Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam Vs Sunil Kumar Sahu

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2025:CGHC:32170-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WA No. 457 of 2025

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1. Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam Through Its Managing Director, Sector-24, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)

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2. The Regional General Manager Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam, Sector-24, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District-Raipur (C.G.)

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3. The Divisional Manager Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam, Bar Nawapara Project Division, C-52, Sector-2, Devendra Nagar, Raipur, District-Raipur (C.G.)

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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1. Sunil Kumar Sahu S/o Pilu Ram Sahu Aged About 34 Years Working As Assistant Project Range Officer, Posted At RangeRawan, Circle-Raitum, Bar Nawapara Project Division, DistrictRaipur (C.G.), (Petitioner In W.P.(S) 1418/2024)

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2. State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Forest, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District-Raipur (C.G.), (Respondent No. 1 In W.P.(S) 1418/2024)

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...Respondent(s)

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For Appellants : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Animesh Tiwari & Mr. Avinash Singh, Advocates.

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For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. M.P.S. Bhatia, Advocate. :

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For Respondent/State Mr. Yashwant Singh Thakur, Additional Advocate General.

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Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN BRIJMOHAN MORLE MORLE Date: 2025.07.11 19:24:02 +0530

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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11.07.2025

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1. Heard Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Animesh Tiwari and Mr. Avinash Singh, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. M.P.S. Bhatia, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Yashwant Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for respondent No. 2/State on I.A. No. 1 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay.

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2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons mentioned in the application, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has been shown in the application and accordingly, I.A. No. 2 of 2025 is allowed and delay of 58 days in filing the appeal is condoned.

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3. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellants/respondents No. 2 to 4 against the order dated 04.02.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 1418 of 2024 ( Sunil Kumar Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others ), whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1/writ petitioner herein.

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4. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants submits that the appellants is the Government Company Limited by shares constituted under the Companies Act, 1956 which was incorporated on 22.05.2001.

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He further submits that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner had filed writ petition bearing WPS No. 1418 of 2024 before this Court seeking following reliefs in paragraph 10 of the writ petition:

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“ A. That the Hon’ble High Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records of the case for its perusal, in the ends of justice.

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B. That, in the facts and circumstances of the writ petition, the Hon’ble Court may most kindly be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents; in particular the respondents No. 2 to 4, to grant the benefit of order dated 10.04.1997 to the petitioner with the all incidental and consequential benefit, in the ends of justice.

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C. That, in the facts and circumstances of the writ petition, the Hon’ble Court may most kindly be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents, in particular respondents No. 2 to 4; to grant all monetary and financial benefits including salary of the higher post/post for back period and seniority for subsequent promotion etc to the petitioner as per law and all consequential and incidental benefits may also kindly be given to the petitioner, in the ends of justice.

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D. That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly be please to award the cost of the petition and any other

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alternative, additional writ in favour of the petitioner in the ends of justice. ”

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5. It is further contended by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner submitted that he was initially appointed on 07.02.2013 as fieldsman (equivalent to forest guard) in the office of the Divisional Manager, Kawardha Project Division, C.G. Van Vikas Nigam. Thereafter, he was sent for training by the Regional General Manager, Raipur to the Forest Guard Training Session at Van Vidyalaya Mahasamund for 06 months where he got training from 01.02.2015 to 30.07.2015. In the training session, the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner secured first position. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner was regularized in services on 17.02.2016. The respondent No. 1/writ petitioner has filed the writ petition for grant of benefits of the order dated 10.04.1997. The respondent No.1/writ petitioner has contended that as per the order dated 10.04.1997 issued by erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh, which is applicable in the State of Chhattisgarh as well, any Fieldsman/Forest Guard who secures 1^st position in the Training Session is directly sent for training session for higher post and if he succeeds and clears the training session, then he is promoted to the next higher post which is Assistant Project Range Officer. The respondent No. 1/writ petitioner has contended that he has been denied the benefit of order dated 10.04.1997 and has prayed for grant of same along with consequential benefits.

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6. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants states that the appellants filed reply in the writ petition, in which appellants contended that the writ petition was barred by delay and laches as the respondent

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No. 1/writ petitioner is claiming benefits of promotion for the post of Assistant Project Range Officer with effect from 30.07.2015 by filing writ petition in the year 2024 and the writ petition was barred by delay of 09 years. In this regard, learned Senior Advocate relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India & Others vs. Tarsem Singh , reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 6 & 7 held as under:

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“ 6. In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 274 this Court held (SCC p.277, paras 8 & 10)

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“8. …… The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its rain new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

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10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That,

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however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. ….. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.”

