Shobhit @ Choti Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Kanchan Sonwani Minor D/o Amarnath Sonwani Aged About 16 Years Through Her Mother Smt. Rajni, W/o Amarnath Sonwani, Aged About 36 Years, R/o Village Machabhata, P.S. Bhatapara, Tahsil Simga, District Baloda Bazaar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh

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--- Appellant

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Versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bhatapara Rural, District Baloda Bazaar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Shobhit Alias Choti S/o Prem Singh Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Machabhata, P.S. Bhatapara Rural, District Baloda BazaarBhatapara, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondents

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(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant in CRA No.1208/2014	: Mr. Neelkanth Malivya and Mr. Arvind Dubey, Advocates
For State	: Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy Advocate General

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Hon'ble Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, Judge Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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12.03.2026

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Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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1. Since both the Criminal Appeal filed on behalf of the accused/appellant and the Acquittal Appeal preferred by the complainant arise out of the same judgment passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge (POCSO Act), Balodabazar, C.G., and as the issues involved in both the appeals are interconnected and based on the same set of facts and evidence, it was considered appropriate and in the interest of justice to hear them together. Accordingly, both the appeals have been clubbed, heard analogously, and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

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2. Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 has been preferred on behalf of the accused/appellant, whereas Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 has been filed by the complainant/victim, assailing the legality, validity and propriety of the judgment dated 22.11.2014 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge (POCSO Act), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara

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(C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 30/2014. By the said judgment, the learned trial Court acquitted the appellant/accused, namely Shobhit @ Choti, of the charges punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Sections 4 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “POCSO Act”). However, the appellant was convicted and senteced for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC, as follows :-

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Conviction		Sentence
Under Section 354 of the IPC	: Rigorous three ye ₹1,000/-, payment rigorous three mo	imprisonment for ars with a fine of in default of of fine, additional imprisonment for nths.
Under Section 506 Part-II of the IPC	: Rigorous two year ₹1,000/-, payment rigorous three mo	imprisonment for s with a fine of in default of of fine, additional imprisonment for nths.
Both the sentences	shall run co	ncurrently.

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3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14.06.2014 the victim lodged a report at Police Station Bhatapara Rural alleging that on the said date she had returned to Bhatapara by train from Tilda and was proceeding from the railway station towards her village on the motorcycle of the accused. When they reached a

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secluded place near village Pendri, the accused allegedly stopped the motorcycle, caught hold of her hand and attempted to drag her towards a nearby field with the intention of outraging her modesty. When the victim protested and told the accused that she would disclose the incident to her parents, the accused threatened to kill her and warned her not to disclose the incident to anyone. Thereafter, the accused again made her sit on the motorcycle and dropped her near her house.

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4. It is further the case of the prosecution that after reaching home, the victim informed her parents, namely the father of the victim and the mother of the victim, about the incident and thereafter the matter was reported to the police. On the basis of the said report, a case was registered against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 of the IPC. During the course of investigation, the spot map of the place of occurrence was prepared in the presence of the victim and the father of the victim on 15.06.2014, which has been exhibited as Ex.P-2.

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5. Thereafter, on 16.06.2014 the victim submitted a written complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Balodabazar, which has been exhibited as Ex.P-3. On the same day, the father of the victim also submitted a written report at Police Station Bhatapara Rural alleging that the accused had forcibly committed sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on the date of the incident and had threatened her with dire consequences if she

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disclosed the incident to anyone. The said written complaint has been exhibited as Ex.P-5, wherein the father of the victim also requested that the victim be medically examined.

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6. During the course of investigation, the accused was arrested and his arrest memo was prepared vide Ex.P-7. The underwear worn by the accused was seized under seizure memo Ex.P-4 and was sent for examination by issuing requisition Ex.P-11. Another seizure memo relating to the undergarments was prepared as Ex.P-6 and the same was also sent for examination through requisition Ex.P-13.

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7. The victim was medically examined and the doctor handed over sealed samples including vaginal swab, slides, pubic hair and undergarments, which were produced before the Investigating Officer by the Lady Constable Manju Tandon and were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P-12.

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8. On 18.06.2014 the statement of the victim was recorded during investigation, wherein she stated that the accused had taken her on a motorcycle from Bhatapara and had stopped the vehicle near a deserted field at village Pendri. It was alleged that the accused dragged her towards the field, forcibly removed her clothes and, despite her resistance, committed sexual intercourse with her. The victim further stated that due to the threats extended by the accused she did not initially disclose the entire incident but later informed her grandmother when she

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experienced pain the next morning. The statements of other witnesses including the grandmother of the victim and the father of the victim were also recorded during investigation, who supported the version narrated by the victim. The statements of PW-6 and other witnesses were also recorded on 22.06.2014.

