the prosecutrix has stated that his mother PW-02 has apprised him of the fact that his sister-in-law/prosecutrix was sexually assaulted by the accused. In para 03 of his crossexamination he has admitted that the accused often used to visit his house and eat food and he too used to visit the house of the accused and have food and the victim is familiar with the accused as both their houses are opposite to each other. In para 06 of his crossexamination he admitted that " यहसहीहैदिकआरोपोंमेंहमारेभाईयोंकीपत्नी परनजर था इसलिलएहमनेरिरपोट8 �ज8 कराया।घटनाकेएकसालपहलेभीआरदिपहमारे भाई्ቚ मो�कीपत्नीकेताथगलतसंबंधबनाया।" यहकहनासहीहैदिकघटनाकी जानकारीमेरीमां�ी।हमलोगोंनेमांकेकहनेपररिरपोट8 लिलखाया।"

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PW-04, husband of the prosecutrix has stated that his wife/prosecutrix apprised him of the fact that the accused committed forcible sexual intercourse upon her by stuffing cloth inside her mouth. In para 04 of his cross-examination, he admitted that the victim and the accused were familiar with each other, as their houses were opposite and they often visited each other.

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PW-05, father of the prosecutrix has stated that his son-in-law called him by saying that accused committed wrong things with his daughter. In para 04 of his cross-examination he admitted that he did

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not know whether the accused come to pick his daughter/prosecutrix or not and he further stated that his daughter did not tell him anything about the incident, his son-in-law told him that the accused had done wrong things with his daughter. He denied this suggestion that prior to the incident, his daughter/prosecutrix and the accused were in love affair with each other.

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PW-06, Dr. Shipra Shrivastava examined the prosecutrix/victim and stated that she did not find any external injuries or internal injuries on the body of the prosecutrix and she opined that victim was habitual of sexual intercourse and no definite opinion can be given regarding recent sexual intercourse and gave her report vide Ex. P/8. In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not find any injury on the victim’s back or any part of her body.

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From close scrutiny of statement of all witnesses, it is clear that the prosecutrix alleged against the accused and stated that she saw the accused for the first time on the date of incident and second time before the learned trial Court, but mother-in-law, brother-in-law, husband and father of the prosecutrix have admitted the suggestion of defence that the accused is neighbour of the prosecutrix and his house is in front of the prosecutrix/victim’s maternal house. The mother-in-law of the prosecutrix admitted this suggestion that she had asked her daughter-in-law to report. She further admitted that if she did not say her to report, then her daughter-in-law would not have reported it. She also admits that she incurred great expense regarding her daughter-in-law's arrival/marriage, and the associated loan remains unpaid, as such, she filed a report after her daughter-in-

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law went with the accused.

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This Court in the matter of Shankar Yadav (Supra) has held in paras 13, 14, 15 and 19 which reads as thus:-

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“13. Though it is well-settled in law that the conviction for rape can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, the settled legal position also demands that such testimony must inspire the confidence of the Court and be of sterling quality. In the present case, the statement of the prosecutrix lacks consistency, naturalness, and spontaneity. Further, her husband (PW-08), whom she claimed to have informed about the incident, did not state that the first incident was ever disclosed to him prior to the second. Parmanand Ram (PW-09), brother of the husband, also categorically stated that the prosecutrix never disclosed any such fact prior to 18.06.2013.

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The defense has led cogent evidence suggesting a false implication. The testimony of DW-1, Shankar Ram Yadav, a natural and independent witness, clearly indicates that the prosecutrix was beaten by her husband with a stick near the village hand pump just days before the FIR was lodged. This crucial testimony suggests that the injuries attributed to the accused were likely inflicted by her husband during the public altercation, and not by the appellant. The motive for false implication is clearly evident, stemming from village rumors of an illicit relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant, leading to domestic strife and ultimately, the filing of the complaint as a retaliatory measure. It appears probable that the prosecutrix, under pressure from her husband after facing public humiliation and physical assault, lodged a false report. Her failure to disclose the alleged incident of January, 2013 to her husband or any other person over several months significantly undermines her credibility. In such a situation, the non-reporting of the earlier offence, combined with a sudden and delayed

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disclosure, creates serious doubt about the veracity of the allegations made by prosecutrix.

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Ali Alias Guddu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh , reported in (2015) 7 SCC 272 has held that a conviction for rape can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, but only if her evidence is of sterling quality and inspires confidence. Since the prosecutrix's version in this case was inconsistent and uncorroborated, the Court acquitted the accused, giving him the benefit of doubt. Relevant paragraph is quoted as under :

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“29. Be it noted, there can be no iota of doubt that on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is unimpeachable and beyond reproach, a conviction can be based. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court have persuaded themselves away with this principle without appreciating the acceptability and reliability of the testimony of the witness. In fact, it would not be inappropriate to say that whatever the analysis in the impugned judgment [Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 2006, decided on 25-3-2009 (All)] , it would only indicate an impropriety of approach. The prosecutrix has deposed that she was taken from one place to the other and remained at various houses for almost two months. The only explanation given by her is that she was threatened by the accused persons. It is not in her testimony that she was confined to one place. In fact, it has been borne out from the material on record that she had travelled from place to place and she was

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ravished a number of times. Under these circumstances, the medical evidence gains significance, for the examining doctor has categorically deposed that there are no injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR, the non-examination of the witnesses, the testimony of the prosecutrix, the associated circumstances and the medical evidence, leave a mark of doubt to treat the testimony of the prosecutrix as so natural and truthful to inspire confidence. It can be stated with certitude that the evidence of the prosecutrix is not of such quality which

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can be placed reliance upon.”

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Phool Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , reported in (2022) 2 SCC 74 has held as under :

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8. In Ganesan [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76] , this Court has observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments of this Court on conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paras 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed and held as under : (Ganesan case [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76] , SCC pp. 57882)

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“10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 639] , it is

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observed in paras 9 to 14 as under : (SCC pp. 195-98)

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‘9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under : (SCC p. 559, para 16)

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“16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court

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keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.”

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10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 780] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it

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may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 597, para 12)

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“12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.”

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11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) “

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8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that

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become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. … Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … * * *

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21. … The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not

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get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.”

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12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1080] , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, nonexamination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case,

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particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence.

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13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 674] , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1208] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213 : AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 SCR 377] .

¶87

14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.’

¶88

10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] , it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an

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accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality.

¶91

10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi). In para 22, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 29)

¶92

‘22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no

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circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have corelation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.’ ” (emphasis in original)

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9. In Pankaj Chaudhary [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264] , it is observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of the accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It is further observed and held that sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be doubted by the court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In para 29, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 587)

¶97

“29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] ]. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 898] ].”

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10. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana [Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 129] , it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paras 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under : (SCC pp. 37-38)

¶100

“6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated

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in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] (SCC p. 403, para 21).]

¶103

7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling

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reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found

¶106

to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1725] .)”

¶107

In the light of above cited judgment, it is clear that the statement of prosecutrix is not reliable, medical evidence also does not support the prosecution case. This Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court are not sustainable in law. The prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the material on record leads to a plausible alternative hypothesis of false implication.

¶108

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 09.05.2007 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges leveled against him. The appellant is already on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C.(481 of the B.N.S.S), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the

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Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The Trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey)

JUDGE

U.K. Raju

Onkar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Onkar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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