Dismissed¶¶63

Nilesh Chauhan v. Bharat Kumar Hotwani

Chhattisgarh HC8 Apr 2026ACQA/38/2017

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against acquittal; cheating; Section 420 IPC; dishonest intention at inception; agreement to sell land; nominee clause in sale agreement; subsequent sale to third party Hiraben Patel; breach of contract versus criminal cheating; double presumption of innocence; scope of interference in acquittal appeal; concurrent findings; Jafarudheen (2022) 8 SCC 440; Mallappa (Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011); Ramesh 2024 Supreme (Online) SC 9816; Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajendra Prasad (1977) 2 SCC 2025; N. Raghavender (2021) 18 SCC 70 distinguished; High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur; ACQA dismissed.

What did the court decide?

From the evidence on record, the execution of the alleged agreement and payment of the consideration amount are not in dispute; the decisive question was dishonest intention at inception. ¶¶37

Nilesh Chauhan Vs Bharat Kumar Hotwani — Cheating and Forgery | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶¶63

Issue for consideration

Whether, at the time of entering into the agreement, the respondent had any dishonest or fraudulent intention to deceive the complainant, so as to attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. +1 more

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Court's answer

From the evidence on record, the execution of the alleged agreement and payment of the consideration amount are not in dispute; the decisive question was dishonest intention at inception.

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Ratio / Principle

The alleged agreement contained a specific clause entitling the purchaser to get the sale deed executed in his own name or in the name of any person nominated by him, and the complainant admitted executing it after reading and understanding its contents.

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Key takeaways

The complainant admitted in cross-examination that he read and understood the agreement before signing and that he raised no objection to the public notice issued prior to execution of the sale deed in favour of Hiraben Patel; this conduct weakens the allegation of deception.ratio¶¶34
Both the trial Court and the Appellate Court rightly held that the essential ingredients of cheating are absent and the dispute is predominantly civil in nature.ratio¶¶60
There is no evidence on record of any dishonest intention on the part of the respondent at the beginning of the transaction; the mere subsequent sale of the land to a third party (Hiraben Patel) does not, without initial dishonest intention, attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Acquittal appeal (ACQA No. 38 of 2017) by complainant Nilesh Chauhan against the concurrent acquittals of respondent Bharat Kumar Hotwani of the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC - trial court judgment dated 23.07.2015 in Criminal Case No.430/2011 (Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur) affirmed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur by judgment dated 22.09.2016 in Criminal Appeal No.182/2015 - arising out of an agreement dated 28.06.2010 to sell 5,250 sq ft of land for Rs.14,96,250/-. Execution of the agreement and payment of consideration being undisputed, the question was whether the respondent harboured dishonest intention at inception. Held: the agreement entitled the purchaser to have the sale deed executed in his own name or that of a nominee; the complainant admitted signing after reading and understanding it and raised no objection to the public notice preceding the sale to Hiraben Patel; no dishonest intention at the beginning of the transaction was established, and the subsequent third-party sale, without more, attracts neither Section 420 IPC nor anything beyond breach of contract, for which a civil remedy lies. Following Jafarudheen, Mallappa and Ramesh on the reinforced presumption favouring an acquitted accused, the concurrent findings were held to be reasonable and possible views, free of patent illegality or perversity; the acquittal appeal was dismissed. The N. Raghavender ruling pressed by respondent No.1 was held distinguishable on facts.

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2026:CGHC:16470

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Digitally
signed by
AKHILESH
AKHILESH BEOHAR
BEOHAR Date:
2026.04.10
11:17:32
+0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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ACQA No. 38 of 2017

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NAFR

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Nilesh Chauhan S/o Dr. Narendra P Chauhan Aged About 38 Years R/o K K Road, Mudhapara, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh

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...Appellant

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versus

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Bharat Kumar Hotwani S/o Shri Amar Lalhotwani Aged About 38 Years R/o Plot No. 26- 27, Hanuman Society, Byron Bazar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh.

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State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Maudhapara Raipur, C.G.

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... Respondents

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For Appellant	: Mr. B.P. Sharma, learned Advocate along with Ms. Kaushaki Kumari and Ms. Nidhi Tiwari, Advocates.
For Respondent No.1	: Ms. Swati Agrawal, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate.
For Respondent No.2/State	: Mr. Ram Narayan Sahu, Deputy Government Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal

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Judgment on Board

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09.04.2026

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This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/complainant against the judgment dated 22.09.2016 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Criminal Appeal No.182/2015 affirming the judgment dated 23.07.2015 passed by the

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learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, C.G. in Criminal Case No.430/2011 whereby the respondent has been acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code (in short, ‘IPC’).

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that appellant/complainant- Nilesh Chauhan lodged a written complaint (Ex.P-1) alleging that the respondent- Bharat Kumar Hotwani, representing himself to be the owner of land situated at Village Labhandi, Patwari Halka No.113, Ashoka Vihar, Khasra No.427/2 (part), Plot No. E-1, admeasuring 10,500 square feet, agreed to sell half portion thereof measuring 5,250 square feet for a total consideration of Rs.14,96,250/- on 28.06.2010. It is alleged that the agreement was executed at the residence of the complainant in the presence of witnesses PW-2 Kripal Singh and PW-3 Sachin Jethwa, whereupon a sum of Rs.1,32,250/- was paid in cash and the remaining consideration was paid through three cheques. The agreement was thereafter notarized and the respondent handed over relevant land documents to the complainant. It is further alleged that despite repeated requests, the respondent avoided execution of the registered sale deed. On 19.01.2011, upon visiting the disputed land, the complainant came to know that the same had already been sold to one Hiraben Patel, which fact was subsequently confirmed from the Tahsil office. It is also alleged that the respondent dishonestly induced the complainant/appellant to pay the amount and thereafter sold the land to a third party. On the basis of said written complaint (Ex.P-1), FIR (Ex.P-2) was registered against the respondent and after due investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the respondent for the

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offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. The accused/respondent denied the charges, abjured the guilt, and prayed for trial.