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9. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 506B, 376 and 511 of the IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

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10. In order to prove the above charges against the accused, a total of 9 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution being PW-1 to PW-9 and 15 documents have been exhibited as Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-15, contrary to which, on behalf of the defence, one defence witness has been examined and he has exhibited 2 documents marked as Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), the accused denied all allegations, asserted his innocence, and stated that he had been falsely implicated.

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11. The learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused / appellant – Shobhit @ Choti for the offence punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC and acquitted him for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Sections 4 and 8 of the

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POCSO Act, against which, aforementioned Criminal Appeal and Acquittal Appeal have been filed by the respective parties i.e. the accused and the complainant/victim.

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12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1208/2014 would submit that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and the evidence available on record. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the allegations against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC is not sustainable in law.

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13. Learned counsel would further submit that the statement of the victim suffers from material inconsistencies and improvements. It is argued that the version given by the victim in the initial report is materially different from the statement subsequently recorded during investigation, particularly with regard to the allegation of sexual assault. It is contended that such material discrepancies create serious doubt about the veracity and reliability of the prosecution case. It is also submitted that the prosecution has failed to produce any independent witness to support the alleged incident. Learned counsel would argue that the place of occurrence is not shown to be so secluded that no independent witness could have been available. Furthermore, the medical evidence and other documentary evidence brought on record do

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not conclusively corroborate the allegations made against the appellant, and therefore the benefit of doubt ought to have been extended to him.

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14. Learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that the learned trial Court itself found the evidence insufficient to establish the charges under Section 376 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act and acquitted the appellant of the said charges. It is submitted that once the more serious allegations were disbelieved, the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC on the same set of evidence is not justified and the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the said charges as well.

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15. Alternatively, learned counsel would submit that even if the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is maintained, the sentence awarded to the appellant is on the higher side. It is submitted that the appellant is a young person with no prior criminal antecedents and has already undergone a substantial period of incarceration during the pendency of the proceedings. Therefore, it is prayed that the sentence imposed upon the appellant be reduced to the period already undergone in the interest of justice.

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16. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would support the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court to the extent it records the conviction of the appellant for the

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offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the said offences against the appellant. He would further submit that the testimony of the victim is natural, cogent and trustworthy and there is no reason to disbelieve her version. It is contended that the victim has consistently stated about the conduct of the appellant in catching hold of her hand, dragging her towards the field and threatening her with dire consequences. Such conduct clearly attracts the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC.

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17. It is also submitted that the evidence of the victim is duly supported by the statements of other prosecution witnesses including the father of the victim and other witnesses examined during trial. The documentary evidence such as the spot map and seizure memos further corroborate the prosecution case. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court does not call for any interference by this Court. He would also submit that the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and has been awarded after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. As such, no case is made out either for interference with the conviction or for reduction of the sentence awarded to the

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appellant. Accordingly, it is prayed that Criminal Appeal No.1208/2014 filed by the appellant be dismissed.

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18. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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19. The pivotal question that arose for consideration before the learned trial Court was whether the prosecution had been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed rape upon the victim and thereby made himself liable for punishment under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act, or whether the evidence on record only established the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC.

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20. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, first examined whether the victim could be held to be a “child” within the meaning of the POCSO Act. In this regard, the Court noticed that though the prosecution had claimed that the victim was about 15 years of age at the time of the incident, no documentary evidence such as a birth certificate, school admission register, or any other reliable record was produced before the Court to establish her age. The investigating officer also admitted in his cross-examination that no document regarding the age of the victim was collected during investigation. In absence of such

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reliable evidence, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to conclusively prove that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident.

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21. The learned trial Court thereafter examined the allegation of rape in light of the medical evidence. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9), who had conducted the medical examination of the victim, deposed that upon examination of the private parts of the victim there were no signs of recent injury, no bleeding, and the hymen was found intact. The doctor further opined that there were no medical indications of recent sexual intercourse. The trial Court found that this medical evidence did not corroborate the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse made by the victim.

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22. The trial Court further observed that although the victim had stated in her evidence that the accused had committed rape upon her, the medical findings did not support the allegation of penetrative sexual assault. The Court therefore held that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients required for constituting the offence of rape under Section 376 of the IPC or penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act.

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23. The learned trial Court also considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the defence that the statements of the victim and her parents contained certain omissions and improvements when compared with the contents of the First Information Report. However, the Court observed that minor discrepancies in the

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statements of witnesses were not sufficient to discard the entire prosecution case, particularly when the core allegation regarding the conduct of the accused remained consistent.

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24. The trial Court found that the testimony of the victim regarding the conduct of the accused in stopping the motorcycle at a secluded place, dragging her towards a field, and using criminal force upon her was supported by the statements of other prosecution witnesses including the father of the victim and her grandmother. The Court further noted that the presence of scratch marks near the buttock of the victim, as noticed by the medical officer, lent some corroboration to her version that she had resisted the accused and had struggled during the incident.

