Kripal Singh Vs Krishna Kumar

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2025:CGHC:31928

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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MAC No. 22 of 2021

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Kripal Singh S/o Humlal Singh Aged About 21 Years Resident Of Misiya, Gorbi, Pasan, District Korba, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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1. Krishna Kumar S/o Ramdayal Gupta Aged About 50 Years Resident Of Bandhapara Bhatgaon, Surajpur, Sarguja (Chhattisgarh) (Driver Of Vehicle)

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2. Dharnidhar Sharma S/o Late Lambodar Sharma, Resident Of Quarter No. 137 Bramhanpara, Surajpur, Sarguja Chhattisgarh (Owner Of Vehicle)

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3. Shriram General Insurance Company Through Branch Office Sitapur Jaipur Rajasthan

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant : Mr. Utkarsh Patel, Adv. on behalf of Mr. P. K. Patel, Adv. For Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Utsav Mahiswar, Adv.

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey

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Judgment On Board

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10-07-2025

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1) Heard on I.A. No. 01/2021, application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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2) The claimant has filed this petition assailing the award dated 22.03.2014 passed in Claim Case No. 49/2012 by the learned

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Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) whereby compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- has been awarded with interest @ 6 % p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application till its realization.

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3) The facts of the present case are that on 29.03.2012, the claimant was traveling in offending vehicle I.e bus bearing registration no. C.G. 15 A-8079 which got turtled due to rash & negligent driving of respondent No. 1 in front of Petrol pump, P.S. Bango, District Korba and as a result of the same, the claimant received grievous injuries.

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4) The learned Tribunal after appreciating documentary and oral evidence awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/with interest @ 6% p.a. to the claimant.

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5) With regard to the application for condonation of delay, the learned counsel for the appellant/claimant would submit that there is a delay of 2389 days in filing the instant appeal. He would contend that the appellant is a poor villager and he was not aware of the proceedings and law of limitation and when he approached the local counsel, he was advised to file Misc. Appeal. Thereafter, he managed money to file the appeal. He further submits that the appellant could not file the instant appeal within the stipulated period owing to the Covid-19 outbreak.

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6) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company submits that there is an inordinate delay of more than

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2389 days in filing the instant appeal, therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed on the grounds of delay.

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7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents.

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8) Admittedly, the award was passed on 22.03.2014 and this appeal was preferred on 06.01.2021. In the application for condonation of delay, the appellant, who was injured in the accident has stated that he was not aware of the proceedings and the law of limitation. It is further stated that he approached the local counsel belatedly and thereafter filed the appeal. The plea of Covid-19 outburst has also been taken. Prior to March, 2020, there was no Covid-19 outburst and the award was passed on 22.03.2014, whereas the appeal was preferred on 06.01.2021. A perusal of the application moved by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would show that the appellant failed to explain the delay of 2389 days properly.

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9) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:-

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“ 10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow:

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3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24

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(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

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11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned. ”

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10) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85 , it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

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20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50 , wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.

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21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363 , where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a

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reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

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22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927 , that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

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23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds .”

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11) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-

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below:-

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“ 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justiceoriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that

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the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. ”

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12) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra). ”

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13) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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14) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected.

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15) Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed . No cost(s).

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Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE

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Ajinkya Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.07.11 13:14:40 +0530

Kripal Singh v. Krishna Kumar

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Kripal Singh v. Krishna Kumar

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