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The learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence available on record, acquitted the respondent of the charge levelled against him. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the complainant/appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court. The learned Appellate Court, by judgment dated 22.09.2016, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the present appeal has been preferred by the complainant/appellant.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence available on record. She further submits that the execution of the agreement, payment of the entire sale consideration, and the subsequent sale of the same land to one Hiraben Patel clearly show dishonest conduct on the part of the respondent. Therefore, it is prayed that the judgments passed by the learned both the Courts be set aside and the respondent be convicted accordingly.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 supports the impugned judgments and submits that the complainant had voluntarily entered into the agreement after understanding its terms and conditions. It is further submitted that the agreement itself permitted execution of the sale deed in favour of any person nominated by the purchaser, and therefore, no offence of cheating is made out. It is also submitted that both the learned Courts have recorded concurrent findings based on proper appreciation of evidence, and hence, no

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interference is called for. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of N. Raghavender vs State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI reported in (2021) 18 SCC 70 .

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Learned counsel for the State/respondent No.2 supports the contention made by learned counsel for the appellant.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

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“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

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PW-1 Nilesh Chauhan / Complainant stated that he knew the respondent and that on 28.06.2010, an agreement (Article-A) was executed between them for purchase of land measuring 5250 square feet at the rate of Rs.285/- per square foot for a total consideration of Rs.14,96,250/-. He stated that he paid Rs.1,32,250/- in cash and the remaining amount through three cheques. He further deposed that the agreement was executed in the presence of witnesses and was notarized. He also stated that possession of the land was handed over to him and he remained in possession till 19.01.2011. However, in cross-examination, he admitted that he had read out and understood

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the alleged agreement before signing it. He further admitted that when a public notice was issued prior to execution of sale deed in favour of Hiraben Patel, he did not raise any objection. This conduct of complainant weakens the allegation of deception.

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PW-2 Kripal Singh and PW-3 Sachin Jethwa (PW-3), who are witnesses to the alleged agreement, supported the case of the prosecution and deposed that the agreement was executed in their presence and the consideration amount was paid. They also identified their signatures on the alleged agreement and seizure memos (Exs.P-3 to P-5).

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PW-11 Chandraprakash Sharma, Notary, deposed that the alleged agreement was notarized before him and entries were made in his register after verifying the identity of the parties and obtaining their signatures.

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Thus, from the above evidence, it is clear that the execution of the alleged agreement and payment of the consideration amount are not in dispute. The main question is whether, at the time of entering into the agreement, the respondent had any dishonest or fraudulent intention to deceive the complainant.

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A careful perusal of the alleged agreement (Article-A) reveals that there was a specific clause to the effect that the purchaser would be entitled to get the sale deed executed either in his own name or in the name of any person nominated by him and the seller would have no objection to the same. The complainant/appellant has admitted that he executed the alleged agreement after reading and understanding its contents. Further, the complainant/appellant himself admitted that when a public notice was

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issued prior to execution of the sale deed in favour of Hiraben Patel, he did not raise any objection. There is no evidence on record to show that the respondent had any dishonest intention at the beginning of the transaction. The mere fact that the alleged land was subsequently sold out to a third party, namely, Hiraben Patel, in absence of any evidence of initial dishonest intention, would not attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 of IPC. At best, it may amount to breach of contract, for which civil remedy is available to the complainant/appellant. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court have carefully examined the evidence and held that the offence under Section 420 IPC is not proved against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, as the prosecution has failed to establish any dishonest intention on the part of the respondent from the beginning of the transaction. Having gone through the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and the principle of law laid down therein, in the given facts and circumstances of the present case, the aforesaid judgment, being distinguishable on facts, is of no help to the counsel for the respondent No.1.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011 in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka , has held in para 36 as under:-

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"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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"(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;'

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

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Likewise, the Supreme Court, in the matter of Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, Home Department Secretary , reported in 2024 Supreme (Online) SC 9816, relying upon its earlier judgments, has held in paragraphs 15 and 16 as under:

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“15……… At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka , reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:-

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of

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an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.

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In Rajendra Prasad vs State of Bihar, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 2025 , a 3- Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of appellant Nos. 1 & 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”

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Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen, Mallappa & Ramesh (supra), it is clear that both the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have rightly held that the essential ingredients of cheating are absent and the dispute is predominantly in civil nature. The view taken is a reasonable and possible view based on the evidence

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available on record. In the absence of any patent illegality or perversity, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgments.

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Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/complainantNilesh Chauhan against the acquittal of respondent- Bharat Kumar Hotwani is hereby dismissed.

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Sd/-

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(Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge

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Akhilesh

Nilesh Chauhan v. Bharat Kumar Hotwani

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Nilesh Chauhan v. Bharat Kumar Hotwani

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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Cases cited

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