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25. The defence had also attempted to suggest that the accused had been falsely implicated due to some prior dispute. However, the learned trial Court found that no cogent evidence had been produced to substantiate the alleged enmity between the parties. The defence witness examined on behalf of the accused also failed to establish any circumstance that could probabilize the defence theory of false implication.

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26. Upon cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that although the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations of rape and penetrative sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence clearly established that the accused had used

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criminal force against the victim with the intention of outraging her modesty and had also threatened her with dire consequences if she disclosed the incident to anyone.

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27. Accordingly, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution had not succeeded in proving the charges under Section 376 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable doubt and the accused was entitled to acquittal in respect of those charges. However, the evidence on record was found sufficient to establish the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC.

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28. Consequently, the learned trial Court convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC. While considering the question of sentence, the trial Court took into account the fact that the father of the victim had reposed trust in the accused by asking him to drop the victim at her home, but the accused had misused the said trust and had taken the victim to a secluded place where he committed the aforesaid acts. Considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the learned trial Court sentenced the accused as detailed in the preceding paragraph of the judgment.

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29. We shall first deal with the appeal filed by the complainant/victim being Acquittal Appeal No.35/2015.

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30. The acquittal appeal challenges the acquittal by the learned trial Court under Section 372 Cr.P.C. While exercising appellate

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jurisdiction, the Court must act with caution, recognizing that the trial Court has the advantage of observing witness demeanour and assessing credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, but only if it is real and substantial, such as a doubt a reasonable person would honestly entertain. Mere theoretical doubts or minor discrepancies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. The appellate Court must ensure the trial Court properly appreciated all evidence and extended the benefit of doubt in line with settled principles.

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31. As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair, AIR 2003 SC 182 , and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha, AIR 2004 SC 1053 , an appellate Court should not substitute its own view unless the trial Court’s findings are perverse or relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored, providing compelling reason for interference.

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32. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083 , clarify that while an appellate Court can examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The trial Court has the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility. Interference is warranted only if the trial Court committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is

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justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:-

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“……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.”

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33. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC

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984 , the Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted only in exceptional cases—where the trial Court committed a manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor

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contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly, extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:-

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" 8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all. "

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34. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 , the Supreme Court held as under:-

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"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."

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35. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, this

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Court is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence in its entirety,

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including both oral testimony and documentary material. The purpose is not merely to review whether the trial Court followed procedural formalities, but to examine whether the evidence, as a whole, supports the conclusions reached. The appellate Court must assess whether the trial Court properly weighed the evidentiary value of each piece of material, evaluated the credibility of witnesses, and provided cogent and valid reasons for its findings. Where the conclusions of the trial Court are found to be unsustainable, manifestly erroneous, or perverse, the appellate Court is not only empowered but obliged to arrive at its own independent conclusion based on the cumulative assessment of the evidence.

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36. Applying these principles, we have undertaken a comprehensive examination of the prosecution’s case. Each witness statement has been scrutinized for credibility, internal consistency, and corroboration with other evidence. Documentary exhibits have been evaluated for their probative value, authenticity, and relevance. Inferences drawn from the facts have been examined for logical coherence and alignment with established legal principles. The ultimate task is to ensure that justice is done, not merely to defer to the trial Court’s judgment. The appellate scrutiny is, therefore, both thorough and independent, aimed at determining whether the acquittal was justified or whether the cumulative evidence necessitates a different conclusion.

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37. In the present case, the victim’s deposition, recorded as PW-2, requires careful scrutiny. She claimed that on the day of the incident, the accused forcibly attempted sexual intercourse. However, her testimony, when compared with other evidence, reveals several material contradictions, omissions, and improvements, which materially affect her credibility.

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38. PW-2, the victim, in her examination-in-chief, provided a detailed account of the alleged incident, claiming that on the day in question, she had accompanied the accused under the pretext of traveling a familiar route within the village. According to her testimony, at a point which she described as relatively secluded, away from the view of other villagers, the accused stopped the motorcycle and forcibly restrained her movements. She stated that the accused grabbed her arm and attempted to pull her into a nearby open field, which, in her words, was “isolated and hidden from the main path leading to the village.” She further alleged that the accused forcibly removed her clothing, including her upper garments, and forcibly attempted sexual intercourse. PW-2 emphasized that despite her repeated protests and resistance, the accused overpowered her. She described the struggle in her own words, noting that she tried to push him away and called out for help, but the accused allegedly threatened her with dire consequences, including harm to her person and her family, should she reveal the incident to anyone. She explicitly stated

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that these threats induced a fear of immediate harm, which prevented her from raising an alarm or escaping at that moment.

