State of Chhattisgarh Vs Ramesh Khare @ Ramesh

Ramesh Khare @ Ramesh, S/o Radheshyam Khare, aged about 33 Years, R/o- Village Kosmanda, Police Station Champa, District- JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent

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For Appellant/State : Mr. Avinash Singh, Government Advocate. For Respondent : None.

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey and

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal

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Judgment on Board 17.03.2026

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Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J.

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Heard on admission.

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The present acquittal appeal, preferred by the appellant/State, arises out of the judgment dated 06.07.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 251/2014, whereby the accused/respondent has been acquitted of the charge under Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) in alternative under Section 302 of IPC, by extending the benefit of doubt.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that deceased- Meera @ Rani, was married to the respondent about seven to eight years prior to the date

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of the incident, and out of the said wedlock, two children were born. According to the prosecution, after the marriage, the accused/respondent used to subject the deceased to physical as well as mental cruelty by taunting her for belonging to a poor family and for not bringing sufficient dowry and also used to quarrel with her after consuming liquor. It is the case of the prosecution that on 16.04.2014, in village Kosmanda, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Champa, the deceased sustained extensive burn injuries in her matrimonial home. She was immediately taken to Government Hospital, Champa, and thereafter referred to CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur for advanced treatment. During the course of treatment, her dying declaration (Ex.P-6) was recorded after due medical certification, wherein she stated that after a quarrel with her husband/respondent, who had come home in an intoxicated condition and was beating her and the child, she herself poured kerosene oil and set herself on fire, and further stated that no one had set her ablaze. Thereafter, despite treatment, the deceased succumbed to her burn injuries on 20.04.2014 at about 9:45 a.m.

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During the course of investigation, merg intimation was recorded vide Exs. P-10 and P-12, and thereafter, FIR (Ex.P-16) was registered against the accused/respondent. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-3, and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. PW-12 Dr. Sunil Kumar Pendro, conducted the post-mortem and submitted his report (Ex.P-17), opining that the cause of death was septic shock resulting from cardio-respiratory failure due to burn injuries. Burnt hair, skin, clothes of the deceased and other articles were seized vide Exs. P-14 and P-15. Seized articles were sent

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to FSL for chemical examination and the FSL report has been brought on record vide Ex.P-21. Statements of witnesses were recorded, and the accused/respondent was arrested vide Ex.P-18.

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After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the competent trial Court. The accused/respondent denied the allegations, pleaded not guilty and prayed for a trial.

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The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent herein of said charges leveled against him.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused/respondent by recording perverse findings. It is contended that the evidence on record clearly shows that the after marriage and soon before her death, deceased was repeatedly subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused/respondent in connection with demand of dowry, as a result of which, she committed suicide by setting herself on fire after pouring kerosene oil. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from illegality and perversity and is liable to be set aside.

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We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

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While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by

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invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

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So far as the death of deceased- Meera @ Rani is concerned, Dr. Anita Shrivastava (PW-3), who initially examined the deceased on 16.04.2014 at Government Hospital, Champa, found that the deceased had sustained 75% to 80% burn injuries on vital parts of her body and that the burns were ante-mortem in nature. She also stated that the deceased was conscious and in a position to speak at the time of examination and was thereafter referred to CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur for further treatment. Her medical report (Ex.P-5) supports the same. Further, Dr. Sunil Kumar Pendro (PW-12), who conducted the postmortem on 20.04.2014, found about 55% to 60% burn injuries over the body of the deceased and opined that the cause of death was septicemic shock resulting from complications of burn injuries leading to cardio-respiratory failure. Nothing material has been elicited in his crossexamination to discredit his opinion. Thus, from the medical evidence on record, it stands proved that the deceased died due to burn injuries and that her death was unnatural. However, the medical evidence is also relevant to determine the nature of the incident. Dr. Sunil Kumar Pendro (PW-12), in his cross-examination, clearly admitted that no external injuries suggestive of force, struggle or resistance were found on the body of the deceased, and he further admitted that the nature of burn injuries could be suicidal. This aspect weakens the prosecution case of

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homicidal death, as in a case of forcible burning, some indication of resistance or external injuries would ordinarily be present. In absence of such evidence, the medical opinion lends support to the possibility that the deceased sustained burn injuries in a suicidal manner.

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The next question for consideration is whether the accused/respondent is responsible for the commission of the offence in question.

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To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test.

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As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions, this Court wishes to refer to the decisions reported in K. Prema S. Rao v. 1 2

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Yadla Srinivasa Rao & Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan .