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7.To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating

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to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. ”

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7. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants would submit that initially the order dated 17.10.1977 was issued by Department of Forest of erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh which provided that any Forest Guard who secures first position in merit in the forest guard training will be sent to training session of Forest Ranger. Thereafter, on 10.04.1997, Madhya Pradesh Van Vikas Nigam issued the order which provided that whoever secures first position in training of forest guard, he shall be sent to training for the next Higher Post and if he successfully completes the training of the next Higher Post, subject to availability, he will be absorbed in the Higher Post. The order dated 10.04.1997 continued in the State of Chhattisgarh after year 2000. The appellants further contended that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner was not entitled for the benefits of order dated 10.04.1997 as the original order of the State Government dated 17.10.1997 was withdrawn on 11.06.2012, the appellants had also withdrawn the order dated 10.04.1997 on 08.08.2023 as the order dated 10.04.1997 was based upon the order of State Government dated

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17.10.1997. Therefore, the order dated 10.04.1997 was also deemed withdrawn with effect from 11.06.2012.

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8. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner had claimed parity with other employees, namely, Devendra Choubey and Nishant Thakur who were granted benefit on 24.05.2023, but the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner was not entitled for parity as his case was distinguishable from them. The other employees had secured first rank in training prior to withdrawal of the order dated 11.06.2012. The respondent No. 1/writ petitioner had completed training after 11.06.2012 and thus, he was not entitled for the benefit of the order dated 17.10.1977 and 10.04.1997. He would submit that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner does not have the requisite qualification for the next post i.e. Project Range Officer as he had not completed five years in the present post i.e. Assistant Project Range Officer which is mandatory under Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Karmachari Sewa Niyam, 1984. The respondent No. 1/writ petitioner was already promoted to the next post on Assistant Project Range Officer on 28.12.2022 and as per the gradation list, the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner is at Sl.No. 95 and the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner had not made party to other 94 Assistant Project Range Officers whose seniority will be affected if the relief claimed by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner is provided. He further contended that the order dated 10.04.1997 does not give any right of promotion, but was confined for sending the candidate, whoever secures first position in forest guard training, to the training of next higher post and after competition of training, he will be absorbed in the higher post if the posts are lying vacant. He further

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contended that the learned Single Judge wrongly interpreted the order dated 10.07.1997 as the same does not confer any right of promotion. The order dated 17.10.1977, which was the basis of order dated 10.07.1997, has been withdrawn by State Government on 11.06.2012, therefore, the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner is not entitled for the benefit of order dated 10.07.1997. The respondent No. 1/writ petitioner’s case is different from employees who were extended the benefit of order dated 10.07.1997 as they had secured first position in training prior to 11.06.2012. He also submits that the learned Single Judge did not appreciate the fact that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner had not raised any objection at the time of granting promotion on the post of Assistant Project Range Officer. Hence, the impugned order dated 04.02.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is perverse and contrary to the facts of the case and liable to be set aside. He further submits that this Court in a similar matter i.e. WA No. 408 of 2025 ( Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam & Others vs. Shrikant Kumar Singh & Another ) had already allowed the writ appeal vide order dated 27.06.2025 and, therefore, the present appeal is also liable to be allowed on the ground of parity.

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9. On the other hand, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.1/writ petitioner submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner, in which no interference is called for.

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10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and materials available on record.

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11. It is true that the order passed by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh dated 10.04.1997 is applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh as it has been adopted by the State of Chhattisgarh. It is also not in dispute that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner was undergone a training vide order 10.04.1997 and has secured first position on 30.07.2015. Thereafter, he was promoted on the post of Assistant Project Range Officer on 28.12.2024 and claimed the benefits of promotion for the post of Assistant Project Range Officer with effect from 30.07.2015, but inordinate delay of 08 years in approaching the Court has not been explained.

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12. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu , reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 held in paragraph 2 as under:

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“ 2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the 2^nd respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the 2^nd respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was

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not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957 after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellants’ case as if

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nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court

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and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal. ”

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13. In the light of principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is evident that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner suddenly claiming the benefits of promotion for the post of Assistant Project Range Officer with effect from 30.07.2015 and other consequential benefits after an inordinate delay of 08 years, which is impermissible in law. As such, the learned Single Judge has erred in granting the relief claimed by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner for promotion and other consequential benefits from the post of Fieldsman to the post of Assistant Project Range Officer from the date when the respondent No.1/writ petitioner has completed his training i.e. 30.07.2015. Thus, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge dated 04.02.2025 is illegal and liable to be set aside. Further, since the facts and issue involved in the present case is identical to that of WA No.408 of 2025 , this appeal may also be allowed in the similar terms.

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14. Accordingly, the present writ appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 04.02.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.1418 of 2024 is hereby set aside. Consequent thereto, the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein stands dismissed .

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Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Brijmohan

Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam v. Sunil Kumar Sahu

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Chhattisgarh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam v. Sunil Kumar Sahu

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