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39. PW-2 further deposed that the accused's conduct continued until he had allegedly satisfied his intentions, after which he released her and allowed her to return home. She described the emotional and psychological impact of the incident, noting that she felt terrified, humiliated, and coerced, which contributed to her delay in approaching the authorities. According to her testimony, the accused repeatedly warned her not to disclose the events to her family or the police, asserting that any disclosure would result in serious consequences, including threats to her life and wellbeing. In addition to her verbal testimony, PW-2 stated that the scene of occurrence was isolated, and that no other person was present in the vicinity. She claimed that she was conscious of the potential witnesses nearby but felt compelled by fear and intimidation not to resist openly or seek immediate help. She also elaborated that she did not preserve her clothing or other items for forensic evidence immediately after the incident due to fear and confusion, which she admitted later complicated the collection of material evidence.

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40. During cross-examination, however, several aspects of her narrative revealed material contradictions. She admitted that the path to the borewell and surrounding garden was frequented by other villagers, and she had continued visiting the accused’s

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premises even after the alleged incident. She also acknowledged that she did not see the accused taking any video or photographs, although she claimed that such recordings existed. Furthermore, no external or internal injuries were identified during the medical examination conducted shortly thereafter, and the forensic reports did not corroborate her allegations of sexual assault. Taken together, PW-2’s testimony presents a detailed, emotive, and narrative account of the alleged assault, emphasizing coercion, threats, and fear. However, her version also contains inconsistencies and omissions, particularly regarding the timing, location, subsequent conduct, and absence of corroborative medical or forensic evidence, which have been critically examined by the trial Court.

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41. On the other hand, the medical and forensic evidence on record presents a significant divergence from the allegations of forcible sexual assault. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9), who medically examined the victim on 15.06.2014, provided detailed testimony regarding the physical condition of the victim at the time of examination. She deposed that no external injuries, abrasions, contusions, or marks of violence were observed on any part of the victim’s body, including the private areas. The doctor specifically noted the absence of signs indicative of physical struggle or restraint, which would ordinarily accompany a forcible sexual assault. Further, the medical examination revealed no evidence of bleeding, trauma, or inflammation suggestive of recent sexual intercourse. The

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hymen was found intact, and the uterus was of normal size. Dr. Verma also testified that no semen or other biological material typically associated with sexual assault was detected on the garments or through laboratory analysis.

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42. The absence of corroborative forensic evidence is particularly material when considered in the context of the gravity of the allegations made by the victim. The prosecution’s case rests heavily on the assertion of forcible sexual intercourse, which would ordinarily produce some observable or detectable physical evidence, especially given that the victim alleged a struggle and coercion. However, the medical findings do not corroborate such a scenario. The petticoat and other garments examined showed only whitish stains, which the medical officer clarified could be naturally present in a married woman and were not indicative of sexual assault. The forensic report did not detect the presence of semen, spermatozoa, or any other biological material that could link the accused to the act alleged. In sum, the medical and forensic findings are neutral or non-corroborative, which materially weakens the prosecution case.

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43. In addition to the forensic and medical evidence, the conduct of the victim following the alleged incident further casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations. PW-2 admitted during her cross-examination that she delayed lodging the FIR for nearly six months, providing fear of the accused as the reason for the delay.

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While delay in reporting may be explainable in cases of intimidation, the substantial passage of time without complaint, coupled with continued interactions with the accused, undermines the credibility of the narrative of sustained fear and coercion. Specifically, she acknowledged that she continued to visit the accused’s premises to fetch water from the borewell even after the alleged incident, which suggests a level of comfort and freedom inconsistent with her claim of terror and immediate threat. Further, despite claiming to have been forcibly restrained in a public area, she did not raise any alarm, call for help, or seek assistance from other villagers, even though she admitted that the borewell and surrounding premises were frequently visited by other members of the community. This conduct, in conjunction with the absence of corroborative medical evidence, is highly material and casts serious doubt on the reliability of her account.

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44. Taken together, the totality of the medical, forensic, and behavioral evidence indicates that the victim’s testimony, while detailed and specific, suffers from significant inconsistencies and lacks independent corroboration. The trial Court was, therefore, justified in observing that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients of forcible sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of injury, the neutral forensic report, and the victim’s post-incident conduct collectively weaken the prosecution’s version and lend substantial plausibility to the acquittal recorded by the trial Court.

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45. The testimony of other witnesses examined by the prosecution fails to provide independent corroboration of the alleged sexual assault, and largely relies on what the victim had narrated to them after the alleged incident. PW-1, the mother of the victim, corroborated that the victim had been threatened by the accused and that she had communicated her ordeal to him. However, his evidence was entirely based on what he was told by the victim months after the incident, and he did not witness any physical assault, struggle, or coercion himself. Similarly, PW-3, the grandmother of the victim, deposed that the victim had narrated the incident to her, yet she could not identify any direct act of assault or threat. Other family members or witnesses, including PW-4 (father of the victim) and PW-5, largely provided statements based on hearsay, without firsthand knowledge of the incident, and could not offer any independent or contemporaneous confirmation of the alleged conduct of the accused.

