Manoranjan Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:5668-DB

ASHOK SAHU

NAFR

Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2026.02.02 17:20:03 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1003 of 2015

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{Arising out of judgment dated 30.06.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No.93/2014 by the learned Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja}

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Manoranjan, S/o. Dewaru Uraon, Aged About 23 Years, R/o. Village - Keraju, Thana - Seetapur, Civil & Revenue District – Surguja- Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The District Magistrate, Ambikapur, District – Surguja, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent

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: For Appellant Mr. Vidya Bhushan Soni, Advocate : For Respondent Mr. Siddhant Tiwari, Panel Lawyer

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(Division Bench)

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma

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Judgment on Board (0 2.02.2026)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

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1 . This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2015 passed by learned Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, in Sessions Trial No.93/2014, by which the sole appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 450 & 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced as

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under :

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CONVICTION		SENTENCE
U/s. 450 of I.P.C.	:	Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs.2,500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, 6 months’ additional rigorous imprisonment
U/s. 302 of I.P.C.	:	Life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,500/- in default of payment of fine amount, 6 months’ additional rigorous imprisonment..
Both the sent	ence	to run concurrently.

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2 . Case of the prosecution, in short, is that in the intervening night of 5/6.7.2014, the appellant herein tress-passed into the house of his maternal grand-mother Bandhni (now deceased)

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and assaulted her by iron axe & iron rod, by which she suffered grievous injuries and died; thereby the offence has been committed. The matter was reported to the police, pursuant to which, Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P-5, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-14, Inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-3 and dead body of deceased Bandhni was subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. M.Nikunj (PW-15), who proved the post-mortem report vide Ex.P-16, according to which, cause of death was stated to be asphyxia caused by strangulation due to respiratory failure and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P-8, on iron axe and one iron rod were seized vide Ex.P-9 & Ex.P-10, which were sent for chemical examination along-with other seized articles to FSL and as per the FSL report (Ex.P-25), blood was not found on the seized weapons. After due investigation, the appellant was chargesheeted for the aforesaid offence to the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

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3 . In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents and the appellant/accused in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document.

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4 . The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the aforesaid offences and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which the present appeal has been preferred.

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5 . Mr. Vidya Bhushan Soni, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the move of offence is not established; the memorandum witnesses Riman Ram (PW-8) and Sant Ram (PW-9) have turned hostile and even on the weapon of offence, no blood was found and only on the basis of statement of the Investigating Officer- R.C.Nishad (PW-16), the appellant has been convicted, which is unsustainable and bad in law. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for acquittal and the appeal deserves to be allowed.

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6 . Mr. Siddhant Tiwari, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant

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herein for the aforesaid offences and, as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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7 . We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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8 . The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Bandhni was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the post-mortem report (Ex.P-16), proved by Dr. M. Nikunj (PW15), according to which, cause of death was stated to be asphyxia caused by strangulation due to respiratory failure and death was homicidal in nature, which in our considered opinion is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.

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9 . The case of the prosecution is not based on direct evidence, it is based on circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles which constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1 , which

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1 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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must be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence in paragraph 153 as under: -

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“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

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It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra² where the following observations were made:

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Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

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(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

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(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,

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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

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2 (1973) 2 SCC 793

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(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

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10. The trial Court has found established the following three incriminating circumstances in paragraph 14 of its judgment, which states as under :

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मृ�ति�का� बं�धनी� पत्नी� lksulk; तिनी:सं � �नी थी�। अपनी� पति� का� मृ�त्यु� पቐኋ�� अपनी� घर मृ� अका�ली� तिनीवा�सं कार�� थी� ?

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मृ�ति�का� बं�धनी� का� प�्ቔ (नी�ति�) अभि�यु�क्� मृनी!र�जनी का� मृ�ति�का� बं�धनी� का� स्वा�मिमृत्वा का% �&मिमृ का�तिवा्ቅयुसं�बं�ध�तिवावा�द हो!नी� ?

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अभि�यु�क्�का� eseksjs.Me काथीनी का� आध�र पर सं�पभि+यु, का! जप्� तिकायु� ज�नी� और उसंमृ� रक्� धब्बं� प�यु� ज�नी�?

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11. In order to consider the correctness of the findings so recorded by the trial Court, we will consider the aforesaid incriminating circumstances one by one.

