Phulsingh Thakur @ Petlu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:18888-DB

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Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.04.29 11:16:09 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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NAFR

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CRA No. 314 of 2024

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1 - Phulsingh Thakur @ Petlu S/o Jagatram Thakur Aged About 22 Years Caste - Gond, R/o Village - Chhatdabra, Chowki - Baya, District - Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. - Rajadevri, District - Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sourabh Dangi, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Nitansh Kumar Jaiswal, Dy. Govt. Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice. 24/04/2026

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This appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 03.01.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-

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Bhatapara (C.G.) in Sessions Case No. 37/2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months.

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Brief facts of the case are that on 07.04.2022 at about 11:40 a.m., the police of Police Station Rajadevari (Police Outpost Baya) received a telephonic information regarding the death of Jagatram Thakur at village Chhatauladabara. Upon receiving the said information, the police proceeded to the spot for verification, where they found the son of the deceased, namely Chitrasen Thakur, who lodged a Dehati Merg Intimation (Ex. P/1). In the said intimation, he stated that on the evening of 06.04.2022 at about 07:00 p.m., while he was returning from his fields, his wife Santoshi Bai informed him that his younger brother, Phulsingh Thakur @ Petlu, had assaulted their father with a burning piece of wood as the deceased had forbidden him from selling ‘Mahua’.

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There was an eyewitness to the incident, namely Sukdev Yadav, who saw the appellant assaulting the deceased with a wooden stick and a burning log at his residence. A Dehati FIR (Ex. P/2) was also recorded. Thereafter, an inquest (Ex. P/5) over the dead body was conducted in the presence of witnesses, and the body was sent for post-mortem examination to the Community Health

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Centre, Kasdol, where PW-10 Dr. Rakesh Kumar Pradhan conducted the autopsy and submitted his report (Ex. P/6).

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During the post-mortem examination, the doctor found a lacerated wound and contusion over the occipital region of the head, along with a depressed fracture of the occipital bone and internal brain hemorrhage. He opined that the cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest due to head injury, and that the death was homicidal in nature.

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The spot map (Ex. P/3) was prepared by the police, and another map (Ex. P/8) was prepared by the Patwari. Blood-stained soil, plain soil, and a green shawl were seized from the spot vide seizure memo (Ex. P/9(1)). The appellant was arrested on 11.04.2022, and his memorandum statement (Ex. P/9) was recorded. Pursuant to the said memorandum, one burnt wooden stick, one wooden stick, and a checked shirt were seized vide seizure memo (Ex. P/10). The seized wooden sticks were not sent to the doctor for query, however, during trial, the medical officer opined that the injury found on the head of the deceased could have been caused by a hard and blunt object. The numbered Merg Intimation (Ex. P/1) was recorded at Police Outpost Baya, and FIR (Ex. P/11) was registered at Police Station Rajadevari against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. The blood-stained soil, shawl, wooden sticks, and the checked shirt of the appellant were sent for chemical examination to the FSL, Raipur. As per the report (Ex. P/13), human blood was

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detected on the articles, particularly on the wooden stick and the shirt seized from the appellant; however, the blood group could not be determined.

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Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) were recorded, and upon completion of the usual investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kasdol, for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was thereafter committed to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, for trial.

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The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. The appellant denied the charges and claimed trial.

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In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was also recorded, wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence, and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. He further submitted that there was a land dispute between him and his brother, on account of which he has been falsely implicated in the offence. He also stated that he did not commit any such offence and that the witnesses have deposed falsely against him.

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After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant

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and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which cannot form the basis for convicting the appellant in the offence in question. He further submits that the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses is unreliable and contradictory, particularly with regard to the timing of the incident and their presence at the spot, and that the case of the prosecution is heavily based on a memorandum statement and seizure of the alleged wooden sticks, which is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of the offence of murder. In the alternative, he submits that as per the medical evidence, only one fatal injury was found on the head of the deceased and the incident occurred in the heat of passion during a sudden quarrel between father and son over a domestic issue relating to the sale of ‘Mahua’, without any premeditated intention to cause death. Therefore, the offence, if any, does not travel beyond the scope of Section 304 Part II of the IPC. He accordingly prays that the conviction be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and the sentence be reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the appeal and submits that the prosecution has proved its case

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beyond reasonable doubt. Save and except minor omissions and contradictions, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is wholly reliable. There is clear evidence of an immediate quarrel between the accused and his father over the issue of selling ‘Mahua’, which led to a fatal assault on the deceased by the appellant. Pursuant to his memorandum statement, the weapons of offence, i.e., wooden sticks and a burning log, were seized. The appellant’s clothes were also seized, on which human blood was found as per the FSL report, which corroborates the presence of blood on the articles recovered from the spot. Furthermore, the testimony of independent eyewitnesses PW-3 and PW-4 clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant. Therefore, there is ample evidence on record to prove that the appellant committed the murder of the deceased. The learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, which calls for no interference.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions and gone through the records with utmost circumspection.

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The first question for consideration would be, whether the death of the deceased Jagatram was homicidal in nature or not?

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The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, and particularly relying upon the testimony of PW-10, Dr. Rakesh Kumar Pradhan,

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who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, came to the conclusion that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to a head injury involving a fracture of the occipital bone, and that the death was homicidal in nature. Further, from the evidence of the witnesses to the inquest (Ex. P/5), namely Chitrasen Thakur (PW-1) and Dayaram Chhatre (PW-5), it is evident that they saw the dead body of the deceased with a bleeding injury on the back of his head, and that the deceased died as a result of the injuries sustained by him. As such, we are also of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court—that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature—is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to the record, and we hereby affirm the said finding.