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46. Material discrepancies were also noted when the FIR, the initial written complaint, and the statement recorded during investigation were compared. The sequence of events narrated by the victim varied across these documents, particularly regarding the precise location to which she was taken, the manner in which her clothes were removed, and the form and content of the threats allegedly made by the accused. Such inconsistencies, while not always fatal, erode the reliability and precision of the prosecution narrative. Further, during cross-

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examination, the victim admitted that she washed and reused the same clothes for several months after the alleged incident, which contradicts the standard expectation that garments worn during a sexual assault would be preserved for forensic examination to detect seminal stains or other biological evidence. In addition, while she alleged that the accused recorded a video and circulated it, she admitted that she did not personally see the video being made, thereby weakening reliance on electronic evidence purportedly supporting the prosecution case.

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47. The documentary evidence adduced during trial also does not materially strengthen the prosecution’s case. The spot map (Ex.P-2) and Patwari map (Ex.P-3) show the layout of the village and the surrounding areas near the borewell, indicating that the location where the incident allegedly occurred was not completely isolated, with other villagers routinely accessing the borewell, casting doubt on the claim of absolute seclusion. Other exhibits, including the medical examination consent form (Ex.P-5), seizure memos (Ex.P-6), and related documents, confirm procedural compliance but do not substantively corroborate the occurrence of forcible sexual intercourse. No physical or forensic evidence was recovered directly from the scene that could unequivocally link the accused to the alleged sexual assault, leaving the prosecution case heavily dependent on inconsistent and largely hearsay testimony.

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48. Taken together, the witness testimony and documentary evidence fail to establish the essential elements of sexual assault or coercion beyond reasonable doubt. While minor discrepancies or omissions in the victim’s statements could be explained, the cumulative absence of independent eyewitnesses, corroborative medical evidence, forensic proof, and reliable electronic evidence renders the prosecution version doubtful and justifies the trial Court’s decision to acquit the accused of the offences under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act.

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49. Applying the principles of law, including C. Antony (supra), Ramanand Yadav (supra), Tota Singh (supra), and Jafarudheen (supra), interference in acquittal appeals is warranted only in exceptional circumstances where the trial Court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly untenable. An appellate Court must not reverse an acquittal simply because it might have arrived at a different view; it can interfere only when the trial Court ignored cogent evidence or misappreciated the facts.

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50. In the present case, the learned trial Court undertook a meticulous and comprehensive scrutiny of all evidence, including oral testimony, documentary exhibits, and forensic reports. The trial Court carefully examined the statements of the victim (PW-2) and other prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5), noting

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areas of consistency, contradictions, and potential embellishments

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51. The trial Court carefully considered the minor discrepancies and omissions in the testimony of the victim, such as variations in the sequence of events, the handling and reuse of clothing, and the description of threats. While such minor inconsistencies do not automatically discredit a witness, the Court rightly observed that they must be considered alongside other factors, particularly in cases alleging sexual assault, where corroboration is essential.

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52. Equally important, the Court evaluated the absence of medical corroboration and forensic evidence. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9) found no external or internal injuries, no signs of trauma, and an intact hymen, while the petticoat examined only showed whitish stains that could naturally occur in a married woman. No semen or other biological evidence suggestive of sexual assault was detected. The Court noted that the victim continued visiting the accused’s premises after the alleged incident, delayed lodging the FIR for nearly six months, and did not raise an alarm despite the presence of other villagers using the same borewell. These factors collectively cast serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case.

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53. The trial Court also weighed documentary evidence, including the spot map (Ex.P-2), Patwari map (Ex.P-3), seizure memos (Ex.P6), and consent forms (Ex.P-5), in light of the village layout and

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routine activity in the area. It concluded that the alleged site of the incident was not entirely secluded, undermining the claim that no independent witness could have observed the occurrence. Furthermore, the purported electronic evidence, including references to a video allegedly recorded by the accused, was unsupported by seizure of the original device or Section 65-B certification, and thus lacked probative value.

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54. Taking all these factors together, the trial Court balanced the minor discrepancies in the statements, the absence of corroborative medical and forensic evidence, the delay in reporting, and the inconsistent conduct of the victim, and concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the offences under Section 376 IPC or Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied settled legal principles, including the presumption of innocence, the need for corroboration in sexual assault cases, and the high threshold of proof required for conviction.

