State of C.G. Vs Sohan Das and anothers

This acquittal appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.) has been preferred by the appellant/State questioning the legality and propriety of the judgment of acquittal dated 11.07.1998 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Korba in Sessions Case No.2 of 1996,

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whereby the learned trial Court while convicting the accused / respondents for offence under Section 498A of the IPC acquitted them of the charges under Sections 306 and 304B of the IPC.

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The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10.08.1995 at about 8:15 A.M., complainant Mohar Das, residents of village Dhanadabri, along with the village Kotwar, lodged a report stating that on 09.08.1995 at about 10:00 P.M., a sudden fire broke out in the house. Due to the fire, his daughter-in-law Laxmaniya Bai, wife of Sohan Das Panika, aged about 20 years, and his granddaughter Pulbatiya Bai, aged about 1 year, who were inside the pakka house, were burnt and died. At that time, his son Sohan Das had gone to the locality to sing Ramayana. When he returned and came to know about the incident, the report was lodged.

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On receiving the information, merg Nos. 76 and 77/95 were registered and merg inquiry was conducted. During the merg inquiry on 10.08.1995, witnesses were summoned and the inquest (panchnama) over the dead body of deceased Laxmaniya Bai was prepared (Ex.P-2). Similarly, the inquest over the dead body of Pulbatiya Bai was prepared (Ex. P-3). Both bodies were sent for post-mortem examination and statements of witnesses were recorded during the merg inquiry. Thereafter, on 16.11.1995, the Station House Officer, Inspector J.S. Bhadoria, registered the First Information Report (Ex. P-10) at Police Station Korba stating that on 09.08.1995 in village Dhanadabri, Laxmaniya Bai, aged about 22 years, at about 10:00 P.M. inside her house, poured kerosene

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oil upon herself and set herself on fire, as a result of which she died due to burn injuries. Her minor daughter also died due to burns. On receiving information on 10.8.95, Merg No.76 and 77/95 was registered in Korba Police Station and investigation was conducted. In the investigation, it was found that deceased Laxmaniya Bai was married to accused Sohan Das four years ago. Four-five months after the marriage, her mother-in-law Panchkunwar Bai and her husband accused Sohan Das used to torture her in various ways, they used to stop her from going out and drinking. They did not even allow her to visit to her parents house. Even before the incident, she had expressed her desire to go to her parents house on the occasion of Rakhi festival, but her husband and mother-in-law did not let her to and harassed her. Thus, both of them instigated her to commit suicide. As a result, Lashmaniya Bai committed suicide by pouring kerosene on herself and her daughter also got burnt. The above act of accused Sohas Das and Panchkunwar Bai was found to be an offence punishable under Section 306/34 of the IPC. In this way, on finding the offence under Section 306/34 of the IPC against the accused / respondents, offence of Ex.P-10 was registered and during investigation of the case, statements of the witnesses were recorded, postmortem report was obtained and after arrest of the accused/respondents, charge-sheet was filed by the prosecution before the competent Court for offence under Section 306/34 of the IPC, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions,

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Korba, from where the Additional Sessions Judge, Korba received the case on transfer for trial.

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In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses. The respondents/accused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which they denied the incriminating circumstances and claimed false implication.

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After hearing both parties and considering the evidence available on record, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Korba while convicting the accused / respondents for offence under Section 498A of the IPC acquitted them of the charges under Sections 306 and 304B of the IPC.

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Learned Government Advocate for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. The learned trial Court also ignored the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which clearly showed that the marriage had been performed within seven years of the incident and that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and demands for dowry. He further submits that the learned trial Court gave undue weight to minor omissions and contradictions, which were not material and were contrary to the medical evidence on record. He also contends that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate that there was a chain of circumstances which proved the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court ignored the evidence of

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Dharamdas (PW-7). Therefore, it is argued that the appeal against acquittal deserves to be allowed and that the respondents ought to be convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 304B of the IPC.

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Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the entire evidence available on record and has passed a wellreasoned judgment of acquittal. It is contended that there is no perversity, illegality, or misappreciation of evidence in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses is inconsistent, exaggerated, and suffers from material omissions and contradictions, which go to the root of the case. The learned trial Court has correctly assessed these discrepancies. It is also submitted that the alleged demand for dowry has not been established by cogent and reliable evidence. The prosecution witnesses are interested witnesses, and their testimony is not corroborated by any independent evidence. The medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution story of abetment or dowry death. Learned counsel further contends that there is no direct or reliable circumstantial evidence to prove that the respondents abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased.

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The essential ingredients of Sections 306 and 304B of the IPC have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to establish a proximate and live link between the alleged cruelty and the death of the deceased. It is argued that the learned trial Court has rightly given the benefit of doubt to the respondents. In an appeal against acquittal, unless the findings of the trial Court are shown to be manifestly illegal or perverse, interference is not warranted. Therefore, the present appeal filed by the State deserves to be dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be affirmed.

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We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the impugned judgment of acquittal and record of the trial Court.

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This is appeal against the judgment of acquittal filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. in exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 378(1) or under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box and also required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.

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As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair¹ , unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha² , the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference.

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The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab³ , the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:-

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“……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the

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1 AIR 2003 SC 182

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2 AIR 2004 SC 1053

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3 AIR 1987 SC 1083

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conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.”

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Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram⁴ has held as follows:-

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" 8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all. "

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In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala⁵ , the Supreme Court held as under:

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"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate

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5 (2022) 8 SCC 440

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4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984

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Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."

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While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of acquittal, the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully empowered to appreciate and reappreciate the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons.

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The prosecution contends that the trial Court failed to properly consider the evidence showing cruelty, harassment, and dowry demands, and that a chain of circumstances proves the guilt of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offences and

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that the trial Court correctly gave the benefit of doubt to the accused.

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Upon careful scrutiny of the record, the Court observes that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses suffers from material contradictions and omissions. The witnesses are mostly interested, and there is insufficient independent corroboration of the alleged acts of cruelty and dowry harassment. The statements regarding instigation to commit suicide are inconsistent, and the medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution’s theory of abetment or dowry-related death.

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While the State relies on the chain of circumstances, the Court notes that circumstantial evidence must be complete, coherent, and lead to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are neither wholly consistent nor fully established to connect the respondents directly with the act of suicide. The trial Court, therefore, after evaluating the totality of the evidence, held that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden beyond reasonable doubt, and rightly acquitted the respondents under Sections 306 and 304B IPC.

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It is well settled that appellate Courts must exercise extreme caution while entertaining appeals against acquittal. As held in C. Antony (supra), Ramanand Yadav (supra) , Tota Singh (supra) , Kistoora Ram (supra) and Jafarudheen (supra), interference in

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acquittal cases is justified only if the judgment of the trial Court is manifestly illegal, perverse, or based on a view that no reasonable Court could have taken. Mere differences in opinion on appreciation of evidence are not sufficient to overturn an acquittal.

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Applying these principles to the present case, this Court finds that the trial Court’s findings are neither perverse nor unreasonable. Two plausible views were open on the evidence, and the trial Court has chosen a view that is entirely reasonable. The trial Court has considered the evidence on record in detail, addressed the inconsistencies and omissions in the testimony, and given appropriate weight to the benefit of doubt in favour of the respondents.

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In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason to interfere with the trial Court’s judgment of acquittal of the accused/respondents for offences under Sections 306 and 304B of the IPC. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant/State under Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. is dismissed .

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The Registry is directed to transmit the certified copy of this judgment along with the record to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha ) Judge Chief Justice

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Bablu

State of C.G. v. Sohan Das and anothers

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State of C.G. v. Sohan Das and anothers

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