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The next question for consideration is whether the accused/appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question. The learned trial Court has answered this question in the affirmative by relying upon the direct evidence of independent eyewitnesses, the motive arising out of a dispute over the sale of ‘Mahua’, the memorandum statement of the appellant, the recovery of a wooden staff and a partially burnt wooden log, and the FSL report (Ex. P/13).

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PW-3 Sukdev Yadav, a neighbour of both the appellant and the deceased, stated in his evidence that on the date of the incident, at about 6:00 PM, while he and his wife were sitting inside their

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house, the deceased, Jagatram, came there crying out for help. He further stated that the appellant, Phulsingh, followed the deceased into the house and struck him on the back of the head with a wooden staff, causing a bleeding injury. Thereafter, the appellant forcibly took the deceased back towards his own house. He identified the appellant as the person who committed the assault.

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PW-6 Alekhram Bhoi stated in his evidence that, after hearing from the villagers that the appellant had killed his father, he went to the house of the deceased and saw the dead body lying in the courtyard (parchi). He also proved the memorandum statement (Ex. P/09), wherein the appellant disclosed that, due to a dispute regarding the sale of ‘Mahua’, he had assaulted his father and concealed the wooden staff and the burnt wooden piece under a sack in his room. Nothing material has come on record in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony.

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PW-6 further deposed that he was present during the investigation and witnessed the recording of the memorandum statement of the appellant as well as the seizure of the weapons of offence. He stated that the appellant, while in police custody, disclosed that his father had forbidden him from selling ‘Mahua’, and that he had assaulted him using a wooden staff and a burning piece of wood, which were concealed in his house. Thereafter, the wooden staff and the appellant’s shirt were seized from his house vide seizure memo (Ex. P/10). In cross-examination, he stated that he was

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present when the appellant was interrogated and admitted that the seized shirt bore blood-like stains. The defence could not rebut the recording of the memorandum statement or the seizure of the incriminating articles in his cross-examination.

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PW-1 Chitrasen Thakur, the son of the deceased, stated that he was informed by his wife, Smt. Santoshi Thakur, that the appellant had assaulted his father with a burning piece of wood. At that time, he was returning from his field. Upon reaching home, he found his father lying unconscious on a cot in the courtyard, and later, at about 10:00–11:00 PM, his father succumbed to the injuries. He then informed the police at Chowki Baya. In crossexamination, he stated that the appellant is his brother and admitted that a dispute had arisen as the appellant wanted to sell ‘Mahua’, which the deceased had opposed. He denied the suggestion that the death was caused by an accidental fall or a pre-existing medical condition such as an aneurysm.

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Since PW-1 is not an eyewitness to the actual assault, his testimony is corroborated by the account of PW-3. From the other evidence on record, it is established that, on the date of the incident, when the dead body was found in the house, the appellant was present in the vicinity in an intoxicated condition. Pursuant to his memorandum statement, the wooden staff, the burnt wooden piece, and his shirt were recovered. Further, as per the FSL report (Ex. P/13), human blood was found on the wooden staff and the shirt seized from the appellant, thereby firmly

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connecting him with the offence in question. The presence of human blood on these articles has not been explained by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., which lends further support to the prosecution case that the appellant caused the injuries to the deceased.

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The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration as to whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants?

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana has observed that:-

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“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II

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of the IPC, which state as under :-

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“23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :

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(a) Motive or previous enmity;

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(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;

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(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;

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(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or

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the victim died after several days;

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(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;

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(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;

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(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;

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(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;

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(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;

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(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;

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(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;

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(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;

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(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.

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Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.

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The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.”

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24. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda , their Lordships

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of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.

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Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-

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“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7)

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“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.

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” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)

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“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal 4 (2017) 3 SCC 2472024:CGHC:9062 DB 11 Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”.

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In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

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held that if there is intention and not knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

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Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:

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“ 16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:

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(i) There must be a sudden fight;

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(ii) There was no premeditation;

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(iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and

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(iv)The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”

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According to the post-mortem report (Ex. P/6), only one significant lacerated wound was found on the occipital region of the head, caused by a hard and blunt object, along with a fracture of the occipital bone. No other significant injury was found on the body of the deceased. In view of the fact that there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased with respect to the sale of ‘Mahua’, it can be safely inferred that the appellant did not have the intention to cause the death of the deceased, rather, in the heat of passion, he assaulted him. As such, the case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellant herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the appellant did not take any undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner.

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Had the appellant intended to cause the death of the deceased, Jagatram, he would have inflicted multiple blows or used a more lethal weapon in a calculated manner and would not have remained in the vicinity in an intoxicated state. Accordingly, it can be safely concluded that the appellant did not have the intention to kill the deceased.

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In view of the above discussion, we hold that it would meet the ends of justice if the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. is altered/converted to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C.

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Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. is set aside , however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years.

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The appellant is reported to be in jail since 11.04.2022. He shall serve the remaining sentence as modified by this Court.

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The criminal appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein above.

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Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

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The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

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Sd/- Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Alok

Phulsingh Thakur @ Petlu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Phulsingh Thakur @ Petlu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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