Jaipal Yadav Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:17066

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 372 of 2017

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1 - Jaipal Yadav S/o Jag Narayan Yadav, Aged About 40 Years R/o Handipara, Shivnagar, Post Office Raipur, Police Station Azad Chowk, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant	:Ms. Pooja Yadav appears on behalf of
	Mr. Shivendu Pandya, Advocate
For Respondent(s)/State	:Ms. Shubha Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer

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Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

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Judgment On Board

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15/04/2026

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The present appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.02.2017 passed by the

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learned Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 93/2013. By the said judgment, the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the appellant has been directed to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.

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The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 29.06.1990 at about 9:00 p.m., the complainant Vinod Tandon, was present at his dairy farm when he noticed Praveen Sahdecha passing by on his scooter. As Praveen approached near the dairy, he was allegedly intercepted by 2–3 persons. Upon observing the incident, the complainant came out onto the road and witnessed accused persons, namely Jogender, Kalu and Jaipal, restraining Praveen, hurling obscene abuses and forcibly demanding cash and a gold chain from him. It is alleged that under coercion, they attempted to extort an amount of Rs. 2,000/- along with the chain. When the complainant intervened and objected to the said acts, the accused persons allegedly released Praveen and turned upon the complainant, assaulting him. Accused Joginder is stated to have inflicted a blow on the complainant’s face with a brick, resulting in facial injuries. The complainant was pushed into a drain, thereby sustaining additional injuries on his knee, neck and other parts of the body.

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It is further the case of the prosecution that accused Jogender forcibly took an amount of Rs. 2,000/- from the complainant’s pocket and thereafter fled from the spot. Thereafter, witnesses namely Chandraprakash, Raju and Lakshmi reached the place of occurrence, assisted the injured complainan, and took him to the police station, where he lodged a report vide Ex.P/1 regarding the incident. A written requisition for medical examination and treatment of the injured complainant was prepared vide Ex.P/4. The complainant was medically examined and treated on the basis of the said requisition. Owing to injuries sustained to his teeth, the attending doctor advised the complainant to undergo further examination by a dentist. Thereafter, on medical advice, the injured complainant was treated by a dentist and the prescription in this regard has been exhibited as Ex. P/5.

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During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer duly prepared a spot map, which has been exhibited on record as Ex.P/5. On 30.06.1990, a piece of brick was seized from the place of incident in the presence of witnesses and the seizure memo thereof was prepared vide Ex.P/2. Similarly, an iron rod was seized from the spot on 29.06.1990 and the corresponding seizure memo was marked as Ex. P/3. Statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded and upon finding prima facie material against the appellant, he was arrested.

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After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur,

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where the case was registered as Criminal Case No. 7529/1990. The matter was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and upon such committal, it was received by the Sessions Court for trial and disposal. The Trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 384, 294, and 394 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code along with Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. The appellant denied the charges, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined 6 witnesses. The statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances put to him and pleaded false implication and innocence. No defence evidence was adduced.

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Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted hin of the charges under Sections 384, 294, 394 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act but convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in para 1 of the impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is bad in law, illegal, perverse and contrary to the facts, circumstances and evidence available on record. The learned Trial Court has erred in

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convicting the appellant under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of surmises and conjectures without proper appreciation of evidence. It is further submitted that there is no cogent, reliable and corroborative evidence to establish the involvement of the appellant in the alleged offence. The testimony of the complainant (PW-1) and other prosecution witnesses is neither consistent nor corroborated and suffers from material contradictions and omissions. Several witnesses have admitted that they could not identify the assailant and that the incident occurred in darkness, thereby creating serious doubt regarding the identity of the accused. It is also submitted that the appellant sustained injuries in the same incident, which the prosecution has failed to explain, thereby rendering the prosecution case doubtful and unreliable. The possibility of false implication due to prior monetary dispute between the parties cannot be ruled out.

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Further, the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case as the doctor (PW-4) has opined that the injuries may be caused by a blunt object or could be self-inflicted and are simple in nature. Independent witnesses (PW-2 and PW-3) have not supported the prosecution case and have turned hostile and the seizure memos have not been duly proved, thereby breaking the chain of evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 325 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction is based on uncorroborated and unreliable evidence and erroneous

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presumptions. Therefore, the impugned judgment being unsustainable in law and on facts is liable to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted.

