Smt. Yogeshwari Gupta Vs Vijay Kumar Gupta

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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FA(MAT) No. 126 of 2023

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Reserved on 09/10/2025

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Delivered on 12/11/2025

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1 - Smt. Yogeshwari Gupta W/o Vijay Kumar Gupta Aged About 46 Years R/o Village Saradih, Post Sakrali, P.S. And Tehsil Dhabra, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - Vijay Kumar Gupta S/o Lallu Prasad Gupta Aged About 49 Years R/o Village Bhatgaon, Post Nartora, P.S. Patewa, Tehsil And District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Pooja Lonia, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Naveen Shukla, Advocate (Division Bench)

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Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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C A V Order

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Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated

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11.04.2023, passed by the Family Court, Janjgir-Champa

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(Chhattisgarh), in Civil Suit No.46-A/2022 whereby the Court allowed the application filed under Section 13(1)(ia)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and consequently dissolved the marriage solemnized between the parties on 11^th July 1995. The Family Court held that the appellant committed cruelty and also deserted the respondent-husband.

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In the present case, it is an undisputed and admitted fact that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 11^th July 1995 at Village Saradih, District JanjgirChampa (Chhattisgarh), in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. After the marriage, in the month of May 1995, both parties began residing together at Village Bhatgaon, District Mahasamund, and commenced their marital life. From this wedlock, a daughter was born, whose marriage was solemnized in the year 2021.

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Facts of the present case, in brevity, is that the wife and the husband were lawfully married on 11^th July 1995 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals, and from this union, they were blessed with a daughter who has since attained majority and entered into matrimony. It is averred that since 2019, the wife has come into contact with a Christian preacher and subsequently embraced Christianity, which led her to regularly attend church services and wholly abandon the observance of Hindu customs and rituals that are fundamental to their marital relationship. In

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particular, the wife ceased wearing the sacred marital necklace ( mangalsutra) and applying vermilion ( sindoor) , which are sacred symbols and essential sacraments of a Hindu married woman’s status. Despite repeated objections and requests by the husband to adhere to the agreed religious practices, the wife steadfastly refused and clearly communicated that she had converted to Christianity and would no longer comply with Hindu rites or customs. In early 2022, the wife voluntarily left the husband’s company and commenced living alone in the matrimonial home, further demanding that the husband must convert to Christianity if he was to continue cohabiting with her. In addition, the wife engaged in conduct that involved neglect, taunting, and ridicule of Hindu gods, goddesses, and idols, thereby causing grave mental agony to the husband. Despite repeated efforts to reconcile and requests to desist from such behavior, the wife persisted in his conduct, thereby subjecting the husband to cruelty within the legal meaning of the term. Consequently, the parties have been living separately since 16th June 2022 due to the appellant‘s abandonment and refusal to live with the husband without his conversion to Christianity. The husband submits that the wife’s conduct amounts to both cruelty and desertion, which has irreparably damaged the marital relationship and caused him severe mental distress. In light of the above, the wife prays that the marriage solemnized between the parties be dissolved by

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granting a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.

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Learned Family Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, the application for divorce filed by the present respondent-husband under Section 13 (1) (1-a) (ii) of Hindu Marriage Act, and the said application was allowed by the trial Court.

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In her return statement, the wife categorically denies all allegations made by the husband, specifically refuting the claim regarding her alleged adoption of Christianity as baseless and without any factual foundation, asserting that the husband has fabricated such grounds solely to obtain a decree of divorce in his favor. The wife further contends that he has neither committed any cruelty against the wife nor deserted her at any time. On the contrary, it is averred that the husband himself has been guilty of cruelty towards the wife, primarily arising from the fact that she has not borne a son, which led the husband and his family to subject her to mental and physical harassment, including threats of marrying another woman to produce a male heir from a second marriage. The husband alleges that the wife neglected him during periods of illness and even instigated her to commit suicide to facilitate remarriage. Owing to the continuous cruelty and illtreatment meted out by the husband and his family, the wife was compelled to leave the matrimonial home. Despite making

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multiple complaints to the police and other authorities, no effective redressal has been provided. It is further stated that the wife sought medical treatment due to her illness and that the petitioner failed to provide any support or care during this time. The respondent prays that all allegations made against her be dismissed as entirely false, fabricated, and liable to be rejected.

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Trial Court’s Findings: In order to determine the matter, the trial court recorded the evidence of both parties and, upon careful consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the respondent-wife had committed cruelty against the petitioner-husband. The court observed that the wife had abandoned the observance of Hindu rites, rituals, and customs, openly defied Hindu gods and goddesses, and was significantly influenced by Christianity. Further, the court noted that the wife had willfully left the company of the husband without any lawful justification. On these grounds, the trial court concluded that both cruelty and desertion were established against the husband and consequently decreed the dissolution of the marriage solemnized between the parties by granting a decree of divorce in favor of the husband.