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(i) The first incriminating circumstance that has been found established by the trial Court is that the deceased was issueless and used to stay alone after death of her husband, which is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record.

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(ii) The second incriminating circumstance is that there was land dispute between the appellant & deceased for which the trial Court has relied upon the statement of Jagdev (PW-1), Gangaram (PW-2) and Bhaktoram (PW-6). Jagdev (PW-1) has clearly stated that there was no dispute between Manoranjan (appellant herein) and deceased Bandhni, which is apparent from his statement. However, Gangaram (PW-2) & Bhaktoram (PW-6) both have not stated anything about the dispute. As such, the motive of offence is not established and the finding of the trial Court in this regard is incorrect.

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(iii) The third & last incriminating circumstances that has been found proved by the trial Court is that pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant, weapons of offence have been seized. However, the memorandum/seizure witnesses Riman Ram (PW-8) & Sant Ram (PW-9) both have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution. However, the trial Court has relied upon the statement of Investigating Officer- R.C. Nishad (PW-16) holding that he has no enmity with the appellant, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve his statement and proceeded to record conviction.

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12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Renuka Prasad v. State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police3 held that

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on the basis of statement of the I.O., conviction cannot be recorded and observed in paragraphs 26 & 46 as under:-

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“26. The statements made by the IOs regarding the motive, conspiracy and preparation comes out as the prosecution story, as discernible from the Section 161 statements of various witnesses who were questioned by the police during investigation; which statements are wholly inadmissible under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. Merely because the IOs spoke of such statements having been made by the witnesses during investigation, does not give them any credibility, enabling acceptance, unless the witnesses themselves spoke of such motive or acts of commission or omission or instances from which conspiracy could be inferred as also the preparation, established beyond reasonable doubt. We are unable to find either the motive, the conspiracy or the preparation or even the crime itself to have been established in Court, at the trial through the witnesses examined before Court. The witnesses had turned hostile, for reasons best known to themselves. The only inference possible, on the witnesses turning hostile is that either they have been persuaded for reasons unknown or coerced into resiling from the statements made under Section 161 or that they had not made such statements

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3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1074

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before police officers. Merely because the story came out of the mouth of the IO, it cannot be believed and a legal sanctity given to it, higher than that provided to Section 161 statements under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.

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We cannot but observe that the judgment of the High Court reversing the order of acquittal of the Trial Court proceeds on mere surmises and conjectures relying wholly on the testimony of the Investigating Officers, who merely regurgitated the statements recorded under Section 161 and the voluntary statements of the accused. As has been rightly pointed out in Ramesh v. State of Haryana⁴ when the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is resiled from, there arises a possibility that the police coerced such statements, but considering the huge prevalence of such instances, as in the present case, of the entire witnesses turning hostile, there could be various other factors also. It could be for fear of deposing against the accused, political pressure, pressure from family or society and even instances of monetary consideration. We do not think that the High Court could have relied on the decision to hold that the reason for the enblock hostility of witnesses at trial, could only be due to the influence wielded by the accused who had even persuaded the wife of the deceased to turn hostile; which reasoning is presumptuous and fallacious.”

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4 (2017) 1 SCC 529

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13. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid matter, the statement of I.O. cannot be relied upon as the witnesses to the memorandum/seizure Riman Ram (PW-8) & Sant Ram (PW-9) have turned hostile and the trial Court has erred in relying upon the statement of I.O. R.C.Nishad (PW-16) to hold that the bloodstained weapon has been recovered from the appellant and he had caused the murder of Bandhni.

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14. Finally, it is held that only on the basis that the deceased was issue-less and residing separately, motive of offence has not been proved, recovery of weapon of offence has also not been proved as memorandum/seizure witnesses have turned hostile and mainly on the basis of statement of Investigating Officer, in absence of any other evidence, the appellant cannot have been convicted for the aforesaid offence.

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15. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.06.2015 is set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The appellant stands acquitted giving him benefit of doubt from the charges framed against him for the offence punishable under Sections 450 & 302 of I.P.C. The appellant is already on bail, he need not surrender; however, his bail bond shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.

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16. Let a certified copy of this judgment along-with the original record be transmitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith for

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necessary information & action, if any.

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Sd/Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Judge

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Ashok

Manoranjan v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Manoranjan v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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