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Alternatively, learned counsel submits that without challenging the finding of conviction, the appellant has confined the present appeal solely to the question of quantum of sentence. It is contended that the incident pertains to the year 1990 and the appeal has remained pending since 2017. It is further submitted that the appellant was about 40 years of age at the time of the incident and has now attained the status of a senior citizen. It is also urged that the appellant has already undergone more than one month of incarceration. In view of these mitigating circumstances, it is prayed that the period of sentence already undergone be considered sufficient and the sentence be modified accordingly.

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Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State, while supporting the impugned judgment, submits that the learned Trial Court, after meticulous appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant for the alleged offence. It is therefore contended that the present appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.

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Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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It is evident from the record that the learned Trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 384, 294, and 394

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read with Section 397 of the IPC, along with Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted the appellant of the aforesaid charges but convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC.

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Vinod Kumar Tandon (P.W.-1) stated that the incident had taken place in the year 1990 at about 7:30 to 8:00 p.m. He deposed that he was working as a dairy operator and owned a dairy situated at Bhaisthan, Old Ramsagarpara. At the relevant time, he was sitting in his dairy, in front of which there was a road. He further stated that one Praveen Kumar Sachdeva was passing along the said road on a scooter when the accused persons, namely Jaipal Yadav, Kalu, Pusat Yadav, Jogendra, and two other unknown persons, intercepted him and attempted to snatch the chain from his neck. Upon witnessing the incident, he intervened and asked Praveen not to proceed further. However, Praveen managed to leave the place. He further deposed that thereafter the accused persons took a sum of Rs. 2,000/- from his pocket and assaulted him with the weapons in their possession. He specifically stated that accused Jaipal Yadav was armed with an axe, while accused Jogendra had a brick and Jogendra struck him with the brick, as a result of which his two front teeth were broken. He further deposed that he lodged the FIR vide Ex.P/1 and admitted his signature on it from A to A part.

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Pawan Kumar (P.W.-2) admitted his signatures on the seizure memos (Ex. P/2 and Ex. P/3) at the portion marked ‘A to A’. Likewise, Horilal Yadav (P.W.-3) admitted his signatures on the seizure memo (Ex. P/3) at the portion marked ‘B to B’. However, both the witnesses did not support the case of the prosecution. They were, therefore, declared hostile by the prosecution and were subjected to cross-examination, but they denied all the suggestions put to them by the prosecution.

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Dr. M. P. Pujari (P.W.-4) deposed that he medically examined the complainant and found seven injuries on his body. He further stated that the complainant was referred to the Dental Department as reflected in the medical memo (Ex. P/5). In his opinion, Injury Nos. 2 and 3 were grievous in nature whereas the remaining injuries were simple in nature.

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Upon due consideration of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and on a careful appraisal of the entire material available on record, this Court finds that the testimony of the complainant (P.W.-1) is cogent, consistent and inspires confidence. The same is duly corroborated by the medical evidence of Dr. M. P. Pujari (P.W.-4), who has clearly opined that Injury Nos. 2 and 3 sustained by the complainant were grievous in nature.

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Although the independent witnesses (P.W.-2 and P.W.-3) have not supported the prosecution case and were declared hostile, their evidence to the extent of admitting their signatures on the

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seizure memos cannot be completely discarded. It is a settled principle of law that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be rejected in toto and can be relied upon to the extent it supports the prosecution case.

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In the present case, the ocular testimony of the complainant, coupled with the medical evidence, sufficiently establishes that the appellant caused grievous injuries to the complainant. The learned Trial Court has, therefore, rightly appreciated the evidence on record and has not committed any illegality in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 325 of the IPC is hereby affirmed.

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So far as the question of sentence is concerned, it is not in dispute that the incident pertains to the year 1990 and the appeal has remained pending since 2017. The appellant was about 40 years of age at the time of the incident and has now become a senior citizen. It is also brought on record that he has already undergone more than one month of incarceration. Keeping in view the long lapse of time, the age of the appellant, the nature of injuries proved and the period of custody already undergone, this Court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if the sentence is confined to the period already undergone.

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Consequently, while affirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 325 of the IPC, the sentence is modified to the

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period already undergone. The fine amount, as imposed by the learned Trial Court, is maintained.

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Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.

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The appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, his bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as provided under Section 481 of BNSS, 2023.

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The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action .

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Sd/-

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(Rajani Dubey) JUDGE

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RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHIYADAV

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Ruchi

Jaipal Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

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Jaipal Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

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