Dr. Parikshit Charan Vs Indian Institute of Management Raipur

2 - Board Of Governor Through The Chairman Shri Puneet Dalmia, Dalmia Bharat Limited, R/o 11 And 12 Floor, Hansalaya Building , 15 Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 110001

¶21

3 - Department Of Personnel And Training Through The Secretary, Government Of India, Ministry Of Personnel, Public Grievance And Pensions, Room No. 222d, North Block, New Delhi.

¶22

4 - Shri Ram Kumar Kakani Director Indian Institute Of Management , Atal Nagar, New Raipur, Raipur (CG)

¶23

5 - Shri P.R. Devi Prasad Enquiry Officer, C/o Director Indian Institute Of Management, Atal Nagar, New Raipur (CG)

¶24

Respondent(s)

¶25

(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

¶26

For Petitioner(s)	: Mr. Sudeep Johri and Mr. Damrudhar Yadav, Advocates
For Resp. No. 1 & 4	: Mr. Shiv Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate
For Resp./UOI	: Mr. Ramakant Mishra, DSGI

¶27

(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU) Order on Board

¶28

24/04/2025

¶29

Since common facts and grounds are involved in both the Writ Petitions, therefore, they are being heard together and decided by this common order.

¶30

In WPS No. 2832/2024 , the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:-

¶31

“10.1 It is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for its kind perusal.

¶32

10.2 To issue a writ/order/directions quashing the order dated 18.04.2024 suspending the petitioner and initiating disciplinary proceedings along with memorandum and annexures including Statement of Article of Charges (ANNEXURE P/1(Colly.) and Annexure P/20 (Colly.) passed by the Respondent Authority being

¶33

3

¶34

illegal arbitrary, malafide and violation of the rights of the Petitioner.

¶35

10.3 Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.”

¶36

In WPS No. 218/2025 , the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs:-

¶37

“1. That, the Hon’ble Court may be kind enough to call the record of the petitioner as well as other respondents.

¶38

2. That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to issue a writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions and to quash the impugned orders P-1 to P-3.

¶39

3 That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to quash and declare the appointment of respondent no.5 as enquiry officer and the respondent no.4 as disciplinary authority in violation of the IIM Act and regulations 2021 and circulars issued by DOPT & the respondent no.3 dated 15-9-2017 and 15-3-2022.

¶40

4. That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to quash and declare the entire enquiry proceedings initiated by the respondent no.5 against the petitioner no.1 as null and void.

¶41

5. That the Hon'ble Court may be kind enough to issue any other writ, order or direction to the respondents in the circumstances of the case and to pass appropriate order in the interest of justice.”

¶42

(a) Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the Petitioner- Parikshit Charan¹ was appointed on the post of Assistant Professor in the Indian Institute of Management² , Raipur on 27/05/2013. Subsequently, he was appointed as Associate Professor on 01/07/2019.

¶43

1 Henceforth ‘the petitioner’

¶44

2 The IIM

¶45

4

¶46

In the month of July, 2023, he being eligible, had applied for promotion to the post of Professor in the IIM, but the application was not considered due to a bogus complaint made against him, which, as per the petitioner, is contrary to clause 5.5 of HR Policy. The complaint was made by one Chandra Prakash, affiliated to IIM Shillong regarding dispute in authorship sequence in an external journal.

¶47

(b) According to Petitioner, the dispute was mainly with Mr. Vivek Roy and he was merely the guide and remained a third author. Even the journal and publisher dropped the dispute in March, 2023 and the Complainant himself conveyed settlement of dispute to respondent No.2 in November, 2023. On 03/02/2024, Additional Secretary, Department of Education, ministry of Education conducted a meeting with faculty including the petitioner. The petitioner being a tenured professor presented the policy and practical challenges being faced by the IIM, Raipur.

¶48

(c) Learned counsel would submit that two days after the said meeting, because of a confidential report of a Committee was leaked through e-mail, which lead the respondents to look into the earlier complaint made against the petitioner. Subsequently, on 19/03/2024, respondent No.2 ordered to seize the laptop of the petitioner and by order dated 18/04/2024, memorandum and charge-sheet were served upon the petitioner and thereby he was placed under suspension from the services with a disciplinary enquiry contemplated against him.

¶49

(d) Learned counsel would submit that the service condition of the

¶50

5

¶51

petitioner was governed under the IIM Conduct Rules/CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The IIM was notified in the Gazette of India on 31/12/2017. After the enactment of the Act namely the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017³ , the Regulation was prepared known as Indian Institutes of Management Regulations, 2021⁴ . As per the Section 10 of the Act, 2017, the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Board of Governors⁵ who had given the powers under Section 11(2)(i) to create academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to make appointments thereto. From the said provisions, it is crystal clear that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the BOG and not the the Director (respondent No.2 in WPS No. 2832/2024). Thus, the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner by the Director is non est in the eyes of law. Even, the Director issued the charge-sheet to the petitioner without any prior approval of the BOG and hence, the entire action taken by the Director against the petitioner is illegal and void ab initio. According to him, even the powers of the BOG have also not been delegated upon the Director to issue the charge-sheet to the petitioner.

