H. C. Prakash Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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1

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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2025:CGHC:22733

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AFR

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ANKITKUMARSINGH Digitallysigned byANKITKUMARSINGHDate:2025.06.1117:10:24+0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPS No. 1925 of 2016

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H. C. Prakash S/o Ram Sahai Dahariya, aged about 48 years, behind Choubey Choul, Amberdkar Ward, Mungeli, District Mungeli, P.S. Mungeli, Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioner

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versus

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State of Chhattisgarh through Secretary, Department of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahandi Bhawan, Capital Complex, New Raipur District Raipur, P.S. Rakhi, Chhattisgarh.

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Director, Public Education, Raipur, Division, Raipur, P.S. Civil Lines, Chhattisgarh.

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District Education Officer, Balodabazar District Balodabazar Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondents

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For Petitioner :- Mr. Sajal Kumar Gupta, Advocate. For State-Respondents :- Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order On Board

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09/06/2025

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The petitioner herein invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India calls in question the legality, validity and correctness of the order dated

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2

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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28.12.2017 by filing this writ petition whereby the petitioner’s representation for reinstatement in service on being acquitted of the criminal charges has been rejected by the State Government finding no merit.

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The petitioner herein was Upper Division Teacher in the Government School. He was prosecuted for committing rape with the student of the school i.e. for offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC and convicted by the jurisdictional criminal Court at Baloda Bazar, Chhattisgarh on 28.08.2001 in Sessions Trial No.55/2000. However, by this Court the petitioner herein has been acquitted of the said charges by this Court in CRA No. 816 of 2001 vide order dated 21.08.2015 extending him benefit of doubt. Meanwhile, the petitioner was terminated from service on 30.12.2005 under Rule 10(8) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.

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Mr. Sajal Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by extending him benefit of doubt though the it was not clean acquittal, however the order of dismissal

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3

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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will cease to be effective and the employee would be entitled to be reinstated. Therefore, the petitioner herein is entitled for reinstatement along with back wages and the present writ petition deserves to be allowed.

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Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned State counsel, would submit that the petitioner being a teacher is governed by the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for brevity “the Rules of 1966) as well as the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 (for short “the Rules of 1961) and in both the Rules there is no provision provided for reinstatement of a Government Servant on the acquittal of the criminal charges, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement in the service on any ground whatsoever. In support of his submission he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. 1 Samuthiram .

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and gone through the records minutely.

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1 (2013) 1 SCC 598

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4

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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Admittedly, the petitioner was working as Upper Division Teacher in the Government School and the FIR was registered against him for offence under Sections 363, 366 & 376 read with 34 of the IPC for kidnapping and committing sexual intercourse with the victim/school student. Thereafter, he faced suspension and was convicted for the aforesaid offences on 28.08.2001 pursuant to which he was terminated from service on 30.12.2005, however he was acquitted of the said charges by this Court in CRA No.816 of 2001 vide its order dated 21.08.2015 by extending him benefit of doubt. This Court in CRA No.816 of 2001 has held as under:-

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“ 14 . Thus taking into account the entire evidence, oral and documentary, the conduct of the prosecutrix during commission of alleged offence and subsequent thereto, the possibility of the prosecutrix being a consenting party to the act of sexual intercourse with appellant No.1 under the pressure of her family members, cannot be ruled out. On the basis of evidence adduced, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the basic ingredients of Section 363, 366 and 376 of IPC and as such, the trial Court was not justified in holding appellant No.1 guilty under these sections and he deserves to be acquitted of the said charges by extending him benefit of doubt.”

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15 . In the result, the appeal so far as it relates to appellant No.1 Husainchandra Prakash, succeeds and is thus allowed. He is acquitted of the charges leveled against him by extending him benefit of doubt.

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5

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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Appellant No.1 is reported to be on bail, therefore, no further order is required.”