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the wife has vehemently contended that the Family Court erred in law and fact in granting a decree of divorce under Section 13 (1) (1 a) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act by dissolving the marriage between the parties. It is

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submitted that the allegations made by the husband were never satisfactorily or cogently proved. There is no evidence on record to substantiate the claim that the wife had adopted Christianity or abandoned Hindu rites and customs. The trial court’s finding that the wife’s alleged conversion and purported defamation of Hindu gods and goddesses amounted to cruelty is wholly unwarranted and lacks any credible evidentiary basis. Furthermore, the Family Court erred in holding that the wife had deserted the husband, when, on the contrary, it is the husband who deserted the wife and subjected her to cruelty. Consequently, the decree passed by the Family Court in favor of the husband is liable to be set aside, and the appeal deserves to be allowed with the impugned judgment and decree quashed.

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On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the husband submits that the trial court, after a thorough and proper appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.04.1995, dissolving the marriage between the parties and granting a decree of divorce. It is argued that the respondent’s refusal to observe the spiritual and religious duties incumbent upon her as a Hindu wife, including her denial to perform pooja and show due respect to Hindu gods and goddesses, clearly constitutes cruelty within the meaning of the law. Furthermore, the wife’s decision to regularly attend church services and adopt Christian practices demonstrates her

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unwillingness to adhere to the faith of the husband and his family, thereby justifying the trial court’s conclusion that the wife conduct amounted to cruelty and warranted the dissolution of the marriage.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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In the present case, it is an undisputed and admitted fact that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 11^th July 1995 at Village Saradih, District JanjgirChampa (Chhattisgarh), in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. After the marriage, in the month of May 1995, both parties began residing together at Village Bhatgaon, District Mahasamund, and commenced their marital life. From this wedlock, a daughter was born, whose marriage was solemnized in the year 2021.

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Analysis of Evidence: From a careful perusal of the record, it appears that although the husband has alleged that the wife adopted Christianity and disrespected Hindu gods, goddesses, and idols, the evidence adduced by the parties does not substantiate such allegations. The cruelty purportedly arising from the wife’s alleged conversion and disrespect towards Hindu customs has not been proved in accordance with law due to insufficient evidence.

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However, it is evident from the record that the wife has deserted the husband by leaving his company during a time when cohabitation and mutual support were expected, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, thereby causing mental cruelty to the husband. While the wife claims to have been deserted by the husband, she has neither filed any application nor taken any steps to resume cohabitation, which further supports the conclusion that the desertion was on her part.

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Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter Debananda Tamuli Vs. Kakumoni Kataky reported in (2022) 5 SCC 459

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relevant paras are reflected as under :-

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“7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, (1964) 4 SCR 331 : AIR 1964 SC 40] which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In

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other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus:

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“ 13. Divorce .—(1) * * *

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1. Explanation.—In this sub-section, the

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expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

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10. The perusal of the respondent's evidence does not disclose any effort made by her to resume the matrimonial relationship. She has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. As can be seen from the evidence on record, the appellant is carrying on business at Tezpur. The respondent is working as a Lecturer in University Law

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College at Gauhati. There is no dispute that from 1-7-2009 till date, they are staying separately.

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11. Merely because on account of the death of the appellant's mother, the respondent visited her matrimonial home in December 2009 and stayed there only for one day, it cannot be said that there was a resumption of cohabitation. She has not stated that she came to her matrimonial home on 21-12-2009 with the intention to resume cohabitation. The intention on the part of the respondent to resume cohabitation is not established. Thus, in the facts of the case, the factum of separation has been proved. From the evidence on record, an inference can be drawn that there was animus deserendi on the part of the respondent. She has not pleaded and established any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home.

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12. Thus, in our considered view, the ground of desertion under clause (i-b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the HM Act has been made out as the desertion for a continuous period of more than two years before the institution of the petition was established in the facts of the case. But, after having carefully perused the evidence on record, we find that no case is made out to disturb the findings recorded by the courts on the issue of cruelty.

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15. We direct the appellant husband to deposit a sum of Rs 15,00,000 (Rupees fifteen lakh only) in this Court within a period of 8 weeks from today.