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55. On a comprehensive review, it is manifestly clear that the trial Court’s conclusion is plausible, reasoned, and supported by evidence. There is no evidence of perversity, misappreciation of facts, or illegality in the trial Court’s approach. The trial Court meticulously evaluated witness credibility, analyzed contradictions and omissions in testimony, assessed

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documentary and forensic evidence, and applied the correct legal standards in reaching its conclusion.

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56. For all these reasons, the acquittal of the accused under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act is affirmed. The Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 filed by the complainant/victim is hereby dismissed.

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57. Now, we shall proceed to deal with appeal filed by the appellant being Criminal Appeal No.1208/2014.

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58. Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 has been filed by the accused/appellant, challenging both the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Court under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC. The appellant contends that the conviction is unsustainable and, in the alternative, seeks reduction of sentence on grounds of being a first-time offender, absence of prior criminal history, and the disproportionate nature of the sentence imposed.

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59. A detailed and careful re-appreciation of the evidence adduced at trial clearly demonstrates that the prosecution has successfully established the essential elements of the offences under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC, namely:

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(a) Use of criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of the victim (Section 354 IPC):

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The victim (PW-2) deposed that on 14.06.2014, she was taken by the accused on a motorcycle from the railway station towards her village. During the course of this journey, she stated that the accused forcibly restrained her movement, attempted to drag her to a secluded field, and physically handled her clothes and body in a manner which caused her fear and distress.

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Though minor discrepancies exist regarding the sequence of events or the exact manner in which the clothes were removed, the core allegation that the accused applied criminal force intending to outrage her modesty remains consistent throughout her statements, including her examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

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The testimony of PW-1 (mother of the victim) and PW-3 (grandmother) corroborates that the victim conveyed to them the intimidating conduct of the accused, including threats and forcible restraint, thereby lending indirect support to the essential elements of Section 354 IPC.

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Documentary evidence, such as Ex.P/2 (spot map) and Ex.P/3 (Patwari map), illustrates that the accused deliberately led the victim to a relatively secluded location, reinforcing the deliberate nature of his actions and the intent to outrage the modesty of the victim.

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The fact that the victim continued to face coercion, fear, and threat during this encounter satisfies the statutory requirement of intent under Section 354 IPC, as it demonstrates that the accused’s actions were not accidental or incidental but carried a clear mens rea to outrage modesty.

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(b) Criminal intimidation by threatening the victim with dire consequences (Section 506 Part-II IPC):

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The victim (PW-2) deposed in her examination-in-chief that the accused repeatedly threatened her with severe and dire consequences if she revealed the incident to anyone, including her parents, neighbors, or other villagers. She stated that these threats were specific, credible, and instilled a genuine fear of harm, both to herself and potentially to her family. The victim further explained that this fear was so overwhelming that it directly influenced her decision to delay lodging the FIR for nearly six months, which underscores the effectiveness and coercive nature of the threats. Her testimony also highlighted that the threats were accompanied by gestures and conduct which made her feel powerless and constrained, demonstrating the intentional use of intimidation to enforce silence.

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PW-1 (mother of the victim) corroborated that the victim had narrated the threats to him in detail, including the nature

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and intensity of the consequences the accused had warned her about. PW-3 (grandmother of the victim) similarly confirmed that the victim had described being threatened, emphasizing the psychological impact and fear generated by the accused’s conduct. While neither PW-1 nor PW-3 witnessed the actual acts of restraint or force, their testimonies provide independent corroboration of the communicated threats and demonstrate the real effect on the victim, satisfying a key requirement under Section 506 Part-II IPC.

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• The spot map (Ex.P/2) and Patwari map (Ex.P/3) provide additional corroboration regarding the location where the accused allegedly carried out the acts. The maps indicate that the area was relatively secluded and partially enclosed, supporting the victim’s account that she was isolated during the incident, which amplifies the credibility and deliberate nature of the threats. The maps, when considered with the testimonies, illustrate that the accused’s actions were calculated to instill fear and ensure compliance, as the victim had little opportunity to seek immediate help from nearby villagers.

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Taken together, the evidence demonstrates that the accused’s threats were real, deliberate, and aimed at coercing the victim into silence. The cumulative effect of the

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threats, the physical restraint, and the isolated location establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim reasonably feared that disclosing the incident could result in serious harm to herself or her family. This satisfies the statutory requirement for criminal intimidation under Section 506 Part-II IPC, as the accused intentionally created a credible apprehension of injury, thereby fulfilling the mens rea and actus reus of the offence.

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60. Considering the detailed testimony of the victim (PW-2), coupled with the corroborative accounts of PW-1 (mother of the victim) and PW-3 (grandmother of the victim), it is evident that the prosecution has successfully established both the use of criminal force to outrage the modesty of the victim and criminal intimidation by threats of dire consequences, thereby fulfilling the essential elements of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC. The victim’s account provides a vivid narration of the accused forcibly restraining her, attempting to drag her to a secluded location, and issuing repeated threats designed to instill fear and compel silence. PW-1 and PW-3 independently corroborate that the victim communicated these threats to them, demonstrating the real and lasting impact of the accused’s coercive conduct, even though they did not personally witness the physical acts.

