Dismissed¶8

United India Insurance Company Limited v. Lalbaran

Chhattisgarh HC16 Nov 2025MAC/129/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Chhattisgarh High Court, Bilaspur; MAC No. 129 of 2024; decided 17/11/2025 by Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J. Insurer's appeal against MACT Surajpur injury award (Claim Case No.26/2018, dated 23.11.2019, Rs. 50,000 + 9% interest) dismissed: condonation of 181-day delay (I.A. No.1/2020) rejected; limitation of 90 days expired 21.02.2020 pre-Covid; appeal filed 24.08.2020 without sufficient reasons or particulars of dispatch/sanction; Pathapati Subba Reddy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 INSC 286 relied on; no costs; NAFR.

What did the court decide?

There is a delay of 181 days in filing the appeal and the same has not been explained properly by the appellant/Insurance Company. ¶7

United India Insurance Company Limited Vs Lalbaran — Chhattisgarh HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

2025:CGHC:55770

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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MAC No. 129 of 2024

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1 - United India Insurance Company Limited Through - Its Divisional Manager, Divisional Office - Near Hotel Kumkum, Bramha Road, Ambikapur, District - Surguja Chhattisgarh. Pin No. - 497001., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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...Appellant

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versus

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1 - Lalbaran, S/o Raghunath, Aged About 42 Years Caste - Kanwar, R/o - Village - Davna, Police Station Bhaiyathan, Tahsil - Odagi, District - Surajpur Chhattisgarh., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Ramjatan Painkara S/o Krishnaram Painkara, Caste - Kanwar, R/o Village - Karaunti (Chendra), Police Station - Bhaiyathan, Tahsil - Odagi, District - Surajpur Chhattisgarh., District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondents

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For Appellant/Insurance Company : Mr. Dashrath Gupta, Advocate For respondents : None appears though served

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board

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17/11/2025

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Heard on I.A. No.1/2020, an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal.

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This appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award passed by the learned Second Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Surajpur (C.G.) in Claim Case No.26/2018 dated 23.11.2019, whereby, learned Tribunal has passed an award to the tune of Rs.50,000/- with interest @ 9% per annum on account of injury sustained by the claimant.

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Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company would submit that the award was passed on 23.11.2019 and on account of Covid outburst, the appeal could not be preferred within limitation. He would submit that relevant documents were sent to the Divisional Office, Bilaspur (C.G.) and thereafter, sanction was accorded and the appeal was preferred. He would further submit that there is delay of 181 days and that may be condoned.

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Heard learned counsel for the Insurance Company at length and perused application for condonation of delay.

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Admittedly, award of Rs.50,000/- was passed on 23.11.2019 and the period of limitation of 90 days expired on 21^st of February, 2020 and at that time, there was no Covid Outburst. The Insurance company preferred this appeal on 24.08.2020 but failed to assign sufficient reasons in the application. The Insurance Company has not stated as to when the copy of award and other documents were sent to Divisional Office, Bilaspur and when sanction was accorded. The appellant has not explained delay properly.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 while dealing with the issue of limitation in paras 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26 & 30 observed and held as under:-

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“ 19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85 , it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

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20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50 , wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.

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21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363 , where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

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22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927 , that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

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23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.

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26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

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30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).”

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Taking into consideration the fact that there is delay of 181 days, the same has not been explained properly by the appellant/Insurance Company and further considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) , in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected.

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Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed . No cost(s).

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Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge

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Rekha

United India Insurance Company Limited v. Lalbaran

Case brief

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United India Insurance Company Limited v. Lalbaran

Case brief

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