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16. It will be open to the respondent to withdraw the said amount of Rs 15,00,000 (Rupees fifteen lakh). It will also be open to her to withdraw a sum of Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand) already deposited by the appellant. ”

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In addition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Nirmal Singh Panesar Vs. Paramjit Kaur Panesar Alias Ajinder Kaur reported in (2025) 3 SCC 790 relevant paras as under :-

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“12. Similarly, the law is also well settled as to what could be said to be “desertion” in the divorce proceedings filed under Section 13 of the said Act. The expression “desertion” had come up under the judicial scrutiny of this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati [Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 15 : AIR 1957 SC 176] , which was again considered in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] . This Court collating the observations made in the earlier decisions, stated its view as under : (Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani case [Lachman Utamchand

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Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] , SCC OnLine SC para 40)

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“40. … Collating the aforesaid observations, the view of this Court may be stated thus : Heavy burden lies upon a petitioner who seeks divorce on the ground of desertion to prove four essential conditions, namely, (1) the factum of separation; (2) animus deserendi; (3) absence of his or her consent; and (4) absence of his or her conduct giving reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.”

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13. Recently, in Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky [Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 82] , the Court referring the decision in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] observed as under : (Debananda Tamuli case [Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 82] , SCC p. 462, paras 7-8)

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“7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand

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Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to subsection (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus:

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‘ 13.Divorce .—(1) * * *

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Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of

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such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.’

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8. The reasons for a dispute between husband and wife are always very complex. Every matrimonial dispute is different from another. Whether a case of desertion is established or not will depend on the peculiar facts of each case. It is a matter of drawing an inference based on the facts brought on record by way of evidence.”

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Legal Position on Cruelty and Desertion:

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While cruelty as defined under Section 13(1)(ia)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act requires proof beyond mere allegations, desertion is a recognized ground for divorce where a spouse voluntarily ceases cohabitation without reasonable cause for a continuous period of two years or more. In the present case, desertion by the appellant is clearly established.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rinku Baheti Vs. Sandesh Sharda reported in (2025) 3 SCC 686 the paragraph(s)

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relevant are as under :-

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“78. Earlier, a two-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Indu Malhotra, J. in Rajnesh v. Neha [Rajnesh v.

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Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 220 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 749] (“Rajnesh”), elaborated upon the broad criteria and the factors to be considered for determining the quantum of maintenance. This Court emphasises that there is no fixed formula for calculating maintenance amount; instead, it should be based on a balanced consideration of various factors. These factors include and are illustrative but are not limited or exhaustive, they are adumbrated as under:

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(i) Status of the parties, social and financial.

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(ii) Reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children.

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(iii) Qualifications and employment status of the parties.

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(iv) Independent income or assets owned by the parties.

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(v) Maintain standard of living as in the matrimonial home.

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(vi) Any employment sacrifices made for family responsibilities.

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(vii) Reasonable litigation costs for a non-working wife. (viii) Financial capacity of husband, his income, maintenance obligations, and liabilities.”

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So far as the Maintenance and Permanent Alimony part is concerned, the issue of maintenance, it is noted that the wife has been living separately since 2020, and nearly five years have elapsed, satisfying the conditions for divorce on grounds of desertion as per the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajnish v. Neha. Both parties have filed affidavits regarding their respective incomes in compliance with earlier orders and the legal principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment.

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It is observed from the records and affidavits filed by both parties that the husband has a regular and stable source of income, which enables him to maintain a reasonable standard of living. In contrast, the wife is currently not engaged in any gainful employment and has no independent means of income to support herself. Considering the disparity in their financial positions and the principle of ensuring the husband’s financial security postseparation, this court deems it just and equitable to grant permanent alimony to the wife. Accordingly, the husband is directed to pay a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh Only) as permanent alimony to the wife, thereby enabling her to sustain herself with dignity and meet her day-to-day living expenses.

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Considering the totality of evidence, this Court is of the opinion that the allegations of cruelty based on the abandonment of Hinduism and adoption of Christianity lack proof, but cruelty in the

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form of desertion is well-established. Accordingly, the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court on the ground of desertion is upheld. In light of the foregoing, the appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated, affirming the decree of divorce on grounds of desertion and awarding permanent alimony to the appellantwife.

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Sd/- (Rajani Du Judge	bey)	Sd/ (Amitendra Kis Jud	- hore Prasad) ge
The date when	The date when	The date when	the judgment is
the judgment is	the judgment is	uploaded on the w	ebsite.
reserved	pronounced
		Operative	Full
09/10/2025	12/11/2025	12-11-2025	14-11-2025

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Digitally ABHIGYA signed by SAXENA ABHIGYA SAXENA Saxena

Smt. Yogeshwari Gupta v. Vijay Kumar Gupta

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Smt. Yogeshwari Gupta v. Vijay Kumar Gupta

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