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61. The spot map (Ex.P/2) and Patwari map (Ex.P/3) reinforce the victim’s testimony, indicating that the location of the incident was

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sufficiently secluded to allow the accused to carry out his threats and apply criminal force without interference from bystanders. The procedural documentation, including the FIR, written complaint, seizure memos, and medical examination records, collectively confirm the formal steps taken by the authorities and substantiate the context in which the offences occurred.

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62. While minor discrepancies exist in peripheral details such as the exact sequence of movements, handling of clothing, and precise timing, these do not detract from the reliability of the core allegations. The deliberate actions of the accused, the isolation of the victim, and the clear communication of threats all point to intentional and unlawful conduct aimed at outraging the victim’s modesty and coercing her through intimidation. Taken cumulatively, the evidence satisfies the statutory requirements for both offences and demonstrates that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is criminally liable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC.

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63. The victim, PW-2, deposed that on 14.06.2014, she was taken by the accused on his motorcycle from the railway station towards her village. She stated that the accused forcibly restrained her movement, attempted to drag her to a secluded field near the village, and repeatedly threatened her with severe consequences should she disclose the incident to anyone, including her family members or neighbors. While there were minor variations in her

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statements regarding the exact sequence of events and the handling of her clothing, the central allegation of criminal force and intimidation remained consistent throughout the FIR (Ex.P/1), written complaints, and statements recorded during investigation. The testimony of PW-2 demonstrates that she experienced fear and coercion, which directly influenced her decision to delay lodging a formal complaint for several months, highlighting the efficacy and impact of the threats made by the accused.

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64. PW-2’s account finds some corroboration in the procedural and documentary records. The FIR lodged at the relevant police station provided a contemporaneous account of the incident, establishing the temporal and factual context. The spot map (Ex.P/2) illustrates the location of the alleged incident, showing that while the area was somewhat secluded, it was not completely inaccessible, thereby demonstrating that the accused’s act of taking the victim to this location was deliberate and not incidental. The Patwari map (Ex.P/3) further confirms the layout of the village, aiding in visualizing the movements alleged by the victim. The consent form for medical examination (Ex.P/5) and the seizure memo pertaining to the victim’s clothing (Ex.P/6) indicate procedural compliance in preserving evidence, although forensic corroboration was limited, as the victim had washed and reused the clothes in the months following the incident. Additionally, PW-2 admitted that she could not personally observe

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any alleged video recordings referenced in her statements, casting doubt on electronic evidence mentioned.

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65. PW-1, the mother of the victim, testified that the victim narrated the threats and coercive conduct of the accused to him. Although he did not witness any physical assault personally, his testimony provides indirect corroboration of criminal intimidation, as it demonstrates that the accused’s threats were communicated and caused the victim genuine fear. PW-3, the grandmother of the victim, similarly confirmed that the victim narrated the incident to her. While she could not personally identify any act of sexual assault, her testimony reinforces the element of intimidation and forced restraint, consistent with the victim’s account. PW-4 father of the victim and PW-5, other family member, largely provided hearsay evidence about the incident and could not independently verify any physical assault; nevertheless, their statements contribute to the overall narrative of coercion and intimidation, supporting the prosecution’s claim that the accused intentionally used force and threats to control the victim.

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66. The medical examination conducted by Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9) on 15.06.2014 revealed that there were no external or internal injuries on the victim’s body, no signs of bleeding or trauma indicative of forcible sexual intercourse, and the hymen was intact with a uterus of normal size. No semen or other biological material suggestive of sexual assault was detected. The petticoat

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examined showed only whitish stains, which the doctor clarified could naturally occur. While the absence of medical corroboration contradicts allegations of penetrative sexual assault, it does not detract from the offences under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC, which relate to the application of criminal force, intent to outrage modesty, and intimidation, all of which are sufficiently established by oral testimony and documentary evidence.

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67. The Court has also considered the documentary evidence in its entirety. The spot map (Ex.P/2) and the Patwari map (Ex.P/3) corroborate the victim’s account regarding the movement to a somewhat secluded field, highlighting the deliberate nature of the accused’s actions to isolate and threaten the victim. The consent form for medical examination (Ex.P/5) and seizure memo (Ex.P/6) establish procedural compliance but do not independently substantiate forcible sexual assault. Other seizure documents (Ex.P/4, Ex.P/11, Ex.P/12, Ex.P/13) reflect the chainof-custody of the victim’s clothing and other samples, although forensic testing did not yield evidence supporting sexual assault. These documents, however, confirm that the victim was in the custody of the accused and subjected to coercion, and they support the victim’s narrative of being forcibly restrained and threatened.