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Not only this the petitioner’s service is governed by the Rules of 1961 as well as the Rules of 1966, but there is no provision in both the Rules that upon acquittal of the criminal charges, the Government Servant is entitled for reinstatement along with back wages. However, this issue came up for consideration before the Supreme Court firstly in the matter of R.P. Kapur v. Union of India2 in which, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. Furthermore, in State of Assam v.

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Raghav Rajgopalachari3 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in paragraph No.8 which states as under:-

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“ 8 . … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully

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3 1972 SLR 44 (SC)

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2 AIR 1964 SC 787

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6

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.”

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Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal4 have considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. It has been held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable and held as under:-

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“13. The above analysis of the relevant provisions of the Regulations, therefore, shows, firstly, that the employee who is absent from duty on account of his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or on account of his detention, is not to be considered to be absent on account of circumstances beyond his control. His absence throughout such period is to be treated as period spent on extraordinary leave when the absence is not followed by discharge, termination of service or dismissal, as the case may be. In the present case, respondent-employee was arrested for criminal offence under Section 302 IPC. He was, however, convicted by the Sessions Judge on December 13, 1976 under Section 304, Part I, IPC. After the copy of the judgment of the Sessions Judge became available he was dismissed from service w.e.f. April 28, 1977. The order passed by the Bank on that day has been reproduced above. By that order the Bank, among other things, revoked the order of suspension and treated the period of suspension from (a) September 18, 1974 to October

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4 (1994) 1 SCC 541

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7

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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5, 1974 as on ordinary leave and the period (b) from October 6, 1974 to April 27, 1977 as on extraordinary leave without pay and allowances and as a period not counted for increment. When the High Court acquitted the respondent-employee by its order of November 21, 1977 giving the benefit of doubt, the Bank rightly refused to reinstate him in service on the ground that it was not an honourable acquittal as required by Regulation 46(4).”

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In the matter of S. Samuthiram (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also considered the principles of law laid down in the matters of R.P Kapur (supra), Raghav Rajgopalachari (supra) and Bhopal Singh Panchal (supra). It has been held by their Lordships in the matter of S. Samuthiram (supra) that the mere acquittal in the criminal case does not entail automatic reinstatement and reinstatement cannot, therefore, be claimed unless there is specific provision to this effect in relevant service rules in cases of honourable acquittal and held in paragraphs No. 26 &

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27 as under:-

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“26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a

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8

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.

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We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules.

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Similarly, the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court have again considered in the matter of Union of India v. Methu Meda5 , in which their Lordships have held that even if the 5 (2022) 1 SCC 1

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt from the charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force and held in paragraph No.21 as under:-

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“ 21 . As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If a person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force. The employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to the candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court have not considered the said legal position, as discussed above in the orders [Union of India v. Methu Meda⁶ & Methu Meda v. Union of India⁷ ] impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Methu Meda v. Union of India [in Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013, order dated 27-9-2013 (MP)] and the Division Bench in Union of India v. Methu Meda [2013 SCC OnLine MP 10701] are not sustainable in law, as discussed hereinabove.”

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Coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that there is no specific provision in the Rules 1961 as well as in

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7 Writ Petition No.3897 of 2013, order dated 27-9-2013 (MP)

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6 2013 SCC OnLine MP 10701

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10

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(WPS No. 1925 of 2016)

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the Rules of 1966 that the “honourable acquittal" of the criminal charges of the government servant, the government servant is entitled for the reinstatement in the service along with back wages. More particularly, the present is not a case where the petitioner has been honourably acquitted of the criminal charges, he has been acquitted of the criminal charges by extending him benefit of doubt as noticed herein above and no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement along with back wages as the petitioner herein/teacher was charged with the offence of committing rape upon student of his school. In that view of the matter, the petitioner herein is not entitled for reinstatement in the service along with back wages and the representations of the petitioner have rightly been rejected by the competent authority.

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Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed . No order as to cost(s).

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Sd/-

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Sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge

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Ankit

H. C. Prakash v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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H. C. Prakash v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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