¶52

(e) Learned counsel would submit that the petitioner has been unnecessarily implicated by the respondent No.2 with mala-fide intention and on a trivial ground, the impugned charge-sheet has been issued and the petitioner has been placed under suspension. Thereafter, respondent/Director contemplated departmental enquiry proceedings

¶53

3 For short’ The Act, 2017’

¶54

4 For Short ‘The Regulation, 2021’

¶55

5 For Short ‘The BOG’

¶56

6

¶57

against the petitioner in an illegal and arbitrary manner.

¶58

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that as per prevailing HR Policy, the Director is the appointing as well as the Disciplinary Authority and in the said capacity, the Director issued the charge-sheet to the petitioner. He would submit that the petitioner has not challenged any of the provisions of the HR Policy. The petitioner was appointed in the year 2013 under the provisions of the HR Policy and hence the said policy is applicable upon the petitioner. According to clause 4.5 (iv)(i) of the HR Policy, the Director is the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority in respect of all the employees. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioner has failed to disclose under which rule the BOG had appointed him. He would submit that the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner by the Director is valid and effective. The Director, in the capacity of disciplinary authority, has rightly appointed the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer to inquire into the matter. He would submit that since the petitioner was appointed in the year 2013 under the Provisions of the HR Policy, the same is applicable in his case as provided under Section 5 (d), 11 (a) and 35 of the Act, 2017 and as per regulation 8 of the Regulations, 2021. The impugned action is just and proper, warranting no interference of this Court.

¶59

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the documents.

¶60

From the pleadings, it is apparent that the petitioner is an Associate

¶61

7

¶62

Professor in the IIM, Raipur. On account of some complaints received against the petitioner, he has been placed under suspension; chargesheet has been issued; and the Departmental Enquiry has been contemplated by the Director of the IIM.

¶63

Section 11 of the Act, 2017 speaks about ‘Powers and Function of the Board’, subject to the provisions of the Act, the Board of every institute shall be responsible for the general superintendence, directions and control of the affairs of the institute and shall have the power to frame or amend or modified or rescind the regulation governing the affairs of the institute to achieve the objects of the Institute specified in Section 6. Section 11 (2) (i) of the Act, 2017 provides that the Board shall have the power to create academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to make appointments thereto. From the said provisions, it is crystal clear that the BOG is the appointing authority of the petitioner. Thus, the charge-sheet can only be issued upon approval of the BOG, but the same has not been followed in the case in hand. Even, the respondents failed to show that the powers delegated by the BOG upon the Director. The charge-sheet issued by the other authority than the specified authority was wholly without jurisdiction and vitiated the whole disciplinary proceedings.

¶64

Such procedure adopted by the Director would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311 (2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Such a

¶65

8

¶66

charge sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority, in the case at hand, it is BOG, not the Director. (See: Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath & Others⁶ .

¶67

It is well settled proposition of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. (See: Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of

¶68

Delhi and Others⁷ )

¶69

As far as the HR Policy is concerned, the same is nothing but internal arrangement of the establishment. Even otherwise, the policy/guidelines cannot supersede the statutes i.e. the Act, 2017. Even the respondents failed to show that the provisions of the Act, 2017 will not applicable to the case of the petitioner.

¶70

Guidelines/policy per se do not partake to the character of statute. Such guidelines/policy in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. This is because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall into the category of legislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary. They have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence to or deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible if the circumstances of any particular fact or law situation warrants the same. Judicial control takes over only where the deviation either involves arbitrariness or discrimination or is so fundamental as to undermine a basic public purpose which the guidelines and the statute under which they are issued are intended to achieve. (See: Poonam Verma & Others v. Delhi

¶71

6 (2014) 1 SCC 351

¶72

7 (2008) 9 SCC 177

¶73

9

¶74

Development Authority⁸

¶75

Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case with regards to contents of the chargesheet, the impugned suspension order; the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner; and the charge-sheet are hereby quashed.

¶76

In the result, both the Writ Petitions are allowed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the respondent/IIM to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised.

¶77

Sd/-

¶78

(BIBHU DATTA GURU) JUDGE

¶79

Gowri/ Rahul

¶80

8 2007 (13) SCC 154

Dr. Parikshit Charan v. Indian Institute of Management Raipur

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Dr. Parikshit Charan v. Indian Institute of Management Raipur

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Deepak Vadyakar Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Mayur Gemnani Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Dhananjay Kumar Vs Can Fin Homes Ltd.

Draupat Bai Sapaha Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Sunita Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Chief Executive Officer Vs Mukesh Kumar Rajwade