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68. A comprehensive review of all evidence demonstrates that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the

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accused applied criminal force intending to outrage the modesty of the victim and threatened her with dire consequences, thereby satisfying the essential elements of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC. The core acts of restraint, intimidation, and threats are consistently supported by the testimony of the victim, corroborative accounts of PW-1 and PW-3, and documentary evidence showing the location and circumstances of the incident. Minor discrepancies, such as variations in the sequence of events, handling of clothing, or the victim’s inability to observe certain electronic evidence, do not dilute the established facts. On the contrary, the cumulative evidence demonstrates that the accused acted deliberately, used coercion effectively, and caused the victim to reasonably fear serious consequences, fulfilling the statutory requirements for criminal force and criminal intimidation.

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69. Therefore, the conviction under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC is fully justified, as the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused forcibly restrained the victim, attempted to isolate her, and threatened her with serious consequences. The oral testimony, corroborative witness accounts, procedural documentation, and location evidence collectively form a reliable and coherent narrative, sufficient to sustain the conviction even in the absence of medical corroboration of sexual assault.

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70. In the present case, minor discrepancies were noted in the evidence, including variations in the sequence of events as

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narrated in the FIR, written complaint, and statement recorded during investigation. There were also differences regarding the handling and washing of the victim’s clothing, which limited the scope for forensic verification, as well as slight variations in the description of the exact location and route taken by the accused and victim. These differences, however, are peripheral and do not affect the core elements of the offences, namely the use of criminal force with intent to outrage modesty and the act of threatening the victim with dire consequences. The Court concurs with the trial Court’s finding that the prosecution has successfully established the essential ingredients of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC beyond reasonable doubt, and that the accused’s actions were deliberate, coercive, and intended to intimidate the victim.

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71. Turning to the question of sentence, the trial Court had imposed rigorous imprisonment of three years for the offence under Section 354 IPC with a fine of ₹1,000/-, and rigorous imprisonment of two years for the offence under Section 506 Part-II IPC, also with a fine of ₹1,000/-. In default of payment, the trial Court directed that the accused undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months on each count. Upon careful examination, this Court finds the sentence to be disproportionate to the circumstances of the case. While the offences are undoubtedly serious and demand deterrence, several mitigating factors must guide the assessment of the appropriate sentence.

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Notably, the accused is a first-time offender with no prior criminal antecedents. Further, there was no physical injury caused to the victim, and the accused’s age, social background, and general circumstances warrant consideration in accordance with the principles of proportionality and reformative justice. Excessively harsh sentences in such circumstances would not serve the rehabilitative objectives of criminal law effectively, nor would they promote societal interests in a measured and balanced manner.

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72. Taking all these factors into account, including the nature of the offence, the evidence of restraint, threats, and criminal force, as well as the mitigating circumstances of first-time offender status, this Court finds it just and equitable to modify the sentence while upholding the conviction. Accordingly, the sentence for the offence under Section 354 IPC is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year instead of rigorous imprisonment for three years, with a fine of ₹20,000/-. In default of payment of the fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Similarly, for the offence under Section 506 Part-II IPC, the sentence is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year instead of rigorous imprisonment for two years, with a fine of ₹10,000/-, and in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months. Both sentences shall run concurrently, ensuring that the punishment is proportionate to the gravity of the offences while also reflecting the principles of deterrence, reformative justice, and proportionality.

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73. It is stated at Bar that the appellant – Shobhit @ Choti in CRA No.1208/2014 is on bail, he is directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remaining part of the sentence.

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74. In conclusion, the conviction of the accused under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC is maintained, as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused applied criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of the victim and threatened her with dire consequences, satisfying all statutory elements of the offences. At the same time, the modification of sentence ensures that justice is served in a measured and balanced manner, upholding both the seriousness of the offences and the principles of proportionality, deterrence, and reformative justice. The Court is thus satisfied that the modified sentence adequately addresses the objectives of criminal punishment without imposing an excessive or unduly harsh penalty on a first-time offender.

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75. In the result:

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(i) Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 filed by the complainant/victim is dismissed , and the acquittal of the accused under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act is confirmed;

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(ii) Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 filed by the accused/appellant is allowed in part , with the conviction under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC maintained, the sentence modified to one year rigorous imprisonment for

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each offence with a fine of ₹20,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC and ₹10,000/for the offence punishable under Section 506 Part-II of the IPC, in default six months’ rigorous imprisonment for each offence, both sentences to run concurrently, and the appellant is directed to surrender for undergoing the remaining part of the sentence.

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76. The fine amount deposited shall be paid to the victim as compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, under the head of victim compensation.

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77. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge

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Yogesh

Shobhit @ Choti v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Shobhit @ Choti v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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