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13. In K. Prema S. Rao (supra) it has been held as under:-

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“16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that 'soon before her death' she was subjected to cruelty and harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry'.”

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In Devi Lal (supra), the ingredients of the provisions of Section 304-B as laid down in Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab3 and Ram Badan Sharma

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v. State of Bihar4 have been reiterated as under:-

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“20. The question, as to what are the ingredients of the provisions of Section 304-B of the Penal Code is no longer res integra. They are: (I) that the death of woman was caused by any burns or bodily injury or in some circumstances which which were not normal; (2) such death occurs within 7 years from the date of her

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1(2003) 1 SCC 217

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2(2007) 14 SCC 176

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3(2006) 1 SCC 463

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4(2006) 10 SCC 115

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marriage; (3) that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (4) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (5) it is established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before death.”

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In the light of the above enunciation of law, the facts of the present case are required to be examined minutely.

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The prosecution mainly relies on the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P-6) recorded by PW-4 Mukesh Pandey, Head Constable, and the statements of the relatives of the deceased.

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The dying declaration (Ex.P-6) was recorded by PW-4 Mukesh Pandey, Head Constable, after obtaining medical certification from PW-3 Dr. Anita Shrivastava regarding the fitness of the deceased. The evidence of PW-3 Dr. Anita Shrivastava shows that she examined the deceased before recording the statement and found her fit to give it. The statement was recorded in question-answer form and there is nothing on record to show any irregularity or tutoring.

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In the dying declaration (Ex.P-6), the deceased stated that her husband/respondent had come home after consuming liquor and was beating her and the child, and due to the quarrel, she herself poured kerosene oil and set herself on fire. She clearly stated that no one had burnt her. Thus, the dying declaration shows that the incident took place due to a quarrel / petty issues, but it does not show that the accused/respondent directly burnt her. It is also important that there is no mention of any demand of dowry or cruelty related to dowry in the dying declaration. Therefore, the dying declaration does not support the allegation that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry.

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Now coming to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, PW-1

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Chedinbai, mother of the deceased, has stated that in her deposition that her daughter/deceased used to visit her parental home and complain that she was not happy in her matrimonial home. She has further stated that the accused/respondent used to taunt the deceased for belonging to a poor family and not bringing dowry, and also used to quarrel after consuming liquor. She has also stated that after the death of her husband, the deceased stayed at her parental home for some time and was not willing to return, but later the accused/respondent took her back. However, in her cross-examination, she admitted that no demand of dowry was made by accused/respondent at the time of marriage and that the accused/respondent never demanded any specific dowry article from her. She further admitted that during the lifetime of the deceased, she did not lodge any report at the Police Station against the accused/respondent regarding cruelty. Thus, her evidence shows general marital disputes, but does not clearly prove any specific demand of dowry by accused/respondent. Similarly, PW-2 Puniram, brother of the deceased, also admitted that the deceased never informed him about any demand of dowry by the accused/respondent.

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Apart from this, PW-5 Ramdhan Lader, an independent witness, has stated that relations between the deceased and the accused were generally good and that disputes arose mainly due to the accused’s habit of consuming liquor. He further stated that a social meeting was held in the village where the accused was advised to stop drinking and a compromise was arrived at. PW-6 Raju Suraj has also supported that such a meeting took place due to quarrels arising from the accused’s drinking habit. Both these witnesses have also not stated anything about any demand of dowry by the accused/respondent. Their evidence shows

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that the dispute between the parties was mainly due to the drinking habit of the accused/respondent.

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Thus, from the above evidence, it is clear that there were matrimonial disputes between the deceased and the accused, mainly due to the accused’s habit of consuming liquor, but there is no clear proof of any specific demand of dowry made by accused/respondent either at the time of marriage or soon before the death. Further, in her dying declaration (Ex.P-6), the deceased stated that her husband had come home after consuming liquor and was beating her and the child, and due to the quarrel, she herself poured kerosene oil and set herself on fire, and she clearly stated that no one had burnt her. No allegation was made by her in the said dying declaration that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry by the accused/respondent . It is also important that the relatives of the deceased have admitted that during her lifetime, no report was lodged against the accused regarding cruelty or dowry demand. Apart from this, there is no evidence on record to show that the accused demanded dowry, harassed the deceased for dowry, or instigated her to commit suicide.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011 in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka , has held in para 36 as under:-

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"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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"(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

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Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen & Mallappa (supra) , the view taken by the learned trial Court appears to be a plausible and possible view. In absence of any patent illegality or perversity, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court.

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Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed at the admission stage.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

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Akhilesh

State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramesh Khare @ Ramesh

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State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramesh Khare @ Ramesh

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